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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE 
By 
IKUHO KOCHI 
May 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Laura O. Taylor 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation addresses two important issues in the literature estimating the 
Value of a Statistical Life.  The first issue is the potential endogeneity bias in cross-
section hedonic wage models. The second issue is the transferability of the VSL between 
different policy contexts.  
To address the first issue, we estimate cross-section and panel hedonic wage 
models to identify the bias due to the time-invariant worker heterogeneity.  We also 
consider potential endogeneity bias due to measurement error associated with risk 
variable, time-variant worker heterogeneity and simultaneity between wage and risk in 
panel models.  We obtain labor market data from the 1996 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation panel, and occupational fatal risk data from Scotton (2000).  We 
find that the cross-section hedonic wage model is significantly biased upward due to 
unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity, but not from time-variant worker 
heterogeneity or simultaneity between wage and risk.   Our results are sensitive to the 
inclusion of industry variables, but not sensitive to the sample of workers used in 
estimation.  
xv 
 
 
 
 
xvi
To address the second issue, we examine whether or not workers and firms 
differentiate heterogeneous risks to determine the risk-wage compensation levels.  We 
focus on two very different fatal risks in terms of the degree of workers’ control over the 
risk and the degree of dread associated with risk: violent assaults and risks related to non-
violent events.  We use occupational drivers to mitigate potential unobserved 
heterogeneity of job characteristics and measurement error associated with risk variables.  
The labor market data comes from the basic CPS, and the occupation-geographic specific 
risk rates for each cause of death are created from the non-public Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries.  We find that occupational drivers require larger compensation to 
accept a marginal increase of violent risk as compared to non-violent risk.  This is true 
for both fatal and non-fatal risks.  Our results are quite robust. This study suggests that 
current direct use of VSL obtained from hedonic wage studies in benefit estimation of 
various governmental programs should be reconsidered. 
 
 
xvi 
 
 
 
 
1
 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) is an important component of benefit 
estimates for many governmental programs that intend to reduce premature deaths.  The 
VSL is a society’s aggregated willingness to pay to save one anonymous person’s life 
(Fisher, Chestnut, & Violette, 1989).  Due to the difficulties of estimating the value of 
life directly, the VSL is estimated based on individual behavior as related to risk-dollar 
tradeoffs.  For example, in a society of 100,000 people, if each individual is willing to 
pay $10 to reduce the risk of death from 2 in 100,000 to 1 in 100,000, then the VSL is 
calculated as $1 million ($10*100,000).  Thus the VSL is the value of reducing the 
probability that one anonymous person in a group dies.  It is important to understand that 
the VSL is not the value of saving a certain person’s life, but the value of saving an 
anonymous person’s life.  In policy applications, the benefit of a policy to reduce 
mortality is computed by multiplying the VSL by the reduction in deaths expected from 
the policy. 
There are several methods used to estimate the VSL, and one of them is the 
hedonic wage method.  The hedonic wage method uses labor market to analyze the 
individual’s risk taking behavior and estimate the worker’s marginal willingness to 
accept a marginal increase in risk.  The basic idea behind the hedonic wage model is that 
in a competitive market, the worker who faces a higher level of disamenity on the job, 
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such as fatal risk, must be compensated with higher wages than the worker who faces a 
lower level of disamenity on the job, or ceteris paribus. 
Empirically, the hedonic wage model regresses the worker’s occupational risk 
level as well as observed worker and job characteristics on wage.   The estimated 
coefficient for the risk variable represents the additional wage workers require to accept 
an additional unit of risk, the wage-risk premium.  This risk premium is then aggregated 
over the pool of workers at risk to estimate the value that workers collectively place on 
reducing the risk that one among them dies, which is equivalent to the VSL. 
The literature of hedonic wage model is extensively reviewed in Fisher et al. 
(1989), Viscusi (1992) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) as well as analyzed in Mrozek and 
Taylor (2002) and Kochi, Hubbell and Kramer (2006).  Beginning with early work in the 
mid-1970s (Smith, 1974, 1976; Thaler & Rosen, 1976), there have been nearly 50 
hedonic wage studies that estimate the VSL, with applications in many countries 
including the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and some Asian countries (Kochi et al., 
2006).1    
Most hedonic wage studies use cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) models 
to estimate the wage-risk premium.  The VSL estimates from studies using data in U.S. 
workers have a quite wide range from $0.1 million (Dilingham, 1985) to $43.3 million 
(Olson, 1981) in 2005 dollars (Kochi et al. 2006).  Mrozek and Taylor (2002) conduct a 
meta analysis of the VSL literature and conclude that the main source of variation in the 
past VSL estimates comes from differences in the quality of occupational risk data and 
                                                 
1 This is the number of hedonic wage studies published until 2002.  There are more recent studies published 
such as Black and Kniesner (2003), Viscusi (2004), and Kniesner et al. (2005). 
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samples of workers (blue collar or white collar workers or mix of both) and differences in 
the hedonic wage model specifications.   
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.EPA) and some other 
government agencies use hedonic wage studies as a primary source of information for 
their VSL estimates.  For example, according to the 2004 U.S.EPA White Paper 
regarding the use of VSL, the U.S.EPA used $4.8 million in 1990 dollars or $7.1 million 
in 2005 dollars as the VSL to assess their policy benefits (USEPA, 2004).   This value 
was first estimated for the 1997 retrospective analysis of the Clean Air Act and is the 
average of 21 estimates from previous hedonic wage studies and 5 estimates from 
previous contingent valuation studies.  All hedonic wage studies considered in 1997 
retrospective analysis employed the cross-section hedonic wage models.   
Recently, the U.S.EPA updated its VSL to $5.5 million in 1999 dollars (or $6.4 
million in 2005 dollars) to evaluate the benefit of reducing mortality by Inter-State Air 
Quality Rule.  This is the central estimate between the reported “best estimates” from two 
meta-analyses, Mrozek and Taylor (2002) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003), that analyze 
previous hedonic wage studies only (U.S.EPA 2004).   The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) also uses the lower and upper bound of the “best estimate” from these 
same two meta-analyses of hedonic wage studies to evaluate the policy benefits for 
preventing the premature mortality when an individual agency does not monetized this 
benefit(OMB, 2003).2 
                                                 
2 Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2004 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/draft_2004_cbreport.pdf . 
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The importance of the VSL for federal benefit cost analysis can be seen in The 
Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1970-1990 conducted by the U.S.EPA to report 
the periodic assessment of costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act to congress (U.S.EPA 
1997).  U.S.EPA (1997) reports that monetized benefit of the Clean Air Act during 1970-
1990 is $22 trillion with 5th and 95th percentile of $5.6 and $49.4 trillion, respectively (in 
1990 dollars).  The cost of the policy is estimated as $0.5 trillion (in 1990 dollars).  Over 
80% of the benefits come from preventing premature mortality.  The substantial 
uncertainty in the policy benefit estimation also comes from the large variance of the 
VSL estimate used where the mean VSL is 4.8 million with standard deviation of 3.2 
million (in 1990 dollars).3 
Given the strong link between the hedonic wage estimation and the policy 
evaluation, the quality of hedonic wage studies has been a major concern (U.S.EPA 
2004).  Although there have been significant improvements in hedonic wage literature, 
especially in the quality of fatal risk data, there are still many criticisms regarding the use 
of the hedonic wage model to evaluate certain government programs, such as 
environmental policy programs.   
One of the major concerns regarding the hedonic wage model in policy analysis is 
the potential bias in the estimators due to omitted variables. A number of studies have 
indicated that the omission of unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as risk 
preferences or the worker’s skill in protecting themselves in a dangerous work 
environment, are potentially important sources of bias in estimating the risk-wage 
premium (McConnell, 2006; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).  
                                                 
3 U.S.EPA apply Weibul distribution on the VSL estimates, so the range of VSL considered in the report is 
always positive. 
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There are several studies that addressed this problem.  One group of studies uses 
an instrumental variable approach to obtain unbiased risk estimators in cross-section 
hedonic wage models (Arabsheibani & Marin, 2001; Garen, 1988; Gunderson & Hyatt, 
2001; Siebert & Wei, 1994).  The other group of studies uses panel models to control for 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity (Black, Galdo, & Lin, 2003; Brown, 1980; 
Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, & Ziliak, 2005).  The instrumental variable studies generally 
report unstable and unreliable risk estimators due to the weak instruments problem.  The 
panel models show more robust results, but the estimators may be still significantly 
biased due to exacerbated measurement error bias and omitted time-variant 
heterogeneity.    
The first objective of this dissertation is to identify the potential magnitude and 
direction of bias in previous cross-sectional hedonic wage studies.  Unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity is controlled for by employing a first-difference model and a 
fixed-effect model on national panel data.   The issues of exacerbated attenuation bias in 
the first-difference and fixed-effect model due to measurement error of the risk variable, 
as well as the bias due to the time-variant omitted variables and simultaneity between 
wage and risk variable are also identified by employing the instrumental variable 
approach on the panel models.   
This dissertation is the first study to combine panel models and the instrumental 
variables approach to examine the comprehensive bias due to omitted variables in cross-
sectional hedonic wage models.  The results are used to evaluate past hedonic wage 
studies and potential biases that may have affected their wage-risk premium estimates.   
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Another concern regarding the use of hedonic wage estimators in policy analysis 
is the applicability of VSL estimates from labor market studies to policies with very 
different safety contexts, such as reducing the risk of death from pollution exposure 
(Hammitt, 2000; USEPA, 1997, 2004, 2005).  The hedonic wage model estimates the 
tradeoff between an occupational risk and wage.  Some psychology studies have found 
that individuals value the reduction of different types of risk differently (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980).  Individuals may have a very different perception about 
occupational risk and other types of risk, such as environmental risk, and may place 
different monetary value on each type of risk reduction.   
There are several stated preference studies examining the link between the risk 
characteristics and the individual’s willingness to pay (Cookson, 2000; McDaniels, 
Kamlet, & Fischer, 1992; Subramanian & Cropper, 2000).  However, there is little 
evidence regarding the nature of fatal risk/dollar tradeoff using revealed preference 
methods, such as hedonic wage models.  Since the stated preference methods may 
contain the hypothetical bias, or bias resulting from difficulties in the communicating 
risk, it is important to verify whether or not individuals exhibit different willingness to 
pay to reduce different types of risks with revealed preference approach, which observes 
individual’s actual behavior. 
The second objective of this dissertation is to evaluate if workers have different 
willingness to pay to reduce different types of risks (e.g. violent assaults vs. traffic-
related accidents) using a hedonic wage models.  We use a specialized sample of workers 
combined with location and occupation-specific risk rates to determine if workers 
command different wage-risk premia for different types of occupational fatality risks.  
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More specifically, we examine whether fatal risks from violent assault risks (i.e., 
homicide) are compensated differently than non-violent risks.   
A sample of occupational drivers is used, which includes truck, taxi, sales and bus 
drivers.  These occupations are focused on for two reasons.  First, these occupations face 
either high violent assault or high non-violent assault (or both) risks routinely as part of 
their job which may mitigate the measurement error due to the disparity between 
perceived risk and objective risk level.  Second, these workers have very similar non-risk 
job characteristics which could help to mitigate bias due to unobserved job heterogeneity 
between occupations.   Importantly, a location-specific fatal risk rate for two types of 
risks for each occupation is created.  This allows risk to vary across Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) or state   
This is one of a few studies that use hedonic wage studies to address the 
heterogeneity of risk and its effect on individual’s willingness to pay to reduce a marginal 
amount of risk.   Also, this is the first study that use location-occupation specific fatal risk 
rate.  This study evaluate if the previous finding from the stated preference methods can 
be verified by the revealed preference method.  Although the focus of this study is to 
estimate the different willingness to pay to reduce different types of occupational risks, 
the results of this study still can provide useful information whether or not the VSL used 
in the evaluation of policy which is different from occupational safety needs to be 
adjusted accordingly. 
 The remaining chapters are organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the theory of 
the hedonic wage model and important assumptions.  The maintained hypothesis that we 
examine in this dissertation are also discussed.  Chapter 3 presents data used in each 
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estimation in later chapters.  Two sets of worker data are used in this dissertation.  In 
chapter 4, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a national panel data, is used 
to conduct the panel data analysis.  In chapter 5, a large-scale cross-section demographic 
data for occupational drivers is constructed from the Current Population Survey and is 
used to analyze the heterogeneity of risk preferences among workers.   
 We also use different risk data for each analysis.  In chapter 4, we use an 
occupation-industry fatal risk matrix created by Scotton (2000).   This risk data is varied 
by occupation and industry, which enables us to identify the risk change among workers 
who change jobs between or within industry and occupation.  In chapter 5, we create an 
original occupation/location specific risk rate from the Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries by Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Chapter 4 presents the literature review and the analytical results of our panel data 
analysis of the hedonic wage model.  We review past efforts to control unobserved 
heterogeneity in hedonic wage models.  Then we describe the panel methods we employ, 
and present the results and conclusions.  Chapter 5 presents the literature review and 
analytical results of our second objective of this study.  We review previous stated 
preference studies to estimate different willingness to pay to reduce different types of 
risks, and discuss their potential problems.  We also review the previous hedonic wage 
study which we improve upon.  We present the estimating hedonic wage models and the 
robustness of our estimation.  Lastly, we present our conclusions.  Chapter 6 discusses 
the findings in the main analyses, and its contribution to the VSL and hedonic wage 
literature.  We also discuss the policy implications of our results and future research.   
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Chapter II  
Theory of Compensating Wage Differentials 
  
This chapter reviews the theory of compensating wage differentials (hedonic 
wage theory) as related to measuring the value of reducing mortality risks.  The theory of 
hedonic wages is largely based on the theory of hedonic pricing developed by Rosen 
(1974).  Rosen analyzes the price determining process of attributes of goods in the 
implicit market.  Jones-Lee (1974) also analyzes the workers risk-wage taking behavior 
using the state dependent expected utility theory.  In general, both theories from Rosen 
and Jones-Lee are combined to describe the underlying theory of hedonic wage.4 
In a hedonic wage equilibrium, there is assumed to exist a hedonic wage schedule, 
v, which relates all relevant job characteristics to wages.  The job characteristics of 
interest here is risk, r.  Thus the hedonic wage functions is written, v(r,z), where z 
subsumes all job characteristics other than risk. This hedonic wage schedule is an 
envelope function arising from all worker’s utility maximization and all firm’s profit 
maximization process.  For each individual worker or individual firm, the market hedonic 
wage schedule is given.  Workers maximize their utilities and firms maximize their 
profits subject to a given hedonic wage schedule.   
In the following sections, we base on Jones-Lee (1974), Rosen (1974) and 
McConnell (2006) for the description of hedonic wage theory.  As mentioned earlier, 
Jones-Lee developed the basic theory of worker’s expected utility maximization between 
the states of survival and death, and Rosen developed the general theory of hedonic 
                                                 
4 See also reviews of hedonic wage theory in McConnell (2006) and Scotton (2000). 
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pricing models.  McConnell (2006) provides the overview of hedonic wage models 
incorporating more recent findings from hedonic wage literature. 
After describing the basic hedonic wage theory, we discuss important underlying 
assumptions in the hedonic wage model.  We discuss the assumption of homogeneity 
among workers or firms and the homogeneity of fatal risk.  There are two aspects of the 
hedonic wage literature as related to estimating the VSL that we wish to extend in this 
dissertation. 
Preferences over Risks and Wages: the Worker 
In this section, we review the workers risk-wage taking behavior using the state 
dependent expected utility theory developed by Jones-Lee (1974).  Given that workers 
face the uncertain outcomes of death and survival at work, we assume that the individual 
worker maximizes expected utility between utility in the death state and utility in the 
survival state.  First, we define state-dependent utility over these two states.  Let 
)(WU S be utility in the survival state, which depends on the level of wealth (wage).  We 
assume that utility is increasing at a decreasing rate as wealth increases, which denotes 
 0')( >=∂
∂
L
L U
W
WU          (1) 
and  
0'')(2
2
<=∂
∂
L
L U
W
WU .        (2) 
We also define )(WU D as the utility in the death state.  We assume that utility in 
the death state is also a function of wealth (wage), since individual may obtain a certain 
utility by bequesting the wealth to heirs.  If this is not the case, then the utility in death 
state is zero.  Thus, we define  
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WU          (3) 
and  
0'')(2
2
≤=∂
∂
D
D U
W
WU .         (4) 
We also assume that for a same level of wealth, workers obtain higher utility in 
the state of survival than in the state of death, thus   
US  > UD.         (5) 
Workers choose a job with a probability of death, r, to maximize their expected 
utility.  Suppose workers initial wealth is W (>0), and the initial level of fatal risk is r  
(0< r <1).  Consequently their expected utility is: 
)()()1(0 WUrWUrEU DS +−=       (6) 
Now, suppose workers fatal risk level is increased to r (0< r  < r <1).  To sustain 
the original level of utility, workers need to be compensated by additional wages.  Let the 
compensation level that leaves workers in the same expected utility level be V.  We call V 
the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for an increment change of risk.  We 
assume that V is a function of the risk preference parameter, α.  By definition, the 
following equality holds: 
))(())(()1()()()1( αα VWrUVWUrWUrWUr DSDS +++−=+−    
           (7) 
The left hand side is a fixed level of expected utility, say EU0.  By rearranging (7), 
we obtain the function for V at the fixed level of expected utility, EU0, which is 
),,,( 0EUWrVV α=         
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Substituting back this V function to (7), and by total differentiating with respect to 
r, the marginal willingness to accept compensation for a marginal change in risk, rV ∂∂ , 
is given by:  
'')1(
)()(
DS
DS
rUUr
VWUVWU
r
V
+−
+−+=∂
∂        (8) 
where VVWUU ss ∂+∂= )(' and VVWUU DD ∂+∂= )(' .  From (1), (3), (5), the 
equation (8) is positive.  The second derivative of (8) is also positive, indicating that the 
workers WTA curves are positively sloped and convex.    
Figure 1 shows the mapping of two individuals’ WTA curves.  To simplify the 
argument, we assume that individuals are equally productive.  The wage level is 
determined by the worker’s productivity as discussed detail in the next section.  The 
variation of identically productive workers wage may arise when workers choose 
different risk levels.     
Figure 1 maps two WTA functions, where V1 is the WTA locus for worker 1 and 
V2 is the WTA locus for worker 2.  Along each WTA locus, the utility level is constant.  
The workers WTA is a function of risk level, r, worker’s risk preference parameter, α, 
and wealth level, W.  Since the WTA function is convex, the movement towards north-
west direction increases their utility level. In figure 1, worker 1 has a higher utility level 
in V1' than V1.  In addition, worker 1 is more risk averse than worker 2, thus the V1 curve 
is steeper than V2 curve.  The steeper V curve indicates that the worker 1 requires more 
wage compensation to accept a marginal increase in risk than worker 2 when they face a 
same risk level.  The workers’ different marginal rates of substitution between risk and 
compensation force workers to find different optimal levels of risk-wage compensation 
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when they face a same market constraint.  Workers maximize their utility level where V 
curves and hedonic wage schedule are tangent to each other.  
Firm’s Production and Risk 
A firm’s profit function can be complicated depending on which cost factors we 
include (McConnell, 2006).  Here we assume a simple profit function that is:   
LrcwLLz );()( µϕπ −−= ,5       (9) 
where φ is the price of output, z(L) is the production function as defined over labor 
inputs, w is the wage rate, c is the cost of providing a certain level of safety per worker 
and µ is the efficiency parameter of providing a certain safety level.  For simplicity, we 
assume there is no factor other than labor to produce output.  Firms maximize their 
profits subject to the hedonic wage schedule (thus w=w(p;z)) by choosing the number of 
workers hired and the level of safety provided.   
The profit maximizing conditions respect to L and r are:  
 ϕ
cw
L
z +=∂
∂                  (10)
 
r
c
r
w
∂
∂−=∂
∂ .                 (11) 
Equation (10) shows that in order to maximize profits, the firm should choose 
labor inputs such that the marginal productivity of labor (left hand side) should equal to 
the wage rate plus the cost to provide safety per worker (right hand side) assuming the 
price of output equal to one.  Equation (11) shows that the firm’s marginal implicit price 
                                                 
5 This is a slightly modified profit function presented in McConnell (2006), which assumes that firms do 
not pay death benefit and compensation for the event of injury, and available instant replacement of an 
identical worker when the worker die.  See McConnell for the discussion with more comprehensive profit 
function. 
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of risk represented by the hedonic wage schedule (left hand side) should be equal to the 
marginal cost-saving from a marginal increase of risk level (right hand side). 
 By rearranging firm’s profit function (9), we obtain the firm’s wage offer curve 
(OC); 
LLrcLzLrwOC /]);()([),,,( πµϕπµ −−== .    (12) 
This offer curve shows the firm’s trade-off between providing safety and wage 
compensation for a given profit level (thus this is an isoprofit curve).  The slope of OC 
curve is given by rcrOC ∂∂−=∂∂ .  Assuming the cost of providing additional unit of 
safety is decreasing at a decreasing rate as risk increases, 6 OC is a positively sloped 
concave function from below.  At the maximum profit level given hedonic wage 
function, the conditions (10) and (11) hold.   
 Figure 1 illustrates the OC for two types of firms.  To simplify the argument we 
assume all firms offer identical job characteristics except fatal risk level. The only 
difference comes from the different efficiency of providing the safety at work.  Firm 1 
has an offer curve 1 (OC1) and Firm 2 has an offer curve 2 (OC2).  Firms’ profits are 
higher on offer curves that are in the south-eastern direction.  For example, firm 1’s profit 
level is higher in OC1' than OC1 since at every risk level, firm 1 pays less wage for 
workers in OC1' than OC1.   Firm 1 has a flatter offer curve than firm 2, indicating firm 1 
has a higher efficiency of providing an additional safety than firm 2.  Firms maximize 
their profit where their offer curves are tangent to the hedonic wage schedule.  The 
different shapes of offer curves force firms to find different optimal levels of providing 
                                                 
6The cost incurred by reducing a marginal risk at high risk levels are lower than the cost incurred by 
reducing a marginal risk at a low risk level. 
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safety and compensation given the market equilibrium wage/risk constraint. Firm 1 
provides higher safety level than firm 2, given the hedonic wage schedule. 
Figure 1 also shows how the hedonic wage schedule emerges when there are 
heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms.  As described more detail in  
McConnell (2006), the hedonic wage schedule is generated by the joint distribution of 
workers’ risk preference (α) and firms’ efficiency to provide safety (µ) holding other job 
and worker characteristics constant.  Worker 1, who is more risk averse than worker 2, 
will be hired by firm 1 for whom providing safety is relatively inexpensive at a risk of r1 
an wage of wage1.  Worker 2, who is less risk averse than worker 1, will be hired by firm 
2 for whom providing safety is relatively costly.  The hedonic wage schedule is an 
envelope function which traces out the each worker/firm labor contracts, where the 
workers’ marginal willing to pay for a marginal decrease in risk level is equal to the 
firms’ marginal cost of providing a marginal decrease in the risk level.    
As noted in Rosen (1974) and further explained by McConnell (2006), the 
hedonic schedule is solely determined by the distribution of firms’ offer curves in the 
long run.  In the long run, due to the entries into the market, firms’ profits are fixed at 
zero.   Provided that in a large economy there is a continuum of workers’ preferences 
over risks and wages, the distribution of firms’ profit functions (or envelope profit 
schedule) reflects the hedonic wage schedule.  This is important because as seen later, it 
relaxes the information requirements to recover the marginal willingness to accept by 
workers to take more risky jobs.  This envelope profit schedule will shift in two cases 
(McConnell, 2006).  One case is when technology innovation alters firms’ cost functions 
to supply safety.  The other case is when the distribution of risk preference of workers 
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changes.  Redistribution of risk preference affects the distribution of isoprofit functions 
through changes in the wage level and the profit levels of firms.   
Underlying Assumptions 
The major underlying assumptions of the hedonic wage model are that the labor 
market is competitive, highly mobile, and the workers and firms have perfect information 
regarding the occupational risk level (McConnell, 2006).  However, the perfect 
information assumption may be relaxed in the long run.  It may not be reasonable to 
assume that the workers have perfect information about the occupational risk level of a 
particular job they are about to take.  Workers would have a certain level of perceived 
fatal risk level of that job, and use this perceived risk level to determine their optimal 
wage/risk compensation.  This perceived fatal risk levels may or may not be the same as 
actual risk levels.   
Researchers do not observe the workers’ perceived risk levels, and thus use the 
objective level of risk on the job, which is estimated from occupational fatal statistics.  If 
the labor market is in a long-run equilibrium, the use of objective risk levels would result 
in unbiased estimates of wage/risk tradeoffs if firms perceive risks accurately.  In the 
long run, there is an entry in the market and the firms profit level is fixed at zero.  This 
constraint results in the hedonic wage schedule being the envelope of firms’ isoprofit 
functions, regardless of the perceived risk level by workers.  Thus researchers observe 
risk-wage pairs that are on the hedonic wage function and are able to recover an unbiased 
hedonic wage function.  
In the short run, however, there is no entry into the market and firms can enjoy 
positive profits.  In this case, the hedonic wage schedule is influenced by both workers 
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and firms.  When all workers underestimate the fatal risk level, the estimated hedonic 
wage functions is also underestimated.  This is illustrated in figure 2.  Suppose there is 
“actual” hedonic wage function which is determined by the “actual” risk level.   Worker 1 
has an V1 and he perceives the risk level of the job at riskperceived  and demands wage 
compensation at wage0.  However, suppose that the actual risk level for this job is 
riskactual where riskperceived< riskactual.  Assume that a firm knows the actual risk level, and 
is willing to pay up to wage1 as compensation.  At the end of wage negotiation, the wage 
level will likely be determined between wage1 and wage0 levels.  Since we only observe 
the actual risk level, we match the wage level (likely) less than wage1 and riskactual as 
opposed to wage1 and riskactual to estimate the hedonic wage function.  This causes an 
underestimation of the actual hedonic wage schedule.  Similarly, if all workers 
overestimate the risk level, we are likely overestimating the hedonic wage function.  If 
there are mix of workers who underestimate or overestimate risk level, the bias in the 
hedonic wage estimation depends on the distribution of worker’s mis-perception of risk 
levels.  
Another important assumption of the hedonic wage model is homogeneity among 
workers in their productivity and job characteristics.   The hedonic wage schedule is 
determined by the characteristics of job and the characteristics of workers (McConnell, 
2006).  As stated in the basic theory of hedonic wage section, we assume identical 
workers in terms of their productivity.  The only difference among workers is the 
difference in their risk preference.  The same is true for firms. We assume firms are 
identical except their efficiency in providing safety.   
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When there are heterogeneous groups of workers or firms, then each group would 
have different hedonic wage schedules.  For example, assume that college graduates and 
high school graduates have an identical distribution over risk preference parameter.  
Generally college graduates are more productive than high school graduates because of 
their higher human capital.  Even though the marginal cost to provide safety is same for 
both groups at every risk level, firms would pay college graduates who have higher 
marginal productivity more than high school graduates.  Thus college graduates and high 
school graduates have different hedonic wage schedules as illustrated in figure 3.   This is 
a particularly important point in estimating hedonic wage model empirically.  Failing to 
take into account differing productivities of workers (i.e., the slope of the hedonic wage 
schedule between different groups of workers) may cause biased estimates of the HW 
schedule and could even cause negative slope estimates in the hedonic wage function 
(McConnell, 2006). 
In terms of job characteristics, homogeneity in terms of firms benefit package 
would be particularly important to control for in estimating a HW function (McConnell, 
2006).  If one group of firms offer full employer provided health insurance plan and 
another group of firms offer no health insurance plan, then their wage schedules should 
be different.  The former group of firms can attract workers with fewer wages than latter 
group of firms. 
We also generally assume that worker’s risk preference does not change for 
heterogeneous risks.  Even for fatal risk, there can be heterogeneity among risks 
depending on the circumstances of death.  As discussed in detail in chapter 5, previous 
studies indicate that individuals may have different risk preferences towards different 
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types of risks.   The different risk preferences seem to depend on the different qualitative 
characteristics of risk such as level of controllability or dread involved.  If workers 
consider different types of risks as separate job characteristics, or marginal cost of 
reducing different types of risk are differed, then there exists separate hedonic wage 
schedules for different types of risks.   
Extensions Examined in This Dissertation 
In implementing the theory and estimating hedonic wage functions, a number of 
key assumptions are invoked.  Chapter 4 examines the implication of failing to take into 
account all heterogeneity among workers and firms in the empirical analysis.   As 
reviewed by McConnell (2006), it is common to control for the heterogeneous levels of 
productivity (actual or perceived) among workers resulting from market segmentation 
based on factors such as race, gender, and education level in the empirical analysis.  
However, it is less common to take into account the heterogeneity among jobs.  In 
addition, there may be more heterogeneous levels of productivity among workers 
originated from workers characteristics which are unobservable to researcher.   
Chapter 4 examines the effect of the unobserved heterogeneity among workers on 
estimating hedonic wage model.  As discussed in chapter 4, we employ panel models that 
control for all time invariant worker characteristics.  We also explore the effect of 
unobserved time-variant worker characteristics and the effect of workers’ potential mis-
perceptions about the risk levels they face on the job.  While we focus on unobserved 
worker heterogeneity, we also attempt to improve on earlier studies, with regards to firm 
heterogeneity.  We include several important job characteristics in our estimation model, 
such as employer provided health insurance availability and firm size.  The firm size may 
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represent the overall amenity of firms.  Unfortunately, a lack of data on firms precludes a 
more sophisticated analysis. 
 The second assumption underlying most hedonic wage estimates is that all risks 
may be aggregated into a single event; death, even though the circumstance of each death 
can be very different. The distribution of workers’ risk preferences and firms’ efficiency 
to supply safety may be significantly different among different circumstances of fatal 
accidents as discussed earlier.  If this is the case, there may be separate HW functions for 
each type of risk, and estimating a HW function with an aggregated measure of risk may 
significantly bias the estimation.  This hypothesis is formerly examined in Scotton and 
Taylor (2006).  As presented by Scotton and Taylor (2006), when there are 
heterogeneous risks, the workers expected utility (6) becomes: 
∑−
=
+=
1
1
)()(
N
i
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where rN is the probability of survival (rN >0), ri is the probability of death by the fatal 
event i (ri >0), 1
1
1
=+∑−
=
N
i
iN rr , Us is the utility level in the survival state, and UDi is the 
utility in the death state resulted in the fatal event i.  The fatal event, i, may be car 
accident, exposure to toxic materials, homicide and so on.   Since UDi is a separate utility 
function for each event of death, the compensation required to accept a marginal increase 
of each type of fatal risk may differ significantly.  In chapter 5, we improve the study 
design upon Scotton and Taylor (2006) and estimate separate hedonic wage functions for 
different types of risks to examine the second assumption of homogeneity among fatal 
risk.   
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The data considerations for each of the above extensions, as well as a review of 
the relevant literature and the testable hypotheses we develop, are presented in detail in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5.  In the next chapter, the data available to explore our extensions to 
previous work estimating hedonic wage functions are presented. 
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Figure 1.  HW equilibrium schedule for heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. 
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Figure 2.  HW equilibrium schedule with workers who underestimate risk levels. 
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Figure 3.  HW equilibrium schedules for workers with different productivity. 
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Chapter III 
Data  
 
This section describes the data used in this dissertation.  The key data needed to 
estimate a hedonic wage (HW) model are occupational fatal risk and labor force data.  
Due to their different focus, chapter 4 and chapter 5 will rely on different data sets to 
estimate hedonic wage models.   
Chapter 4 focuses on controlling for worker heterogeneity in a hedonic wage 
model through panel data methods.  For this purpose, the demographic information must 
come from longitudinal data.  The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is 
used to construct this longitudinal data.  It is also critical to identify the changes in risk 
level when workers change their jobs.  An industry based risk level, which has been most 
commonly used in hedonic wage literature, is not a good candidate for this purpose since 
it does not capture the changes in risk if workers change occupations within the same 
industry group.   The risk data should at least vary by occupation and industry.   
Occupational fatal risk data created by Scotton (2000), which varies by reasonably 
disaggregated occupational and industry codes is used. 
Chapter 5 focuses on identifying potential heterogeneity in risk-wage premia for 
different types of risk.  To accomplish this, a sample of occupational drivers is used.  
These workers are chosen to control heterogeneous aspects of job requirements as well as 
mitigate measurement error associated with the risk variable.  In a cross section study 
such as that employed in chapter 5, it is difficult to control for unobserved non-risk 
aspects of jobs, such as working conditions and job requirements, even though these 
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could be important factors to determine the wage, as well as the risk level.  Using a 
sample of occupations which requires similar working conditions and job skills may 
enable us to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem associated with omitted variables 
in HW models.   In addition, there is likely a disparity between the objective risk measure 
and the subjective risk measure, which can be another source of endogeneity problems in 
the HW model.  Benjamin (2001) observed that the individuals who are facing the high 
objective risk often understand their objective risk level correctly.  Driving is one of the 
riskiest jobs in the United States.   For example, in 2003, 861 sales workers and truck 
drivers died at work.  This is the highest level of death among all occupation groups.7    
The fatality rate of these drivers is 2.67 per 10,000 workers, which is the fourth highest 
risk rate among all occupations.8 
The demographic information for this sample comes from the basic monthly 
Current Population Survey collected by the BLS.  We divide risks into two types for this 
analysis: violent assault risks and all other risks, which mostly relate to traffic accidents.  
These risks for occupational drivers largely vary by geographic area (Knestaut, 1997).  
Thus the risk data varies by occupation and geographic area.   This occupational fatal risk 
data is created from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) 1992-2002,9 and 
the Occupational Employment Statistics 1998-2003, both collected by the BLS.  In 
addition, various geographic specific wage determinants, such as the unemployment rate, 
                                                 
7 Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 2003 data retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0002.pdf 
8 Ranking of high risk occupation is (from the highest to lowest): logging, aircraft pilots and farmers and 
ranchers.  
9 This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.  The views 
expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS. 
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local industry composition, population, local total vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are 
collected.       
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  First, the demographic data 
and risk data used for chapter 4 are discussed separately.  Then, demographic data are 
merged with the risk data and risks for the sample of workers used in chapter 5 are 
presented.  Data for chapter 5 are then discussed, following the same format as the 
discussion for the data used in chapter 4. 
Data for Panel Study (Chapter 4) 
Labor force data: the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
Data for individual hourly wage, job and socio-economic characteristics come 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).10  The SIPP is national 
panel data administered by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The SIPP contains rich information 
about individual income, labor force status, and general demographic characteristics of 
U.S. population.  People are interviewed by phone or in person every four months.   Each 
four months reference period is called a wave. 11  Only one observation from each wave is 
used.     
The 1996 SIPP data is used in this analysis.12    The 1996 SIPP panel lasts for four 
years and contains twelve waves.  The total sample sizes in the beginning of the 1996 
panel are approximately 115,700 individuals. 13    
                                                 
10 Detailed data description and data download is available at http://www.bls.census.gov/sipp/ (retrieved 
March 25, 2007) 
11 Some questionnaires ask people to record information for every month since the last interview.  In this 
case, only the fourth observation is used for the analysis. 
12 The SIPP is available for 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996 and 2001 panels.  Samples in each panel 
are independent from each other.  Since the risk data is available only from 1992 as discussed later, the 
1990 and 1991 panel are removed from the analysis.   The 2001 panel is also removed because the risk data 
is available only until 1997 and there is no overlap in the time period between the 2001 SIPP panel and the 
risk data.  The 1993 SIPP panel does not include many eligible workers who has two or more observations, 
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The main advantage of using the SIPP data as compared to other labor force data 
such as the CPS and the PSID is its structure as panel data and the richness of the 
information it contains.  The SIPP is a medium length time series data with large sample 
size.  The CPS is a relatively short length time series data with limited wage 
observations.  In the CPS, for each individual, there are only two observations obtainable 
for the current wage level, while there are nine to twelve observations on current wage 
levels in the SIPP.  The PSID is the long length time series data (since 1968), but with 
relatively small sample size (about 6,000-8,000 households).   
As compared to the CPS and the PSID, the SIPP also provides more information 
on employer characteristics, as well as current earned and unearned income.    The SIPP 
collects important employer characteristics such as the availability of employer-provided 
health insurance and the size of firms.  According to the SIPP User Guide,14 the SIPP 
collects 70 cash and in-kind source income data for the current year, 15 while the CPS 
collects only 35 and the PSID collects only 25 cash and in-kind source income for the 
prior calendar year.   
The major wage determinants commonly used in the hedonic wage literature are 
available in the SIPP.  These include age, educational attainment, gender, race, marital 
                                                                                                                                                 
and thus is also removed from analysis.   The data from the 1992 panel is not used in this analysis due to a 
concern about the data quality. 
13 The sample size of SIPP is increased in 1996 panel dramatically as a part of SIPP reform.  This reform is 
called 1996 redesign.  Main aspects of reform include: lager sample size, longer panel, introduction of 
computer-assisted interviewing system, which automatically check the consistency of reported data during 
the interview, and oversampling the low-income household (http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/evol.html, 
retrieved March 25, 2007). 
14 Available via http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/usrguide/sipp2001.pdf (retrieved March 25, 2007). 
15 Cash and in-kind source income include: wage, earnings from various financial and real estate 
investments, and payment relating to the workers compensation, such as temporal sickness benefits, 
pensions and government welfare programs. 
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status, number of children under 18 in the household,16 union status, and the occupation 
and industry group of the firm for which workers work.   The worker’s current wage is 
available on either an hourly or monthly basis.  The hourly wage data is preferred since 
there are more missing observations in the monthly wage data.  Also collected are 
residential location (urban vs. rural), region, availability of employer provided health 
insurance, size of firms, and whether or not the person works over-time as potentially 
important wage determinants.   
Table 1 shows the definition of variables extracted from the 1996 SIPP panel and 
the summary statistics for the sample of workers.   The sample is full time workers17 who 
hold only one job at a time.  The workers who are earning less than minimum wage,18 or 
whose age are less than 18 or more than 65 are omitted from the analysis.   There are total 
of 166,362 observations for 34,846 workers.  The minimum, average and maximum 
number of observations per worker is 1, 4.8 and 12, respectively.   The average hourly 
wage is $13.27, which is lower than the average hourly earning in the U.S. labor market 
that is $16 in 2005.19  The average age of workers is 38 years old, and 41% of the sample 
graduated from high school, 33% of the sample has attended college, and 9 % of the 
sample has a bachelors or higher degree. The current national trend is that approximately 
30% of the workforce having graduated from high school, 30% have attended a college 
but have no degree, and 30% hold a bachelor’s degree or more.20 Compared to the current 
                                                 
16 Inclusion of the number of children in a HW equation is rather rare, but is seen in Lenoie et al. (1995), 
Herzog and Schlottman (1990), Siebert and Wei (1994) and Sandy and Elliot (1996). 
17 Full time workers are defined as workers who work more than 35 hours per week. 
18 The minimum wage level for the service workers ($2.13 per hour) is used as a cut off wage level.  
19 October 2005 Employment Situation Summary retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.  All monetary values are adjusted to 2005 dollars using 
the consumer price index. 
20  The educational attainment level of labor force over time retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2005/chart2-1.pdf. 
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national trend of educational attainment in the U.S. labor force, our sample under-
represents the labor force with bachelor’s degree or more, and over-represents the labor 
force with less than high school diploma.21     
About 45% of the sample is female and 56% of the sample is married.  The 
majority of workers are white, 13% of workers are Hispanic and another 13% of workers 
are African American, which correctly reflects the recent racial composition of the labor 
force in the US.22   About 19% of workers are union members or covered by union 
benefits, which is slightly higher than the current average union membership rate in the 
U.S. of 12.5%.23  The average number of children for workers in the sample whose age is 
less than 18 is 0.79, which is less than the national average of 0.9.24  More than 60% of 
workers receive part or full health insurance through their employers.  Seventy-eight 
percent of workers lived in urban areas. There is a slightly larger proportion of workers in 
the South, and a smaller proportion of workers from the Northeastern region.   Fifty-six 
percent of workers work in the firms with more than 100 employees in all location, and 
29% of workers work in the firms with less than 25 employees in the worker’s location.   
The share of workers who work in each major occupation and industry group is 
following. 25   Only five percent of workers have a farming related occupation.   Twenty-
eight percent of workers have a technical occupation, 26% of workers have a labor 
                                                 
21 This difference may come from the oversampling of low-income household in SIPP.  
22 Selected labor force characteristics of Hispanics or Latinos retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2005/chart4-2.pdf.  According to this, the Hispanic makes up 13% of labor 
force in 2005. 
23 Union members summary: Union members in 2006 retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
24 This is the average number of children under 18 per household.  Average number of children per family 
and per family with children, 2000 Census retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabST-F1-2000.pdf. 
25 Major industry and occupation classification follows Scotton (2000), and is reproduced in appendix B 
and C, respectively.   
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occupation, 14% of workers have a service occupation, 16% of workers have a craftsman 
occupation, and 11% of worker has a professional occupation.  There are few workers 
engaging in the agricultural, construction, transportation/ communications/utility and 
public industry. These workers makes-up only 15% of total sample.  In contrast, a high 
proportion of workers engage in the trade, service and manufacturing industries.  Thirty 
one percent of workers engage in the service industry, 19% of workers engage in the 
wholesale or retail trade industry, and 25% of workers engage in the manufacturing 
industry.  
In the 1996 SIPP sample, there are total 16,001 workers who change their 
occupation or industry at the 3-digit level classification group between waves.  This is 
approximately 9% of total observations in the sample.  Among these job changers, 5,849 
workers change the occupation within the same 3-digit level industry group, 1,587 
workers change the industry but stay in the same 3-digit level occupation group, and 
8,565 workers change both the occupation and the industry group.  Although there may 
be significant number of workers who change their jobs within a same occupation and 
industry, the exact number who does so is difficult to identify.  The SIPP provides 
information on whether or not a worker changes jobs between consecutive waves.  
However, many individuals in our sample do not have observations in consecutive waves 
because an observation(s) from a previous or following wave is dropped due to missing 
data, or because they are ineligible to be included.26   Thus without a balanced panel from 
                                                 
26 For instance, say a worker was employed full time in one job in wave 1.  In wave 2, the worker takes a 
second part-time job and keeps this for two waves. This worker would not be included in wave 2 or 3 
because sample is limited to those working one fulltime jobs.  If in wave 4, we observe the worker in new 
job (as compared t wave 1) and working one fulltime job again, they would re-enter our sample. 
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consecutive waves, the exact number of workers who change their jobs within the same 
occupation and industry is uncertain. 
Table 2 shows the summary of job changing behavior between major occupation 
groups among the 1996 SIPP sample.   The first row shows the major occupation groups 
workers belong to at t where t=2, 3,…12.  The first column shows the major occupation 
groups workers belong to at t-1.  For example, the second column-third row cell 
represents the number of workers who change job from a craftsman occupation to a 
professional occupation.   About 5-10% of workers in each occupation group change jobs 
to different major occupation groups.  Although workers move between all major 
occupation groups, there are tendencies for workers in certain occupations to change jobs 
to certain other occupations.  For example, relatively high proportion of workers who are 
in a professional occupation switch to a technical occupation, and the workers who are in 
a technical occupation tend to switch to a professional, labor or service occupation.  In 
general, there is a balanced in-flow and out-flow in each occupational group during the 
panel. 
Table 3 shows the summary of job changing behavior between major industry 
groups among the 1996 SIPP sample.   There are 3-12% of workers in each industry 
group who switch their jobs to a different industry group.  The workers who are in the 
public industry has the lowest rate to switch jobs to a different industry (3.05%), and the 
workers in the construction industry has the highest rate to switch jobs to a different 
industry (12.14%).  There are also tendencies of workers job changing pattern between 
major industry groups.  The workers in a construction industry tend to switch jobs to an 
agriculture, service or manufacturing industry.  Workers in a wholesales trade, service or 
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manufacturing industry tend to switch jobs among these industries.  The workers in a 
transportation/communication/utility industry tend to switch to a service or wholesales 
trade industry.  The workers in a public industry tend to switch to a service industry.  
Changes in key demographic characteristics of workers (regardless of whether 
they change jobs) are as follows.  There are 1,503 times that someone changes marital 
status from single to married and 805 times that someone changes from married to 
single.27  These make-up about 0.9% and 0.4% of total observations, respectively.  There 
are 2,358 observations that become new parents during the panel, and there are 3,341 
observations whose underage kids become older than 18, or deceased during the panel.  
There are 3,660 observations that have a union membership at t-1, and lose that 
membership at t, after they change jobs.  There are 3,553 observations who newly acquire 
union membership due to a job change.  
Occupational fatal risk data. 
Scotton (2000) creates 506 risk rates based on a 22 occupation × 23 industry fatal 
risk-rate matrix.  To avoid measurement error due to yearly fluctuations of death 
incidences, Scotton computes a six year average risk rate between 1992 and 1997.  The 
risk rate in each occupation-industry cell is calculated by the following formula: 
oi
oi
oi W
D
p =          (14) 
where poi is the fatal risk rate in occupation o and industry i, Doi is the annual average 
number of death incidents in occupation o in industry j, and Woi is the annual average 
total number of workers in occupation o in industry i.   
                                                 
27 An individual may changes marital status more than one time.  Thus the number of changes may be 
greater than the number of individuals who change marital status. 
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The numerator in equation 14, Doi, is obtained from the CFOI files for the period 
1992-1997, which contains more than 37,000 deaths.  CFOI for this period uses 3-digit 
occupation code from the Census Occupation Classification System 1990, and 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 1987 code to classify the occupation and 
industry, respectively (Scotton 2000).   There are 473 occupation and 1,183 industry 
categories included in 1992-1997 CFOI.  The list of all variables available in the CFOI 
files is reproduced in Appendix A.  The CFOI contains various characteristics of 
deceased workers, such as gender, age, race, location of accident, size of firm, event of 
accident, occupation, industry, and time of accident.     
Scotton regroups occupation and industry codes in the CFOI into an original 
matrix of 22 occupation and 23 industry codes.  She obtains the annual average deaths in 
each occupation industry pair between 1992 and 1997.  In the equation 14, Woi is 
obtained from taking annual averages of employment levels in the industry and 
occupation pairs from the Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix (OEM) 1991-1996 
administered by the BLS.   Scotton’s 22 occupation and 23 industry classification is 
reproduced in Appendix D and E.  Appendix D shows the occupation group mapping.  
The first column shows Scotton’s 22 occupation group, the second column is the title of 
the occupational group and the third column is the census’ 3-digit occupation categories 
which are included in each occupation group created by Scotton.   Appendix E shows the 
industry group mapping.  The first and second columns show the Scotton’s 23 industry 
group title and codes, respectively.  The third and fourth columns show the 2-digit SIC 
title and codes included in Scotton’s grouping, respectively.  The last column shows the 
corresponding industry code in the SIPP for each of the 23 industry groups.   
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The SIPP uses the same 3-digit occupation code as the CFOI, so the occupation 
code in the SIPP is directly converted to 22 occupation groups created by Scotton.  The 
SIPP uses the 3-digit industry code following the 1990 Census classification as described 
in the SIPP data dictionary.28  The data dictionary also shows the corresponding 4-digit 
SIC code for each 1990 Census classification system industry categories.  Scotton 
presents a corresponding 2-digit SIC code for her 23 industry group.  Thus for this 
analysis, the SIPP industry codes are matched to the 2-digit SIC codes, and then 
converted to the 23 industry groups used by Scotton.  
First, we briefly discuss the average annual risk rate among the 506 occupation-
industry groups. The average number of deaths is nine in every 100,000 workers or  
0.9×10-4.  The highest risk bearing group is the construction tradesmen in the personal 
transportation service industry, where the risk is 35.5 ×10-4.  The second highest risk 
bearing group is the agricultural workers in the lumber/wood/stone/glass product industry 
where the risk is 12.4 ×10-4.  High risk bearing industries include the personal 
transportation industry and the mining industry.   High risk bearing occupations include 
construction tradesmen and truck drivers.  Examples of a low risk bearing industry is the 
social/legal/education service industry, while and example of a low risk bearing 
occupation is the financial record keepers.  Fifty-one occupation-industry groups had no 
deaths during the 6 year period. 
After merging the risk data with the SIPP workforce data, we can examine the 
distribution of risk in our sample.  The mean fatal rate in the SIPP sample is 5.5×10-5 with 
standard deviation of 9.5×10-5 and the median risk rate is 2.0×10-5.  This is comparable to 
the mean risk rate of related studies which use the occupation within industry risk rates.  
                                                 
28 Data dictionary is available via http://www.bls.census.gov/sipp/diction.html (retrieved March 25, 2007). 
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Scotton (2000) reports a mean risk rate for her sample from CPS (n=4,891) is 5.0×10-5 
with standard deviation of 9.0×10-5.  Kniesner et al.(2005) report a mean risk rate for 
their sample from the PSID (n=7,937) is approximately 5.8×10-5 with a standard 
deviation of 8.5×10-5.  
About 0.6% of total observations, 1,156 observations in the SIPP sample, face 
zero risk.  There are only two observations in the SIPP sample that face the highest risk 
level which is 35.5×10-4.  Both workers are construction tradesmen in the bus service and 
urban transit industry.  The second highest risk level is 12.4×10-4, and there are 75 
observations who face this level of risk.   
There are a total 13,733 observations in the SIPP sample where the risk rate 
changes between waves due to worker’s job changes.  This comprises approximately 8% 
of total observations.   The risk change ranges from -12.3×10-4 to 12.4×10-4.  The workers 
who experience the largest negative risk change, -12.3×10-4, are those who change the job 
from a timber cutter in the millwork industry to a production coordinator in the same 
industry.  The workers who experience the largest positive risk change, 12.4×10-4, is the 
worker who change the job from a stock/inventory clerk in the health service industry to 
a timber cutter in the logging industry.   
The mean risk change is 0.02 ×10-5.  Table 4 and 5 shows the mean risk change 
between major occupation and industry groups, respectively.  The structure of tables is 
same as table 2 and 3.  The risk change is the risk level at t minus the risk level at t-1.  
Thus the positive (negative) number indicates the increased (reduced) risk level due to a 
job change.  Diagonal entries are not zero since there can be some risk changes within an 
aggregated level occupation/industry group if workers change jobs at more disaggregated 
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occupation/industry groups.   As shown in table 4, the mean risk change within the same 
major occupation group is small and it ranges from -0.4×10-7 to 0.4×10-6.  However, for 
some occupation groups, the range of risk changes is large even for workers who stay in a 
same occupation group.  For example, craft, technical, and labor occupations show risk 
changes ranging between -5.0×10-4 and 5.0×10-4.  Considering that the mean risk level of 
workers in the sample is 0.5×10-4, this risk change is significant.  The variation of risk 
changes within the same major occupation group comes from the changes of industry 
group and the changes of occupation group at a disaggregated level.  On the other hand, 
professional and service workers experience relatively small risk change when they stay 
in the same occupation groups, ranging between -1.0×10-4 and 1.0×10-4, and -1.5×10-4 
and 1.5×10-4, respectively.   
On average, for technical workers, switching jobs to any other major occupation 
group increases their risk level.  For labor, farming, and craft workers, switching jobs to 
any major occupation groups except farming or labor reduces their occupational risk 
level.   For the professional workers, switching jobs to technical occupation reduces their 
risk level.  For service workers, changing the job to the professional or technical 
occupation reduces their risk level. 
The job changing pattern between major industry groups is as follows.  On 
average, the workers in the service industry increase their risk level when they change the 
job to any other industry.  For workers in the construction, agriculture or 
transportation/communication/utility industry group, changing the job to other industries 
other than these three major group industries reduces their risk level.  The workers 
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moving into the service industry from other industries reduce their risk level, and the 
workers moving into the construction industry increase their risk level. 
Table 6 shows the summary changes in the risk level of workers who do not 
change demographic categories and table 7 shows the summary changes in the risk level 
of workers who change demographic characteristics.  For example, suppose worker 1’s 
marital status is single from wave 1 to 10 and is married in wave 11 and 12.  Changes in 
risk levels between wave 1 and wave 2, wave 2 and wave 3, …, and wave 9 and wave 10 
(total 9 observations) for worker 1 are included under “single worker” category in table 6.  
The change in risk level between wave 11 and wave 12 (one observation) is included 
under the “married worker” category in table 6.  In other words, the change in risk levels 
between wave 10 and wave 11 where worker 1 changes his/her marital status is not 
included in table 6 but included in table 7 under “single to married” category.  
Demographic categories examined here include, gender, marital status, kids status, and 
union status.  
As shown in table 6, for male workers, the mean risk change level is 3.9×10-7 
while that of the female workers is 0.2×10-8.  Due to the large standard deviation, these 
mean values are not significantly different from zero.  In fact, none of demographic 
category has a mean risk change value which is different from zero.  Almost 90% of 
female or male workers have zero risk change and thus the median risk change level is 
zero.  This high proportion of zero risk changers is also true for all other demographic 
categories.  Once zero risk changers are removed, we have higher mean risk change 
values of 3.7×10-6 and 0.2×10-7 for male and female workers, respectively.  The variance 
of risk change for the male workers is much larger than that for the female workers as 
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well. This does not change after we remove zero risk changers.  This may be due to the 
limited availability of high risk jobs for female workers while male workers have more 
mobility between safe and risky jobs.    
For workers who remain single and workers who remain married between waves, 
the mean risk changes are 0.3×10-6 and 0.1×10-6 respectively (including zero risk 
changers).  There is not much difference between these two groups of workers in terms of 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum value of risk change for both with and 
without zero risk changers.  For workers whose kids’ status does not change between 
waves, the mean risk changes are 0.1×10-6 and 0.9×10-7 for those with underage kids and 
those without underage kids, respectively (including zero risk changers).  In general, 
workers without kids have more variation in risk change than workers with kids.29  This 
may indicate that the having underage kids forces workers to make a conservative 
decision in terms of occupational risk when they change a career.30  For the workers who 
remain as a union member, and workers who remain as a non-union member between 
waves, the mean risk changes are 0.2×10-6 and 0.1×10-6, respectively.  The workers who 
remain as a non-union member show wider variation of risk changes than union-
members.  Although table 6 shows the smallest risk change for unionized worker is -
10.74×10-4, there is only one observation for this level of risk change.  The second 
smallest risk change for unionized workers is -5.64×10-4, thus the more reasonable range 
                                                 
29 Although the table 6 indicates the similar min and max risk change of workers with underage kids 
compared those of workers without underage kids, there are only one observation at upper and lower bound 
level of risk changes.  Removal of these observations reduce the range of risk change to -5.64×10-4 to 
5.50×10-4. 
30 Of course there may be other demographic characteristics which explain the difference of the risk change 
range between two groups.  For example, workers with underage kids are younger and more likely being 
married than workers without underage kids. 
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of risk change for these workers is -5.64×10-4 to 4.96×10-4 which is much narrower than 
the risk change for non-union workers (-12.33×10-4 to 12.41×10-4). 
This section describes the risk level change associated with the changes in 
workers demographic characteristics shown in table 7.  In general, the range of risk 
change for workers who change demographic characteristics is narrower than that of 
workers who do not change demographic status.31 32  The difference in the range of risk 
change between these two groups of workers may be due to the different sample size.  
For example, there are only 2,308 worker-wave observations who change marital status 
while there are 131,515 worker-wave observations that do not change marital status.  The 
small sample size in table 7 may fail to capture the workers movement between extreme 
risk changes.   Risk changes seem to be randomly distributed on observable demographic 
characteristics changes as indicated the mean changes not being significantly different 
from zero.  This is consistent with the mean risk changes for workers whose demographic 
status does not change.  Interestingly, however, workers tend to change risk level when 
they change a demographic status more often than when staying in a same demographic 
category.  The proportions of zero risk changers among workers who stay in a same 
demographic status are between 4 and 11% depending on the category, while that among 
workers who change a demographic status are between 17 and 28%.   
 
 
                                                 
31 Although the maximum risk change for workers who change marital status from married to single is 
11.37×10-4, there is only one observation that experiences this level of risk change.  The second highest risk 
change is 4.31×10-4 for these workers. 
32 Although the table 3.7 indicates that the min and max risk change of workers who change from non-
union to union status is -11.58×10-4 to 10.83×10-4 there are only one observation at upper and lower bound 
level of risk changes.  Removal of these observations reduces the range of risk change to -5.36×10-4 to 
5.58×10-4. 
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Data for Chapter 5 
This section is organized as follows.  First, the labor force data used in chapter 5, 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), is discussed.  Also discussed are potential wage 
determinants for drivers that are not available from the CPS, such as regional 
characteristics including the local annual unemployment rate, and the per capita sales 
volume of wholesale, retail, transportation, and entertainment industries.  Next section 
discusses the occupational fatal data followed by the employment data and the summary 
of risk rates for each occupational driver.  Also the non-fatal injury risk data and the 
summary of non-fatal injury risk rates for each occupational driver is discussed.  Lastly 
the summary statistics for fatal and non-fatal events for the sample workers are discussed.      
Labor force data: Current Population Survey (CPS). 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a national survey administered by the 
Census Bureau and the BLS.  Each survey includes about 50,000 households.  It is a 
monthly survey and each respondent participates for 16 month.  The samples are 
interviewed each month for the first four months, and then take a break for eight months, 
and then come back and are interviewed each month for a final four months.  The sample 
used in the analysis is group of respondents who are either in the fourth or the eighth 
“Month in Survey,” in other word, in the fourth or the 16th month of their participation 
period.  Survey participants in the fourth or 16th month are referred to as the “outgoing 
rotation group.”  The outgoing rotation group is a preferred sample because of the 
availability of current wage data.   We collect the sample of workers every other year so 
that no person appears in an outgoing rotation group more than once.   
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The sample of drivers is obtained from the CPS administered in 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2002.   The sample is limited to a non self-employed, single job holding, full 
time occupational drivers. Workers earning less than minimum wage33 and workers in 
Hawaii and Alaska are not included.  Self employed workers are omitted for several 
reasons: 1) our focus is to estimate hedonic wage equations resulting in the wage-risk 
negotiation, however this would not be the case for self-employed workers, and 2) as 
described later, the risk measure does not reflect the risk of self employed workers.   
There are total 19,371 occupational drivers in the CPS sample including truck, 
sales, bus and taxi drivers.   The worker’s occupation in the CPS is coded according to 
the Census Occupation Classification, which follows the Standard Occupation 
Classification 1980 definition.  In Census Occupation Classification, the following codes 
are assigned to each occupational driver; 804 for truck drivers, 806 for sales drivers, 808 
for bus drivers and 809 for taxi drivers.  The detailed definition of each occupational 
driver is presented in Appendix F.  Truck drivers operate tractors, heavy or light trucks.  
They transport, deliver or/and pick up goods and merchandise.   Sales drivers operate 
trucks or other vehicles to deliver, sell, or collect goods over establish routes.   Bus 
drivers transport passengers inter-city and intra-city by bus.   Taxi drivers operate 
automobiles or limousines to transport passengers.   
The wage, individual and job characteristics other than occupational fatal risk (X) 
are also obtained from the CPS.  The variables in Xi includes age, educational attainment, 
race, U.S. citizenship, gender, usual work hours, union status, marital status, location of 
                                                 
33 Minimum hourly wage for taxi driver is $2.13 per hour.  Minimum wage per hour for other drivers is 
$4.25 in 1994, $4.75 in 1996, and $5.15 in 1998, 2000 and 2002. Per hour minimum wage is multiplied by 
35 hours to obtain weekly minimum wage.  
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household, occupation dummy, regional dummy and MSA dummy variables.   Table 8 
shows the definitions, data source and summary statistics of each variable.   
The average weekly wage of occupational drivers is $683 which is higher than the 
average U.S. worker’s weekly wage which is about $530 and the SIPP sample used in 
chapter 4.34  In chapter 5, all monetary values are adjusted to 2004 dollars using the 
consumer price index.  Average age of the sample is 40 years old which is slightly older 
than the SIPP sample.  About half of the sample graduated from high school, 23% of the 
sample received a college level education, and 4% of the sample graduated from a four 
year college.  Compared to the SIPP sample, the educational attainment level is slightly 
lower among the CPS driver sample, and compared to the national average, the 
educational attainment level is even lower.   
Ten percent of the sample is of Hispanic origin, and 12% is African American.  
Most of the sample has U.S. citizenship (93%) and only 6% of the sample is female, 
reflecting the male-dominance of the occupations upon which we focus.   Fifty-percent of 
the sample works overtime and 23% of the sample holds a union membership, both of 
which are noticeably larger than that of our general sample from the SIPP used in chapter 
4.  In the SIPP sample, only 19% worked overtime and 19% held a union membership, 
which is still higher than the national average (12.5%).  Sixty four percent of the sample 
is married, which is again higher than the proportion of married sample in the SIPP 
(56%).  In summary, occupational drivers tend to be older, less educated, highly male 
dominated, engaged in more overtime work, and more heavily unionized than the 
national average and our general SIPP sample from chapter 4.  
                                                 
34 According to October 2005 Employment Situation Summary published by BLS.  Monetary value of 
average weekly wage for the U.S. worker is adjusted to 2004 currency level by consumer price index. 
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Local area unemployment statistics. 
The local unemployment rate is a potentially important factor for determining the 
wage level, as well as the willingness of workers to accept workplace risk.  The 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) unemployment rate in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2002 is obtained from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) administered by 
the BLS. 35  The average annual unemployment rate during the sample period (1994-
2002) is between 4% and 6%.  However, the unemployment rate varies significantly 
across MSAs.  For example, some MSAs such as the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission MSA in 
Texas recorded quite high unemployment rates (over 10%) between 1994 and 2002, 
while others such as Madison, Wisconsin experienced quite low unemployment rates (2-
3%) during the sample period.  In general, the West census region experienced relatively 
high unemployment rate (average 6%) compared to other regions (4.5% to 5.5%) during 
the sample period.   
Economic activity in each MSA. 
Different levels of economic activity in each MSA could affect the wage level of 
workers through different levels of demand for occupational drivers.  The volume of sales 
in wholesales, retail, transportation, arts-entertainment, and accommodation and food 
service industries in each MSA would likely affect the demand for the truck, sales, bus 
and taxi drivers.  These data are obtained from the 1997 Economic Census administered 
by the U.S. Census Bureau and are only available for 1997.36     The population of each 
                                                 
35 The data is available via the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) retrieved March 25, 2007 
from http://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm. 
36 The data is available via 1997 Economic Census retrieved March 25, 2007 from 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/econ97.html. 
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MSA is also obtained from the 1997 Economic Census to calculate the per-capita sales 
volume and employment level in the above industries.  
The vehicle miles traveled (VMT). 
 The number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in each MSA may indicate different 
traffic levels and workload for occupational drivers among MSAs.  This difference may 
affect the wage level of occupational drivers, and the fatal or non-fatal risk levels the 
drivers face at work.  The VMT is obtained from Bluestone (Forthcoming).  Bluestone 
collects the county level VMT in 1996 from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)37 and aggregates it to the MSA level.  The VMT is computed on a per-capita basis.   
Occupational fatal incidences. 
This section describes the source of occupational fatal incidence data.  The next 
section presents the local employment data used to calculate the local fatal risk rates, 
followed by a discussion of the estimated local fatal risk rates.   
The number of occupational fatal incidences is obtained from the Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries (CFOI) file collected by the BLS for the period 1992 through 2002.  
This data differs from that in chapter 4 by level of detail and is thus not publicly 
available.  The non-public use CFOI file contains information on the location of injury at 
the county level in addition to the information available in the public CFOI (see appendix 
A).   For this research, the location of injury at the county level is aggregated into an 
MSA level count of deaths using the 1999 MSA definition by the Office of Management 
                                                 
37 U.S.EPA (1998) National Air Pollutant Emission Trends Update, 1970-1997," EPA-454/E-98-007, U.S. 
Environmental Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC, 
December 1998 
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and Budget.38  This is the definition used in the 1999-2002 Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES), which provide the source of our employment level in each MSA.39  
Later, the count of deaths in each MSA for each occupational driver is divided by the 
employment level of each occupational driver in each MSA, so the MSA definition 
should be matched between denominator and numerator.  The location of injury at the 
state level is directly coded from the CFOI.40   
Two types of fatal events are also obtained directly from the CFOI; homicide and 
non-homicide deaths.  For ease of exposition, we refer to homicides as violent assault 
deaths and non-homicides as non-violent deaths.   Violent assaults include assaults and 
violent acts by persons such as hitting and shooting, and do not include self-inflicted 
injuries and assaults by animals.  Non-violent events include deaths from all sources 
other than homicide and self-inflicted injuries.       
There are a total of 10,475 non-self employed occupational drivers deaths during 
the period 1992 to 2002 or 952 deaths per year on average.41  Among them, 8,872 are 
deaths of truck drivers, 468 are sales drivers, 198 are bus drivers and 937 are taxi drivers.  
The number of deaths is re-counted for each occupational driver in each MSA/state for 
each death event.  The summary of the fatal incidence for each type of driver for each 
event is shown in table 9.  The transportation related injuries are the main cause of death 
for truck, sales, and bus drivers and accounts for 70 to 80% of total deaths.  Violent 
assaults are the main cause of death for taxi drivers, accounting for 70% of total deaths.  
                                                 
38 MSA definition available from Metropolitan Areas and Components 1999 with FIPS code retrieved 
March 25, 2007 from http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt. 
39 We also use 1998 and 2003 OES which use slightly different MSA definitions.  However, definition 
change between 1998 OES, 2003 OES and 1999-2002 OES is marginal and should not have any effect on 
using 1999-2002 MSA definition for entire period. 
40 Both county and state are coded based on FIPS.  In CFOI, state of New York is coded as 68 instead of 36 
as of FIPS. 
41 This number includes the deaths due to self-inflicted injury and assaults by animals.  
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Other deaths include being struck by objects, caught in equipment, compressed or 
pinched by rolling, sliding or shifting objects, caught in or crushed in collapsing 
materials, falls, bodily reactions and exertion, contact with electric current, exposure to 
temperature extremes or to caustic, noxious or allergenic substances, ingestion of 
substances, fire, or explosion.   
The majority of violent assault deaths occur inside MSAs.   Of those who die of a 
violent assault, 84 percent of truck drivers, 87% of sales drivers and 91 % of taxi drivers 
died within an MSA. The number of death within an MSA for bus drivers and all drivers 
are suppressed for reasons of confidentiality.  A high level of deaths by homicide within 
MSAs could be due to the higher crime rates in urban areas as compared to non-urban 
areas.  Non-violent deaths including transportation related deaths and other types of 
deaths often occur outside MSAs.  Of those who die of a transportation related event, 47 
percent of truck drivers, 36% of sales drivers, 35% of bus drivers, and 21% of taxi drivers 
died in transportation related events outside MSAs.  Also, of those who die of other types 
of death, 36% of truck drivers and 31% of sales drivers died outside the MSAs.  In the 
analysis, the regression results using different combinations of MSA-level and state-level 
violent and non-violent risk rates will be presented. 
Table 10 reports the MSAs where the top five numbers of deaths occurs for truck, 
sales and taxi drivers summarized by the event of death. The second and the fourth 
columns show the actual number of deaths in each MSA with a corresponding risk rate, 
which discussed later.  Los Angeles and Chicago are ranked in the top five for 
occupational deaths in each driving occupation regardless the death event.  The other 
cities in the top five ranking are large MSAs, such as Dallas, Washington, DC, Miami, 
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Atlanta, Houston, Philadelphia, Detroit, and New York.  Not surprisingly, New York City 
has an outstanding number of violent assault deaths of taxi drivers.  One-hundred, eighty-
six taxi drivers (17 taxi drivers annually) died due to the violent assault over the last 11 
years.   Also table 11 shows the list of states where the top five number of deaths occurs 
for the truck, sales and taxi drivers.  For truck drivers, California, Texas and Florida have 
the highest deaths for both violent and non-violent events.  For sales drivers, 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Georgia record the highest deaths among all states for both 
events. For taxi drivers, New York, California, Florida and Illinois are the states with the 
highest level of deaths regardless of the event.  
Area specific employment level: Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). 
The fatal risk rate is calculated by equation 14.  The annual average number of 
deaths in each occupation and in each MSA/state is divided by the annual average 
employment level in each occupation and in each MSA/state.  The number of workers in 
each driving occupation in each MSA/state is collected from the Occupational 
Employment Statistics (OES) administered in 1998-2003 at the MSA level and 1998-
2004 OES at the state level by the BLS.   Unfortunately, employment data at the MSA 
and state level (for detailed occupations) is not available prior to 1998.  In addition, the 
OES does not include self-employed workers, therefore self-employed worker deaths are 
removed from the risk estimation.   
There can be significant bias of our risk estimation due to the use of data from a 
different time period in the numerator (period in 1992-2002) and the denominator (period 
in 1998–2003).  If the actual employment level between 1992 and 1997 is significantly 
lower (higher) than the employment level between 1998 and 2003, the estimated risk rate 
 
 
 
49
is underestimated (overestimated) as the annual average risk rate of the period in 1992-
2002.  
Table 12 is the assessment of the potential bias due to the limited employment 
data period.  According to the BLS’s Current Employment Statistics (CES), which report 
a longer period of national employment data, there is the following employment trend for 
the driving occupations between 1992-1997 and 1998-2003.  In the CES, there is no 
distinction between the truck driver and the sales drivers, so both occupations are 
combined into the “truck” category in table 12.  The taxi and bus drivers are reported to 
have about a 3 to 4% increase in employment levels, while the truck drivers show a rather 
significant increase in the employment level between two periods (12%).  This indicates 
that using the 1998-2003 average employment level as a denominator would likely 
underestimate the average fatal risk level of truck drivers between 1992 and 2002 
periods.   
A solution to this problem is to estimate risk rates using only the 1998-2002 death 
record to match the data period of the denominator and the numerator.  A potential 
problem of this solution is a reduction of number of deaths due to the shorter period of 
data.  The reduction in the number of deaths will generate more geographic areas with 
zero risk, which can lead to a less variation in the risk variables.  This is a particular 
concern for the violent assault fatal risk.   
Table 13 shows the summary of deaths by occupation in the period of 1998-2002.  
If the frequencies of deaths are constant over time, the number of deaths in the period of 
1998-2002 should account for about 45% of total number of deaths between 1992 and 
2002.  The parentheses in table 13 shows the proportion of deaths occurred in the period 
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1998-2002 in the total deaths occurred between 1992 and 2002.  For the violent assault 
case, truck drivers and taxi drivers have somewhat fewer deaths than expected during 
1998-2002 while the number of transportation related deaths is increased for all drivers, 
particularly for bus drivers compare to the period of 1992-1997.   
 To further examine the potential impact of the available data on our hedonic 
results, hedonic wage models are estimated separately using two risk rates.  First the risk 
rates created with the 1992-2002 death record are matched to our 1994-2002 worker data, 
and then the risk rates created with the 1998-2002 death record are matched to 1996-2002 
worker data.  For the model using the risk rate based on the 1998-2002 death record, the 
1994 CPS is dropped from the analysis because its labor data period is far before the risk 
data period.  
Fatal risk rate. 
The summary of risk rates by occupation for each event is described in this 
section.  Table 14 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the risk rates created 
from the 1992-2002 death record for each event of death and for each occupational 
driver.  The risk rates are estimated both at MSA and state levels. Standard deviations are 
presented in parentheses.   At the MSA level, the average violent assault fatal risk is 0.97 
in 10,000 drivers or 0.97×10-4, and the average non-violent fatal risk is 1.74×10 -4.  
Compared to the average risk level of all occupations, which is 0.9×10-4, driving is a 
somewhat higher risk occupation.  Taxi drivers report the highest violent fatal risk rate of 
3.52×10 -4.  The average violent fatal risk for the sales, bus and truck drivers are 0.24×10-
4, 0.13×10-4 and 0.06×10-4, respectively.  On the other hand, truck drivers have the 
highest non-violent fatal risk rate of 2.62×10-4.  Taxi drivers have the second highest fatal 
 
 
 
51
risk rate, 2.17×10-4, followed by that of sales drivers of 1.02×10-4, and that of bus drivers 
of 0.95×10-4.    
Compared to the MSA level risk, the mean value of state level violent assault risk 
is higher for all occupational drivers, and the mean value of state level non-violent risk is 
slightly higher or similar.   For example, the mean state-level violent assault risk is 46% 
more than the mean MSA level risk, and the mean state level non-violent fatal risk is 
14% more than the mean MSA level non-violent fatal risk.   The largest difference in the 
mean violent risk can be seen for the taxi drivers where the state level risk is 51% more 
than the mean MSA level risk.  The largest difference in the mean non-violent risk is for 
the bus drivers where the state level risk is 52% more than the mean MSA level risk 
which indicates that the deaths outside MSA are proportionally more than the number of 
workers outside MSA.     
 Table 15 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the MSA level fatal risk 
rate by occupation and event after dropping MSAs with less than 100 employees.  Since 
some MSAs have very high risk rate due to their small employment level, we examine if 
the average risk level change by excluding MSAs with less than 100 employees. There is 
no change in the risk rate for the truck drivers.  There are slight decreases in risk rates for 
other drivers, except the violent assault risk rate for the taxi drivers.  The violent assault 
risk rate for the taxi drivers actually increased.  This is because dropping MSAs with less 
than 100 employees removes many MSAs with zero risk as well as MSAs with a very 
high violent assault risk.   
Table 16 and 17 repeat the information in table 14 and 15, but risks are created 
using only the 1998-2002 CFOI data.  As indicated in table 16, the violent fatal risk rate 
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created based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data is generally smaller than that created based on 
the 1992-2002 CFOI data except for the bus drivers.  This is true for both the MSA level 
risk rate and the state level risk rate.  For example, with the MSA level risk rate, the mean 
1998-2002 CFOI based violent risk rate is 0.75×10-4 for all drivers, which is 22% less 
compared to the 1992-2002 CFOI based risk rate.   The non-violent fatal risk created 
from the 1998-2002 CFOI is larger than that created from the 1992-2002 CFOI for the 
MSA level risk for any types of driver.  It is slightly larger for truck and sales drivers and 
smaller for bus and taxi drivers when we compare the state level risk. 
Table 17 is the mean and standard deviation of the fatal risk rate by occupation 
and the event of death based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data after dropping MSAs with less 
than 100 employees.  There is no change in the risk rate for truck drivers.  The risk level 
is decreased for other drivers except for the violent risk for the sales drivers.  
The decrease in violent fatal risk rates based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data (except 
bus drivers) as compared to the risk rates based on the 1992-2002 CFOI data is as 
expected.  The annual frequency of violent fatal incidence during the period of 1998-
2002 is less than that of 1992-2002 (except bus drivers), but we use a same annual 
employment level to estimate both risk rates.    For the same reason, the increase in non-
violent fatal risk rates based on the 1998-2002 CFOI data as compared to the risk rates 
based on the 1992-2002 CFOI data is as expected.   
Non-fatal injury incidence: Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (IIF) program. 
This section describes the number of non-fatal occupational injuries and its risk 
rates among occupational drivers.  The non-fatal occupational injury risk is called injury 
risk in this study.  The count of non-fatal injuries comes from the Injuries, Illnesses, and 
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Fatalities (IIF) program, administered by the BLS.  The IIF provides information about 
the number of incidences of occupational injuries for each state in the United States.    
The number of injuries can be broken down into the following categories: state where the 
incidence occurs, employer profile (private, state government, or local government), year 
of incidence, and injured worker’s characteristics such as industry and occupation 
affiliation and event of injuries.  The aggregated number of injury cases for state-
occupation-event pairs is readily available in the IIF CD-Rom (available from the BLS 
upon request).  However, for each state-occupation-event pair, the information about 
industry affiliation of injured worker is not available.  Thus, we include school bus 
drivers, which are removed from the fatal risk calculation, to estimate a injury risk for 
bus drivers. 
The number of injuries is defined as the number of workers who experience days 
away from work due to an occupational injury.  Occupational injuries which result in 
death are omitted from these statistics.   The annual non-fatal injury data are available 
between 1992 and 2002 for most states.  The more detailed data availability by state is 
summarized in table 18.  Colorado, Washington DC, Idaho, New Hampshire, North 
Dakota and Ohio do not participate in the IIF program and so there is no injury data 
available for these states.  The nonfatal injuries are divided into two events following the 
fatal risk creation: those caused by violent interactions such as worker conflicts or 
assaults and those caused by non-violent acts.   
For each occupation, the number of nonfatal injuries for each event is divided by 
the number of total employment in each state to create non-fatal injury risk rates.  The 
number of total employment is obtained from the OES.  The injury risk is only available 
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at the state level.  For the same reason of the fatal risk case, the injury risk rate is 
calculated separately using 1992-2002 data and 1998-2002 data. 
Table 19 shows the mean injury risk rates for each driving occupation across state 
for total risk, violent interactions and transportation related event created from the 1992-
2002 injury data.  Truck driving has the highest non-fatal injury rate for both total injury 
and transportation related injuries.    Five in 100 truck drivers experience some kind of 
injury every year, and seven in 1,000 truck drivers experience some type of traffic-related 
injury.   Bus drivers show the highest violent-related injury rate among all driving 
occupations.  Four in 1,000 bus drivers suffer a violent-related injury every year.  Taxi 
drivers experience a relatively low non-fatal violent-related injury (seven in 10,000).  A 
relatively low non-fatal violent-related injury rate combined with a high violent-related 
fatality risk indicates that when a taxi driver is assaulted, it tends to be fatal.   
For the truck, sales and bus drivers, the proportion of transportation related non-
fatal injuries to total injuries is between 6 and 21%.  This is a dramatic difference 
compared to the proportion of transportation-related fatal injuries of between 70 and 
80%.   This disparity of event component between fatal and nonfatal injuries may explain 
why there is generally no effect of adding injury risk on the fatal risk coefficient in the 
previous HW studies (Kochi et al., 2006; Mrozek & Taylor, 2002).     
Table 20 shows the non-fatal injury rates by occupation based on the IFF 1998-
2002.  When the injury risk is created from the 1998-2002 injury data to match the period 
of employment data, the injury risk rate is generally slightly reduced as compared to the 
injury risk rate created based on the IFF 1992-2002.   
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Fatal and non-fatal risks in the sample. 
This section describe the fatal and non-fatal injury risk level our sample of 
workers face.  First I describes the risk rates created from the 1992-2002 CFOI, and then 
describe the risk rates created from the 1998-2002 CFOI.  Table 21 shows the summary 
statistics of the MSA level risk rates based on the 1992-2002 CFOI in the sample.  There 
are 12,892 total drivers who live in MSAs in the sample.  Among them, 40% of drivers 
face zero violent fatal risk and 8% of drivers face zero non-violent fatal risk.  The mean 
violent assault fatal risk rate is 0.83×10-4 and the mean non-violent fatal risk rate is 
1.92×10-4.   Compared to the mean fatal risk level in the SIPP sample in chapter 4, the 
fatal risk level of occupational drivers is quite high. 
The proportion of the sample living in MSAs which face zero violent fatal risk is 
39% for truck drivers, 60% for sales drivers, 79% for bus drivers, and 14% for taxi 
drivers.  On the other hand, there is generally a much smaller proportion of the sample 
which faces zero non-violent fatal risk (except for taxi drivers).  Only 1% of truck 
drivers, 38% of sales drivers, 39% of bus drivers and 20% of taxi drivers face zero non-
violent fatal risk.      
The mean violent fatal risk rate for truck, sales, bus and taxi drivers is 0.08×10-4, 
0.30×10-4, 0.18×10-4, and 10.67×10-4 respectively.  The mean non-violent fatal risk rate 
for truck, sales, bus and taxi drivers is 2.07×10-4, 0.70×10-4, 0.87×10-4, and 2.38×10-4 
respectively.  Table 22 summarizes the state level risk rates in the sample that is 
constructed from the CFOI 1992-2002.  In general, the state level violent assault risk is 
lower than MSA level violent risk, while the state level non-violent risk is higher than the 
MSA level non-violent risk for the sample.  The number of workers with zero risk at the 
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state level is much smaller than at the MSA level.  With the state level risk rates, there are 
18% of drivers who face zero violent fatal risk and only 1% of drivers who face zero non-
violent fatal risk.  There is no state in which truck drivers face zero non-violent fatal risk 
in the sample.   
Table 23 and 24 shows a summary of the MSA and state level risk rates that are 
constructed from the CFOI 1998-2002 sample, respectively.  The risk rates are merged 
with CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 only.  The number of workers who face zero risk 
increases as compared to table 21 and 23.  For violent fatal risk, the 1998-2002 CFOI 
base risk rates is smaller than the 1992-2002 risk rate for total, truck and taxi drivers 
regardless of the geographic level at which the risk is created.  Compared to the 1992-
2002 CFOI base risk rate, the mean MSA level violent risk is reduced from 0.83×10-4 to 
0.46×10-4 for the entire sample.  The risk rate changes for truck, sales and bus drivers are 
small, while that of taxi drivers is quite large (5.43×10-4 in the 1998-2002 CFOI base 
risk)   
For the non-violent fatal risk, the 1998-2002 CFOI base risk rates are larger than 
the 1992-2002 CFOI risk rates for all drivers except taxi drivers, regardless the 
geographic level at which the risk is created.  Compared to the 1992-2002 CFOI based 
risk rate, the mean MSA level non-violent risk is increased from 1.92×10-4 to 2.09×10-4, 
and the mean state level non-violent risk is also increased from 2.92×10-4 to 3.16×10-4 for 
the entire sample. 
Table 25 shows the summary of injury risks for each driver and event created 
from the 1992-2002 IFF.  For all drivers, the mean violent injury rate is 2.0×10-4 and the 
mean non-violent injury rate is 5.22×10-2.  The lowest mean violent injury risk is for 
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truck drivers (1.0×10-4) and the highest mean violent injury risk is for bus drivers 
(1.2×10-3).  The lowest mean non-violent injury risk is for taxi drivers (1.1×10-2) and the 
highest mean non-violent injury risk is for truck drivers (5.7×10-2).  Thirty-percent of 
drivers face zero violent injury risk, and only 0.1% of drivers face zero non-violent injury 
risks.  None of the truck, sales or bus drivers face zero non-violent injury risks.  Table 26 
shows the summary of the injury rates created from the 1998-2002 IIF.  When using the 
1998-2002 IIF, the mean injury risk rates are generally slightly decreased as compared to 
the 1992-2002 based injury risk.  Only the violent injury risks for sales drivers are 
slightly increased. 
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Table 1  
Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
1996SIPP, all 
worker-wave 
(N=166,362)  Definition 
Mean (SD) 
hwage hourly wage 13.27 (5.90) 
risk fatal risk injury rate by occupation and industry per 10,000 workers 0.55 (0.95) 
age age in years 38.06 (11.47) 
ugdeg 1 if individual have bachelor degree or more 0.09  
college 1 if individual attended college 0.33  
hsgrad 1 if individual graduated from high school 0.41  
hispanic 1 if individual has a Hispanic origin 0.13  
blacknh 1 if individual is black and non-Hispanic 0.13  
othrace 1 if individual is non-white, non-black, non-Hispanic 0.04  
female 1 if individual is female 0.45  
workov 1 if individual usually works more than 40 hours 0.19  
union 1 if individual is a union member or covered by union 0.19  
married 1 if individual is married 0.56  
kids18 number of kids under 18 years old 0.79 (1.10) 
hipart 1 if individual is provided part of health insurance by employer 0.44  
hifull 1 if individual is provided full health insurance by employer 0.20  
empall 1 if number of employee at all locations > 100 0.56  
empsize 1 if number of employee at worker's location < 25 0.29  
neast 1 if individual lives in Northeastern region 0.16  
midwest 1 if individual lives in Midwestern region 0.26  
west 1 if individual lives in West region 0.18  
south 1 if individual lives in Southern region 0.34  
urban 1 if individual lives in urban area 0.78  
agind 1 if individual works in the agricultural industry 0.02  
constind 1 if individual works in the construction industry 0.07  
tcuind 1 if individual works in the transportation, communications or utility industry 0.06  
trdind 1 if individual works in the wholesale or retail trades industry 0.19  
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servind 1 if individual works in the service industry 0.31  
manufind 1 if individual works in the manufacturing industry 0.25  
pubind 1 if individual works in the public industry 0.10  
craftocc 1 if individual has a craft job 0.16  
profocc 1 if individual has a professional job 0.11  
techocc 1 if individual has a technical job 0.28  
servocc 1 if individual has a service job 0.14  
farmocc 1 if individual has a farming job 0.05  
laborocc 1 if individual has a labor job 0.26  
Note. Standard deviations for continuous variables are shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 2  
The Number of Observations Changing Jobs between Major Occupation Groups 
 
After (t) 
 
Before (t-1) 
Professional Craft Technical Service Labor Farming Total 
Professional 13,854 103 595 196 155 11 14,914 
Craft 151 21,438 279 150 716 50 22,784 
Technical 752 289 35,388 423 603 31 37,486 
Service 243 142 468 16,482 392 38 17,765 
Labor 198 833 662 408 33,666 115 35,882 
Farming 15 45 53 55 119 2,397 2,684 
Total 15,213 22,850 37,445 17,714 35,651 2,642 131,515a 
 
a The total number in this cell does not match the total number of observations in the sample because for each  
  worker, the first observation is dropped due to the lack of a “previous occupation” data. 
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Table 3   
The Number of Observations Changing Jobs between Major Industry Groups 
 
                 After (t) 
     Before (t-1) 
Construc-
tion 
Agri-
culture TCU WST Service 
Manufac-
turing Public Total 
Construction 9,380 754 56 144 155 162 25 10,676 
Agriculture 51 2,902 14 86 55 34 14 3,156 
Transportation 
/Communication/ 
Utility (TCU) 
52 8 8,785 102 175 84 16 9,222 
Wholesales/ 
Trade (WST) 158 66 133 22,584 834 495 66 24,336 
Service 175 43 204 641 38,978 519 147 40,707 
Manufacturing 218 48 115 428 546 34,593 46 35,994 
Public 21 6 23 35 124 39 7,876 8,124 
Total 10,055 3,827 9,330 24,020 40,867 35,926 8,190 132,215a 
a The total number in this cell does not match the total number of observations in the sample because for each worker, the first 
observation is dropped due to the lack of a “previous occupation” data. 
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Table 4    
The Risk Rate Change in Each Major Occupation Group 
 
 
After (t) 
 
 
Before (t-1) 
Professional 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Craft 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Technical 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Service 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Labor 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Farming 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
professional 0.00004 (0.037) [-1.04/0.94] 
0.722 (1.201) 
[-0.247/5.301] 
-0.049 (0.315) 
[-0.934/5.584] 
0.053 (0.317) 
[-0.870/0.835] 
0.757 (1.264) 
[-1.378/5.357] 
1.115 (0.433) 
[0.420/1.672] 
craft -0.522 (0.677) [-3.442/0.942] 
0.0008 (0.180) 
[-5.325/4.887] 
-0.518 (0.846) 
[-5.434/5.080] 
-0.382 (0.731) 
[-2.210/1.063] 
0.532 (1.467) 
[-4.851/5.071] 
0.461 (2.110) 
[-4.927/11.372] 
technical 0.055 (0.164) [-1.482/0.928] 
0.509 (0.795) 
[-4.867/5.239] 
-0.0004 (0.064) 
[-5.638/5.391] 
0.064 (0.359) 
[-3.819/1.806] 
0.753 (1.121) 
[-4.765/5.402] 
1.992 (3.314) 
[-0.554/12.413] 
service -0.027 (0.334) [-1.814/1.025] 
0.534 (0.966) 
[-1.653/4.774] 
-0.051 (0.249) 
[-1.564/0.737] 
0.0001 (0.058) 
[-1.509/1.521] 
0.670 (1.160) 
[-1.022/4.983] 
1.167 (0.699) 
[-0.374/3.036] 
labor -0.872 (1.266) [-4.270/1.499] 
-0.306 (1.347) 
[-5.013/5.278] 
-0.695 (1.058) 
[-5.640/1.053] 
-0.547 (1.111) 
[-4.534/1.185] 
0.004 (0.358) 
[-5.072/5.500] 
0.356 (2.342) 
[-3.302/12.286] 
farming -0.969 (1.583) [-1.672/0.185] 
-0.799 (2.514) 
[-10.746/4.244] 
-1.302 (1.721) 
[-12.336/2.177] 
-1.460 (2.178) 
[-12.182/0.403] 
0.239 (2.117) 
[-11.505/3.809] 
0.002 (0.275) 
(-2.646/10.695] 
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Table 5   
The Risk Rate Change in Each Major Industry Group  
 
 
After (t) 
 
 
Before (t-1) 
Construction 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Agriculture 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
TCU 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Wholesales/ 
Trade 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Service 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Manufacturing 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Public 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit: 10-4) 
Construction -0.002 (0.391) [-4.826/4.411] 
0. 335 (1.909) 
[-2.721/5.091] 
0.067 (2.044) 
[-3.612/4.317] 
-1.500 (1.092) 
[-4.436/0.590] 
-1.667 (1.452) 
[-5.162/1.917] 
-1.986 (1.337) 
[-5.072/1.724] 
-2.022 (1.078) 
[-3.713/-0.059] 
Agriculture 0.290 (1.831) [-3.765/2.622] 
0.002 (0.382) 
[-4.072/5.402] 
0.425 (1.553) 
[-1.690/2.597] 
-1.551 (1.135) 
[-5.434/0.111] 
-1.273 (0.937) 
[-4.327/2.235] 
-1.361 (2.484) 
[-5.325/10.695] 
-1.610 (1.665) 
[-5.367/0.453] 
Transportation 
/Communication/ 
Utility (TCU) 
0.092 (2.097) 
[-3.769/4.169] 
0.240 (2.302) 
[-2.235/4.253] 
0.008 (0.388) 
[-5.640/5.366] 
-1.128 (1.667) 
[-5.417/1.120] 
-0.886 (1.496) 
[-5.638/2.102] 
-1.141 (2.159) 
[-4.867/12.125] 
-0.851 (1.511) 
[-3.483/0.852] 
Wholesales/ 
Trade 
1.471 (1.192) 
[-0.826/4.943] 
1.241 (0.996) 
[-0.265/4.672] 
0.692 (1.508) 
[-1.361/5.391] 
-0.0003 (0.111) 
[-1.410/1.563] 
-0.089 (0.395) 
[-1.379/2.728] 
-0.050 (0.578) 
[-1.474/2.847] 
0.1003 (0.437) 
[-0.960/0.804] 
Service 1.632 (1.373) [-1.364/4.983] 
1.546 (1.020) 
[0.035/5.301] 
0.796 (1.485) 
[-2.798/5.584] 
0.077 (0.413) 
[-2.715/1.399] 
0.003 (0.094) 
[-2.949/2.949] 
0.087 (0.900) 
[-2.194/12.413] 
0.134 (0.471) 
[-2.900/1.366] 
Manufacturing 1.815 (1.844) [-10.746/5.094] 
1.908 (1.175) 
[-0.125/5.278] 
1.260 (1.530) 
[-0.946/5.500] 
0.061 (0.771) 
[-11.505/1.578] 
-0.060 (0.695) 
[-12.182/2.383] 
0.0006 (0.201) 
[-12.336/11.831] 
0.195 (0.456) 
[-0.765/0.860] 
Public 1.752 (1.226) [-0.424/3.713] 
0.700 (0.746) 
[-0.820/1.650] 
1.454 (1.781) 
[-0.370/4.344] 
-0.049 (0.429) 
[-0.804/0.901] 
-0.175 (0.377) 
[-0.891/1.251] 
-0.079 (0.461) 
[-1.007/0.813] 
-0.0002 (0.083) 
[-1.399/1.382] 
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Table 6  
The Summary of Risk Changes in Different Groups of Workers  
 
 Total 
Meana (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit:10-4) 
# of workers 
whose risk 
change is not 
zero (%in Total) 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit:10-4) 
Median 
(unit:10-4) 
Male workers 72,212 0.0039
 (0.46) 
[-12.33/12.41] 7,646 (10%) 
0.0376 (1.43) 
[-12.33/12.41] 0.0009 
Female workers 59,303 0.0002 (0.15) [-5.64/4.95] 6,087 (10%) 
0.0020 (0.49) 
[-5.64/4.95] 0.0001 
Single workers 55,029 0.0031 (0.39) [-12.18/12.41] 6,821 (12%) 
0.0226 (1.09) 
[-12.18/12.41] 0.0008 
Married workers 76,486 0.0016 (0.33) [-12.33/12.12] 6256 (8%) 
0.0193 (1.15) 
[-12.33/12.12] 0.0010 
Workers who have kids age 
under 18 22,507 
0.0013 (0.33) 
[-10.74/10.83] 2,294 (10%) 
0.0135 (1.06) 
[-10.74/10.83] 0.0021 
Workers who do not have kids 
age under 18 72,380 
0.0009 (1.13) 
[-12.33/12.41] 7,131 (9%) 
0.0099 (1.13) 
[-12.33/12.41] -0.0008 
Workers in union  23,471 0.0024 (0.25) [-10.74/4.96] 984 (4%) 
0.0588 (1.25) 
[-10.74/4.96] 0.0122 
Workers in non-union 100,831 0.0018 (0.36) [-12.33/12.41] 11,335 (11%) 
0.0167 (1.08) 
[-12.33/12.41] 0.0001 
a The median value of all cases is zero. 
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Table 7  
The Summary of Risk Changes in Different Groups of Workers Who Changes Demographic Status 
 
 Total 
Meana (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit:10-4) 
# of workers 
whose risk 
change is not 
zero (%in Total) 
Mean (sd) 
[min/max] 
(unit:10-4) 
 
Median 
(unit:10-4) 
Single to married 1,503 0.0037 (0.50) [-5.32/5.09] 429 (28%) 
0.0131 (0.94) 
[-5.32/5.09] -0.0113 
Married to single 805 0.0236 (0.63) [-3.98/11.37) 227 (28%) 
0.0839 (1.19) 
[-3.98/11.37] -0.0008 
No kids under 18 to some kids 
under 18 2,358 
0.0099 (0.54) 
[-4.99/5.30] 552 (23%) 
0.0425 (1.13) 
[-4.99/5.30] 0.0070 
Some kids under 18 to no kids 
under 18 3,341 
0.0189 (0.57) 
[-5.32/11.37] 698 (20%) 
0.0908 (1.26) 
[-5.32/11.37] 0.0018 
Union to non-union  3,660 -0.0147 (0.50) [-5.41/4.20] 652 (17%) 
-0.0828 (1.18) 
[-5.41/4.20) -0.0161 
Non union to union 3,553 0.0301 (0.64) [-11.58/10.83] 762 (21%) 
0.1405 (1.38) 
[-11.58/10.83] 0.0124 
a The median value of all cases is zero. 
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Table 8   
Variable Definition, Source and Summary Statistics (n=19,371a) 
Variables Description Mean (SD) Data source 
wage weekly wage (adjusted to $2004) 683 (336) 
age age in years 40.69 (11.60) 
ugdeg 1 if individual has a four year college degree 0.04 
college 1 if individual attended college 0.23 
hsgrad 1 if individual graduated from high school 0.52 
hispanic 1 if individual has a Hispanic origin 0.10 
blacknh 1 if individual is black and non-Hispanic 0.12 
othrace 1 if individual is not black, white or Hispanic 0.02 
uscit 1 if individual is U.S. citizen 0.93 
female 1 if individual is female 0.06 
salary 1 if individual works for salary 0.36 
workov 1 if individual usually works more than 40 hours 0.50 
union 1 if individual is a union member or covered by union 0.23 
married 1 if individual is married 0.66 
central 1 if individual lives in central city 0.21 
truck 1 if individual is truck driver 0.83 
bus 1 if individual is bus driver 0.07 
taxi 1 if individual is taxi driver 0.05 
year dummy 1 if individual's data comes from corresponding year  
MSA dummy 1 if individual lives in a corresponding MSA  
State dummy 1 if individual lives in a corresponding state  
Region dummy 1 if individual lives in a corresponding region  
CPS (94, 96, 98, 
00, 02) 
 
nonfatal_vrisk occupational nonfatal violent assault risk 2.18×10
-4 
(5.36×10-4) 
nonfatal_other occupational nonfatal non-violent injury risk 5.25×10
-2 
(1.63×10-2) 
estimated by 
authors from IIF 
(92-03) and OES 
(98-03) 
unemp annual unemployment rate of MSA where individual lives 
5.10 
(1.95) 
Local Area 
Unemployment 
Statistics  (94, 96, 
98, 00, 02) 
whole_sales per capita sales in whole industry in MSA where individual lives ($1,000) 
17.58 
(9.95) 
retail_sales per capita sales in retail industry in MSA where individual lives ($1,000) 
9.38 
(1.91) 
trans_sales per capita sales in transportation  industry in MSA where individual lives ($1,000) 
1.39 
(1.04) 
ent_sales per capita sales in entertainment industry in MSA where individual lives ($1,000) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
1997 Economic 
Census 
msavmtp per capita vehicle miles traveled in MSA where individual lives 
8,315 
(2,901) 
Bluestone 
(forthcoming) 
Note. The variables unemp, whole_sales, retail_sales, trans_sales, ent_sales, msavmtp,  
 msavmta, ppmsa contain less observations due to the missing values. 
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Table 9  
Summary of Fatal Incidences by Occupation and Event (1992-2002 CFOI) 
  Truck Sales Bus Taxi Total 
Violent Total 232 101 25 668 1,026 
 (in an MSA) (195) (88) -a (612) -a 
 [MSA % of total] [84] [87] -a [91] -a 
Non-violent       
Transportation Total 7,176 335 150 245 7,906 
 (in an MSA) (3,776) (214) (97) (193) (4,280) 
 [MSA % of total] [52] [63] [64] [78] [54] 
Others Total 1,362 29 16 16 1,423 
 (in an MSA) (862) (20) -a -a (907) 
 [MSA % of total] [63] [68] -a -a [63] 
a The number is suppressed for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Table 10 
MSAs with Top Five Number of Deaths by Occupation and Event (1992-2002 CFOI) 
 
Violent fatal injury # of deaths (risk rate) Non-violent fatal injury 
# of deaths 
(risk rate) 
Truck driver 
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA  
16  
(0.22×10-4) 
Riverside-San Fernardino, CA 
PMSA 
140 
(4.93×10-4) 
Dallas, TX PMSA  9 (0.19×10-4) 
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
126 
(1.79×10-4) 
Chicago, IL PMSA  7 (0.19×10-4) Chicago, IL PMSA  
113 
(1.38×10-4) 
Washington D.C, PMSA  7 (0.19×10-4) Atlanta, GA MSA  
94 
(1.91×10-4) 
Miami FL, PMSA  6 (0.35×10-4) Houston, TX PMSA 
94 
(2.29×10-4) 
 
Sales driver 
 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA  8 (1.43×10-4) Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 
11 
(1.97×10-4) 
Dallas, TX PMSA  6 (1.32×10-4) Atlanta, GA MSA 
10 
(1.42×10-4) 
Atlanta, GA MSA 6 (0.85×10-4) Chicago, IL PMSA 
7 
(0.81×10-4) 
Detroit, MI PMSA  5 (0.90×10-4) Houston, TX PMSA 
7 
(0.85×10-4) 
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA  -
a Los Angels-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
7 
(0.51×10-4) 
 
Taxi driver 
 
New York, NY PMSA 186 (32.26×10-4) New York, NY PMSA 
25 
(4.3×10-4) 
Chicago, IL PMSA 29 (9.39×10-4) Chicago, IL PMSA  
9 
(2.91×10-4) 
Atlanta, GA MSA 24 (13.41×10-4) Washington D.C, PMSA  
7 
(2.43×10-4) 
Washington D.C, PMSA  24 (8.33×10-4) 
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA  
7 
(1.42×10-4) 
Los Angels-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA  
20 
(4.36×10-4) Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA  
6 
(2.36×10-4) 
a The number is suppressed for reasons of confidentiality 
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Table 11   
States with Top Five Number of Death Incidences by Occupation and Event 
(1992-2002 CFOI) 
 
Sales driver 
 
Taxi driver 
 
New York 200 (18.88×10-4) New York 
40 
(3.77×10-4) 
California 48 (3.23×10-4) California 
23 
(1.54×10-4) 
Florida 36 (3.73×10-4) Florida 
22 
(2.28×10-4) 
Illinois 33 (6.90×10-4) New Jersey 
15 
(2.32×10-4) 
Georgia 33 (10.07×10-4) Illinois 
13 
(0.20×10-4) 
Violent fatal injury # of deaths (risk rate) Non-violent fatal injury 
# of deaths  
(risk rate) 
Truck driver  
California 36 (0.14×10-4) California 
821 
(3.20×10-4) 
Texas 27 (0.13×10-4) Texas 
777 
(3.93×10-4) 
Florida 15 (0.11×10-4) Florida 
418 
(3.08×10-4) 
Illinois 10 (0.07×10-4) North Carolina 
351 
(4.17×10-4) 
New York 10 (0.08×10-4) Pennsylvania 
332 
(2.49×10-4) 
Pennsylvania 10 (0.55×10-4) Texas 
34 
(1.04×10-4) 
Texas 9 (0.27×10-4) Georgia 
30 
(2.27×10-4) 
Georgia 8 (0.60×10-4) Missouri 
21 
(2.24×10-4) 
New York 6 (0.38×10-4) Ohio 
20 
(0.93×10-4) 
Florida 6 (0.21×10-4) Pennsylvania 
20 
(1.11×10-4) 
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Table 12   
National Trend of Employment Growth in Driving Occupations 
Occupation Average employment 1992-1997 (thousands)
Average employment 
1998-2003 (thousands)
Percent change 
between 1992-1997 
average and 1998-
2003 average 
Truck 1217.66 1367.23 12% increase 
Taxi 31.35 32.4 3% increase 
Bus 21.85 22.86 4% increase 
 
 
 
  
Table 13   
Summary of Fatal Incidence by Occupation and Event in the 1998-2002 CFOI (in 
parenthesis, the proportion of deaths in 1992-2002 is reported) 
 Truck  Sales Bus Taxi Total 
Violent      
Total 85 
(36%) 
43  
(42%) 
12  
(48%) 
208  
(31%) 
348  
(33%) 
(in an MSA) 74  
(37%) 
38  
(43%) 
-a 190  
(31%) 
 -a 
Non-violent      
Total 4,125 
(48%) 
194  
(53%) 
102  
(61%) 
130  
(49%) 
4,551 
(48%) 
(in an MSA) 2,259 
(48%) 
124  
(52%) 
67  
(61%) 
101  
(49%) 
2,551  
(49%) 
a The number is suppressed for reasons of confidentiality 
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Table 14   
Mean and Standard Deviation of Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event (1992-2002 
CFOI) (standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 MSA level State level 
 Violent fatal risk (in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk 
(in 10,000) 
Violent fatal risk 
(in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk 
(in 10,000) 
Total 0.97 (3.97) 1.74 (3.72) 1.42 (4.20) 1.99 (1.64) 
Truck 0.06 (0.15) 2.62 (2.10) 0.08 (0.15) 3.27 (1.68) 
Sales 0.24 (1.00) 1.02 (2.19) 0.27 (0.27) 0.98 (0.70) 
Bus 0.13 (0.85) 0.95 (2.95) 0.16 (0.43) 1.45 (1.59) 
Taxi 3.52 (7.36) 2.17 (6.09) 5.34 (7.30) 2.14 (1.39) 
 
 
Table 15   
Mean and Standard Deviation of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event 
(1992-2002 CFOI) After Dropping MSAs With Less Than 100 Employees (standard 
deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 Violent fatal risk 
(in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal risk 
(in 10,000) 
Total 0.75 (2.82) 1.60 (2.29) 
Truck 0.06 (0.15) 2.62 (2.10) 
Sales 0.23 (0.82) 0.97 (1.91) 
Bus 0.11 (0.51) 0.68 (1.44) 
Taxi 3.75 (5.88) 1.68 (3.10) 
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Table 16   
Mean and Standard Deviation of Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event Based on 
1998-2002 CFOI (standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 MSA level State level 
 Violent fatal risk (in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk 
(in 10,000) 
Violent fatal risk 
(in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk 
(in 10,000) 
Total 0.75 (4.39) 1.95 (5.09) 1.00 (3.11) 1.91 (1.91) 
Truck 0.05 (0.22) 2.79 (2.46) 0.04 (0.05) 3.32 (2.19) 
Sales 0.19 (1.11) 1.22 (3.63) 0.26 (0.45) 1.09 (1.10) 
Bus 0.14 (1.64) 1.43 (5.20) 0.19 (0.83) 1.43 (1.76) 
Taxi 2.66 (8.40) 2.25 (7.80) 3.47 (5.47) 1.79 (1.65) 
 
 
Table 17   
Mean and Standard Deviation of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rate by Occupation and Event 
After Dropping MSAs With Less Than 100 Employees Based on 1998-2002 CFOI 
(standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 Violent assault 
(in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal risk 
(in 10,000) 
Total 0.48 (2.33) 1.78 (3.20) 
Truck 0.05 (0.22) 2.79 (2.46) 
Sales 0.21 (1.15) 1.03 (2.53) 
Bus 0.05 (0.31) 0.92 (2.55) 
Taxi 2.29 (5.06) 2.03 (5.09) 
 
 
 
73
Table 18   
Missing Injury Data by Statea 
Name of State  Years missing 
Colorado  
District of Columbia  
1992-2002 
1992-2002 
Idaho  1992-2002 
Illinois   1992-1997 
Maine   1995 
Maryland  1995 
Mississippi  1995-2002 
Missouri  1995 
Montana  1995 
New Hampshire  1992-2002 
New Jersey  1992 
North Carolina  1996 
North Dakota  1992-2002 
Ohio  1992-2002 
Oregon  1995 
Pennsylvania  1992, 1995-2002 
South Carolina  1995 
Vermont  1995-1996 
Virginia  1995 
West Virginia  1992-1997 
Wyoming  1995-2001 
 a State not listed had no missing data.  
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Table 19   
State Level Non-fatal Injury Rates by Occupation Based on the IFF 1992-2002 (standard 
deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 Truck drivers Sales drivers Bus drivers Taxi drivers 
Assault injury 0.0001 (0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0009) 
0.0004 
(0.0008) 
0.00007 
(0.0003) 
Transportation 
related injury 
0.007 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Total injury 0.0581 (0.011) 
0.046 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
 
 
 
 
Table 20  
State Level Non-fatal Injury Rates by Occupation Based on the IFF 1998-2002 (standard 
deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 Truck drivers Sales drivers Bus drivers Taxi drivers 
Assault injury 0.00005 (0.0001) 
0.0003 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0007) 
0.00006 
(0.0004) 
Transportation 
related injury 
0.007 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Total injury 0.055 (0.012) 
0.041  
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
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Table 21  
Summary of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based 
on 1992-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 N Violent fatal risk (in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk (in 10,000) 
# of workers with 
zero violent/non-
violent risk 
Total 12,892 0.83 (4.19) 1.92 (1.63) 5,408/1037 
Truck 10,293 0.08 (0.11) 2.07 (2.46) 4,036/ 189 
Sales 602 0.30 (0.57) 0.70 (3.63) 366/231 
Bus 1,115 0.18 (1.64) 0.87 (1.39) 880/440 
Taxi 882 10.67 (12.33) 2.38 (3.17) 126/177 
 
 
 
 
Table 22  
Summary of State Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based 
on 1992-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 N Violent fatal risk (in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk (in 10,000) 
# of workers with 
zero violent/non-
violent risk 
Total 19,371 0.52 (2.71) 2.92 (1.67) 3,505/200 
Truck 16,085 0.07 (0.08) 3.23 (1.56) 2627/ 0 
Sales 895 0.26 (0.23) 0.91 (0.58) 195/33 
Bus 1,385 0.11 (0.23) 0.92 (1.06) 629/130 
Taxi 1,006 8.38 (8.73) 2.39 (1.32) 54/37 
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Table 23  
Summary of MSA Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based 
on 1998-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 N Violent fatal risk (in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk (in 10,000) 
# of workers with 
zero violent/non-
violent risk 
Total 10,479 0.46 (1.91) 2.09 (1.84) 6,215/1155 
Truck 8,369 0.06 (0.11) 2.23 (1.60) 4,862/ 254 
Sales 483 0.36 (1.04) 0.76 (1.48) 358/283 
Bus 906 0.17 (0.96) 1.38 (2.78) 823/392 
Taxi 721 5.43 (4.98) 2.37 (2.41) 172/226 
 
 
 
 
Table 24   
Summary of State Level Fatal Risk Rates for the Sample of Workers (Risk Created Based 
on 1998-2002 CFOI; standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 N Violent fatal risk (in 10,000) 
Non-violent fatal 
risk (in 10,000) 
# of workers with 
zero violent/non-
violent risk 
Total 15,447 0.32 (1.58) 3.16 (1.98) 4,600/348 
Truck 12,829 0.05 (0.05) 3.48 (1.93) 3,580/ 0 
Sales 689 0.27 (0.38) 1.15 (0.96) 265/70 
Bus 1,118 0.13 (0.47) 1.27 (1.23) 658/189 
Taxi 811 4.90 (4.99) 2.38 (1.35) 97/89 
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Table 25  
Summary of State Level Injury Rates for the Sample of Workers (Injury Risk Created 
Based on  1992-2002 IFF; standard deviation reported in parentheses) 
 
 N Violent injury risk Non-violent injury risk 
# of workers with zero 
violent/non-violent injury 
risk 
Total 17,091 0.0002 (0.0005) 0.0525 (0.0163) 5,142/22 
Truck 14,164 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0577 (0.0093) 2,215/ 0 
Sales 772 0.0002 (0.0007) 0.0466 (0.0148) 772/0 
Bus 1,230 0.0012 (0.0014) 0.0279 (0.0179) 1,230/0 
Taxi 925 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0115 (0.0078) 925/22 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26  
Summary of State Level Injury Rates for the Sample of Workers (Injury Risk Created 
Based on 1998-2002 IFF; standard deviation reported in parenthesis) 
 
 N Violent injury risk Non-violent injury risk 
# of workers with zero 
violent/non-violent injury 
risk 
Total 12,754 0.0001 (0.0005) 0.0485 (0.0159) 7,747/105 
Truck 10,529 0.00005 (0.0001) 0.0534 (0.0103) 6,286/ 0 
Sales 561 0.0003 (0.0008) 0.0409 (0.0139) 436/70 
Bus 945 0.0010 (0.0012) 0.0271 (0.0154) 344/189 
Taxi 719 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0111 (0.0090) 681/105 
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 Chapter IV   
Panel Data Analysis of Hedonic Wage Model 
 
This study uses panel data models to identify the endogeneity bias in the cross-
sectional HW model and to estimate a consistent wage/risk premium.  In addition to 
employing panel models to control for time-invariant omitted variables, we also test the 
strict exogeneity assumption to assure the consistency of panel estimators.  To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to test the use of panel estimators in estimating the HW 
model.  The labor market data comes from the large continuous national panel, the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panel administered by U.S. Census 
Bureau.  As discussed in chapter 3, the SIPP contains rich information on workers’ wage 
and demographic characteristics.  The occupational fatal risk comes from Scotton (2000).  
The risk rate varies by occupation and industry group. 
Endogeneity in Hedonic Models. 
The standard HW model estimates the following equation by an ordinary least 
square (OLS) model: 
iiii Xry µγβ ++=        (15) 
where yi is a wage level (often natural log form), ri is an occupational fatal risk level, Xi is 
a vector of determinants of wages (e.g., age, educational attainment, race, sex, including a 
constant), and µi is an error term for individual i.   
The coefficient of risk variable β  represents the risk premium on wages.  The 
estimated β  is unbiased only if ri is an exogenous variable.  If the risk variable is 
endogeneous such that the cov(ri,µ i|Xi)≠0, then the estimated β  is biased and 
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inconsistent.  The non-zero covariance between the risk variable and the error term may 
arise from omitted variables, measurement error associated with the risk variable, or 
simultaneity between wage and the risk variable. 
  In the HW literature, many researchers show concern for this endogeneity 
problem in the cross-section HW models, especially endogeneity related to omitted 
variables or measurement error associated with risk variables.  Potential unobservable 
characteristics which could influence wages and would vary with a worker’s wage-risk 
tradeoff include heterogeneous workers’ characteristics such as risk preference or 
productivity under non-safe environment, and working conditions such as the level of 
physical exertion involved and the risk of job-related injuries (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).   
Measurement error associated with the risk variable can be one of two types.  One 
type is measurement error between the estimated objective risk level and the actual 
individual worker’s risk level.  The other type is measurement error between the actual 
individual worker’s risk level and worker’s perceived risk level (see discussion about 
measurement error in chapter 2).  The first type of measurement error has not been 
considered in the HW literature until recently.  Most of the HW studies in the U.S. assign 
the industry average risk level to each worker to estimate the HW equation (Viscusi and 
Aldy 2003).   This practice assumes that different occupations in a same industry such as 
the secretary and construction worker at construction industry face the same risk level, 
which is apparently not true.   
The recent renovation in the occupational risk data enables researchers to 
construct more flexible format of the risk variable, such as the risk rate varies by 
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occupation and industry group as used in this study.42  It is still possible that there is 
measurement error between the estimated risk level and the actual individual worker’s 
risk level, but error of this type should be smaller when we use the occupation-industry 
risk rate as compared to the industry average risk rates.   
There is no satisfactory argument about the second type of measurement error 
(McConnell 2006).  However, past studies report important disparities between subjective 
risk measures (the risk a person believes he/she faces) and objective risk measures for 
different types of risks (Benjamin, 2001; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & 
Combs, 1978), and thus this type of error may bias the risk estimator significantly. 
Several empirical studies attempt to correct this endogeneity bias in the HW 
model using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Siebert and Wei (1994) use a 
standard 2SLS model.  Garen (1988) use a general case of the 2SLS approach which 
includes the interaction term between the estimated residual from the first stage equation 
and the risk variable in addition to the risk variable itself (Card, 1999). Gunderson and 
Hyatt (2001) and Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) follow Garen’s approach using labor 
market data in Canada and in the United Kingdom, respectively.  
Previous studies generally find a substantial increase of the risk premium when an 
IV estimation strategy is used.  For example, Siebert and Wei (1994) find a 1.5 to 2.5-
fold increase, Gunderson and Hyatt (2001) find a five-fold increase, and Arabsheibani 
and Marin (2001) find up to a 10-fold increase in the estimated risk premium.  However, 
results of these studies are often quite sensitive to the model’s specification.  
Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) find that a slight change in the sample composition and in 
the model specification dramatically changes the magnitude of their estimated risk 
                                                 
42 See Scotton (2000) and Viscusi (2004) for the studies which use occupation-industry risk rates. 
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premium in the Garen model.  They argue that the instability of their risk premium 
estimates are likely due to the poor fit of the first stage risk equation.   
There are a few studies that use panel data to correct the time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity problem in the HW equation, but the results of these are mixed.  
Brown (1980) estimates a HW model using a fixed effect (FE) model with panel data of 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).   Although he uses an actuarial risk 
measure, which reflects not only occupational causes of death, but all causes of death, he 
finds a statistically significant positive estimate of the risk premium.  Black et al. (2003) 
also use NLSY for their analysis, but could not find a statistically significant result, likely 
due to a large measurement error bias associated with their measure of workplace risk.  
Kniesner et al. (2005) use a first difference (FD) model on panel data from the Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), incorporating a fairly disaggregated occupational 
risk measure.  They find a significant decrease in risk premium once they control for the 
time-invariant heterogeneities.    
 Although Kniesner et al. (2005) provide the most reliable risk premium estimate 
among previous panel studies because they use the most disaggregated occupational risk 
data, there still remains concern.  As Griliches and Hausman (1986) indicate, it is 
common to observe lower or insignificant estimates when one applies a FE or FD model 
as these models exacerbate measurement error bias.  Thus smaller or insignificant 
coefficient estimates may be caused by measurement error bias, and not necessarily due 
to the correction of unobserved heterogeneity.   In addition, Kniesner et al. (2005) assume 
that time-varying unobserved factors that could be correlated with risk are negligible, but 
it may not be the case.  For instance, on the job training in a previous job might affect the 
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worker skill related to the next job, although on-the-job training is often unobserved to 
the researcher 
VSL is an important component of policy analysis, and careful examination of 
this potential bias in the panel data analysis should be conducted.  The panel data analysis 
and IV approach have different advantages and disadvantages.  Panel data provides an 
excellent way to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but panel models 
are sensitive to measurement error bias.  The IV approach can control for more 
endogenous factors, but requires additional information.     
In this study, we estimate panel models to assess the potential bias due to 
endogeneity problems in cross-section HW models.  We test the consistency of panel 
estimators by employing simple statistical tests, as well as by combining the panel data 
approach and the IV approach to control for time-invariant and time-varying worker 
heterogeneity, measurement error bias, and simultaneity between wage and risk variable.  
The next section first discusses the theory underlying the FD and FE models, followed by 
a discussion of the strict exogeneity assumption to obtain consistent panel estimators.  
We then present the estimation results for the pooled cross-section OLS, FD and FE 
models.  After discussing these results, we examine potential violations of the strict 
exogeneity assumption in panel models from the simple statistical test and from two stage 
panel models.  We also conduct sensitivity analysis on our results.  Lastly we present the 
conclusions of the analyses. 
Basic FD and FE Model 
Assume the wages in period t, tiy , , are determined as follows: 
tiitititi ZXry ,,,, µδγβ +++= ,      (16) 
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where tiy , , tir ,  and tiX ,  are defined as in the equation (15),  iZ is a vector of unobserved 
time-invariant factors, ti,µ is an error term which may contain a vector of  unobserved 
time-varying factors or measurement error associated with the risk variable, and  
}{ Tt ,...,2,1= .  
A FD model with T periods implies the following estimating equation:  
titititi Xry ,,,, µγβ ∆+∆+∆=∆ ,       (17) 
where, 
1,,,1,,,1,1,,,  and , , , −−−− −=∆−=∆−=∆−=∆ tititititititttitititi XXXrrryyy µµµ . 
For a FE model with T periods, the estimating equation becomes: 
titititi Xry ,,,, µγβ &&&&&&&& ++=        (18) 
where ititiititiititiititi XXXrrryyy µµµ −=−=−=−= ,,,,,,,,  and , , , &&&&&&&& , and where  
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Note that in both equations, the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity Z is 
perfectly controlled, while remaining unobserved factors may be still a problem.  We 
estimate equation 16 and 17 to obtain the FD and FE estimators. 
Endogeneity in Panel Models 
The important underlying assumption that panel models must satisfy to obtain 
consistent estimators is the strict exogeneity assumption..  The strict exogeneity 
assumption requires that the error terms are uncorrelated with r, X or Z in any time period 
as expressed in equation (19): 
 0),,|( ,,, =isisiti ZXrE µ , for T.s t, ∈∀      (19) 
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 The violation of strict exogeneity may come from contemporaneous correlation 
between the risk variable and the error term, which can be caused by time-varying 
omitted variables, measurement error associated with risk variable, or simultaneity 
between wages and the risk variable (Wooldridge, 2001).  The violation of strict 
exogeneity assumption leads to inconsistent panel estimators.  In this study, we assume 
that a vector of X satisfies the strict exogeneity assumption.  Thus we only focus on r as a 
potential endogeneous variable.   
According to Wooldridge (2001), one can test for the strict exogeneity assumption 
of variable of interest, using the FE model with t>2 by testing a H0: ξ =0 by estimating on 
the FE model assuming the HW model is  
1t t t t ty r X W Zβ γ ξ δ µ+= + + + +       (20) 
where W is the subset of X.  In our case, W consists only of the risk variable.  If there is a 
violation of strict exogeneity, one msut find external instruments to obtain consistent 
estimators.   
For the FD model, the outside instruments, Q, should satisfy following conditions: 
0),cov( and 0),cov( ,,,, ≠∆=∆ titititi QrQu      (21) 
And for the FE model, the outside instrument should satisfy: 
0),cov( and 0),cov( ,,,, ≠= titititi QrQu &&&&      (22) 
The conditions above imply that the variables Q are expected to influence the 
choice of risk but not wages received.  More specifically, Q is expected to be correlated 
with  changes in risks but not changes in wages in the FD models.  And for the FE model, 
Q is expected to influence time-demeaned risks but not time-demeaned wages.  
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In the next section, we present the OLS, FD and FE estimation results, followed 
by the test results for the strict exogeneity assumption.  We also examine the potential 
endogeneity problem from the contemporaneous correlation using external instruments, 
assuming there are time-varying omitted variables, measurement error associated with 
risk variable or simultaneity between wage and risk variables. 
Results 
Table 27 shows the estimation results with OLS, FD and FE models.  Data are 
discussed in chapter 3.  The dependent variable is the log of gross hourly wage level, and 
independent variables include the occupational risk level, job characteristics, worker’s 
characteristics, and regional variables.  Most of explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, and results are generally consistent with findings in previous studies using 
similar risk measures such as Scotton (2000) and Viscusi (2004).  Age and education 
level are positively correlated with wages.  Hispanics and African Americans earn less 
than whites, and females earn less than males.  Workers who belong to a union receive 
higher wages than non-union workers and so do married workers compared to single 
workers.   
The coefficient for the risk variable from the cross-section HW model is 0.0167 
and statistically significant at the 1% level.  The cross section HW model allows the 
correlation among observations of a same worker.  The estimated VSL from this cross-
section HW model is $4.6 million.43   This value is in a range of the average value of 
previous VSL estimates (Kochi et al., 2006; Viscusi, 1992).  This VSL estimate is 
significantly smaller than the estimate based on the similar risk measure by Kniesner et 
                                                 
43 The VSL is estimated as follows: VSL=coefficient of risk variable ×hourly wage× 40 ×52 (weeks) 
×10,000, where 10,000 is the unit of fatal risk. 
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al. (2005), which is $17.7 million.44   The difference between the estimates likely comes 
from the different model specification as well as the difference in average wage level of 
the sample.  Kniesner et al. (2005) do not include industry dummy variables due to the 
concern of multicolinearity between risk variables and industry dummy variables.   In 
addition, Kniesner et al. (2005) do not include firm side variables included in our model.  
The VSL estimate also depends on the average wage level.  In our sample, the average 
wage is $13.27 while the sample of Kniesner et al. (2005) has the average wage of 
$21.04.   
When we omit industry dummy variables from our model, the estimated 
coefficient of the risk variable increases to 0.0374, which also increases the VSL to $10.3 
million. This estimate is still less than the estimates of Kniesner et al. (2005).  When we 
omit firm specific variables, hipart, hifull, empsiz, empall, in addition to omitting 
industry dummy variables, the estimated coefficient of the risk variable decreases to 
0.0264, which is a VSL of $7.2 million.  Both these estimates are higher than the VSL 
obtained from our pooled cross-section OLS model, which is $4.6 million.  This indicates 
that the excluding industry dummy variables and firm-side variables likely overestimates 
the wage/risk premium.   
As shown in table 27, all industry dummy variables and firm variables are 
significant factors to determine wages and they also affect the coefficient of risk.  
Including these variables does not reduce the significance of risk coefficients, which 
indicates that the multicollinearity is not likely the issue in our model.  Since these 
variables are correlated with risk variable, excluding these variables would bias the 
results and thus we keep these variables in our models.   
                                                 
44 Estimate based on 11-year average risk rates. 
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Remaining differences in the VSL estimates between our study and Kniesner et al 
(2005) are likely from the difference in the wage level across sample of workers.  As 
mentioned earlier, the average wage (in our sample) is $13.27 while that of Kniesner et 
al.’s (2005) sample is $21.04.  Due to the over-sampling of low-income population in the 
SIPP program, the average wage level of the sample in the SIPP is less than national 
average (see chapter 3).   The average wage level of Kniesner et al.’s (2005) sample is 
higher than the national average, which we would expect to make the divergence between 
our estimate and their estimate larger if risk is a normal good.   
Our cross section HW result indicates that workers in the U.S. labor market 
receive a significant wage premium for accepting higher levels of occupational risk.  
However, when we apply the FE model and the FD model, the coefficient of risk variable 
dramatically reduced, yet still significant.  The FE and FD models show the coefficient of 
0.0094 and 0.0062, respectively, which are significant at the 1% level.   The estimated 
VSL are $2.5 and $1.7 million, respectively.  The 95% confidence interval of the VSL 
based on the FE estimator is $1.7 -$3.4 million and that of the VSL based on the FD 
estimator is $0.5 -$2.9 million.  These results indicate that the unobserved time invariant 
worker characteristics significantly bias the OLS results upward, and resulted in the 
pooled OLS overestimating the wage-risk premium.  This finding is similar to Kniesner 
et al. (2005).  They also find that panel models significantly reduce the risk coefficient.  
However, after they use FD models, their estimated VSL becomes $6.7 million (with 
approximate 95% interval of $2.7-$10.7million), which is still higher than our point 
estimates, and just barely overlaps with the 95% confidence interval of our FD estimate.45  
                                                 
45 When we omit the industry dummy and firm-side variables, our FE and FD estimator is 0.014 with 
standard error 0.0013 and 0.011 with standard error 0.0019, respectively.  The corresponding VSL 
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The estimated risk coefficients of our FD and FE models are similar to each other 
with overlapped 95 % intervals, which may indicate that there is not an important 
endogeneity issue in the models.46  However, it is still worthwhile to examine the 
consistency of estimators using additional methods because the panel estimators of risk 
variable are not consistent if the risk variable is endogenous in the panel.  The following 
section examines the consistency of FE and FD estimators using two methods. The first 
method employs the strict exogeneity test illustrated in Wooldridge (2001), and the 
second method employs the second stage panel models.   
First, we examine the consistency of risk estimators in panel models using the 
strict exogeneity testing method illustrated in Wooldridge (2001).  Following Wooldridge 
(2001), we include one period lead risk variable (riskt+1), and re-estimate the FE model, 
assuming all other explanatory variables are strictly exogeneous.  The estimating 
coefficient of lead risk variable is -0.0004 with standard error 0.0015.  The coefficient is 
not significant, which indicate that the strict exogeneity assumption is not violated in our 
models.   However, when we estimate model without industry variables, where the risk 
variable is clearly endogenous, the lead risk variable is still not significantly different 
from zero.  This indicates that this strict exogeneity test may not be strong enough.   
Next, we employ the two stage panel models to ensure the exogeneity of risk 
variable.  Two types of instruments are explored.  The first type of instrumental variables 
are “outside” the model data and are variables that we expect will influence the choice of 
risk-level but not wages-received.  These are; the monthly income other than wage 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimates are $3.8 (95% interval: $3.1-$4.5million) and $3.0 million (95% interval: $2-4million), 
respectively.  These change indicate that the Kniesner et al. (2005) study overestimate the VSL.  
46  Ziliak et al. (1999) noted that if there is no endogeneity in panel models and if the FE model is adjusted 
for a non-stationarity, then the FD model and the FE model should have a same probability limit when 
more than two time period are contained in the data. 
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(inc_other), the number of social security recipients in the household (N_SS), the monthly 
income from all financial investments (inv_all) and a dummy variable indicating that the 
reason the employee chose not to have health insurance is a lack of belief in health 
insurance (nohi_reason).47   These variables are obtained from the 1996 SIPP.   
The wage level should be determined according to the worker’s productivity.  The 
incomes that are earned through non-wage sources, the number of social security 
recipients in household, or their lack of belief in health insurance would not likely affect 
the worker’s productivity.  On the other hand, the level of total wealth, number of 
dependents or belief in health insurance may be related to the worker’s risk taking 
behavior.   
The second type of instruments adds a variable developed from the risk data itself.  
This additional variable is the difference between the risk level of individual worker and 
the average risk of the 3-digit level occupation in which the worker engages (dif_rocc).  
The variable dif_rocc is expected to have a strong correlation with the risk variable.  The 
variable dif_rocc is a valid instrument only if the worker’s deviation from the mean risk 
level within a same occupation is not correlated with the error term.48 
 Table 28 shows the first-stage regression results with the second type of 
instrumental variables, and table 29 shows the second-stage regression results from IV-
                                                 
47 There are several categories of reasons employees chose not to be covered by health insurance in the 
1996 SIPP, and they are: health insurance not offered by employer; they use a VA or military hospital; they 
are covered by other health plans; they haven’t needed health insurance; job layoff, loss, unemployment; 
they are no longer covered by parents; they are not eligible (part time or temporal workers), poor health, 
illness, age, etc.; some other reason; and too expensive and cannot afford. Models were estimated using all 
these variables but there is no improvement in results.  
48 More specifically, the changes in the deviation from the mean occupational risk (across all industries) 
must be uncorrelated with changes in the error term from the regression estimating the changes in wage for 
the FD model.  For the FE model, the time-demeaned deviation from the mean occupational risk (across all 
industries) must be uncorrelated with time-demeaned error term from the regression estimating the time-
demeaned in wage. 
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FE and IV-FD models based on the second type of instrumental variables. As presented 
in table 28, dif_rocc and nohi_reason are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively in the 
first-stage FE model, and only dif_rocc is significant at 1% in the first-stage FD model.  
Note that most of industry dummy variables are significant risk determinants at the 1% 
level.  In addition, our firm variables, empsize, and hifull, are also significant risk 
determinants at the 1% and 10 % levels, respectively.  These strong correlations of the 
risk variable between industry dummy variables and firm-side variables confirm the 
importance of including these variables in the hedonic wage model, as discussed earlier.   
 As shown in table 29, the second stage IV-FE model and IV-FD models show the 
coefficients of the risk variable to be 0.0112 and 0.0077, respectively.  The Hausman test 
for endogeneity results, shown in the Endogeneity test row, indicates that these 
coefficients are not significantly different from those in the FD and the FE models.  
These results suggest that there is no endogeneity bias in the FD and FE models resulting 
from contemporaneous correlation.  The Sargan statistics, which evaluates the over-
identification restriction, fails to reject the null hypothesis.  Failing the null hypothesis of 
the over-identifying restriction indicates that the current set of instruments is valid, 
although this may be due to the low power of the test (Wooldridge 2001).  Nevertheless, 
the coefficient estimates in the IV-FE and IV-FD models are similar to each other, which 
indicate that the models are well-specified.  There is no significant change among non-
risk variables when we estimate the IV-FE and IV-FD models as compared to the FE and 
FD models.   
There may be a question about using dif_rocc as an instrument.  The instrument 
should correlate with risk variable and not correlate with error terms in the FD and FE 
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models.  As mentioned earlier, the variable dif_rocc is not a valid instrument if worker’s 
deviation from the mean risk level within a same occupation is correlated with the error 
term.  Table 30 shows the second-stage results of the IV-FE and IV-FD estimators when 
we omit dif_rocc as an instrument in the first stage.  The top half of table 30 presents key 
results from the second stage of the IV-FE and IV-FD models and the second half shows 
key results from the first stage.  None of the external instruments are significant in either 
the FD or FE models.  The Anderson statistics, which test for the relevance of 
instruments, fail to reject null hypothesis that indicates that the correlation between the 
risk variable and external instruments are weak (Baum, 2006).  Weak instruments 
generally make the estimators inconsistent, and increase the standard error of the 
estimator (Wooldridge 2001).  The omission of dif_rocc apparently makes the 
instruments weak and the IV-FD and IV-FE estimators become insignificant.  In addition, 
the IV-FD estimator changes sign indicating that the estimators may indeed be 
inconsistent.   Including additional variables indicating why workers do not have health 
insurance (see footnote 47), does not improve the results.    
It is difficult to say with certainty whether dif_rocc is a valid instrument.  The 
conditions be met are quite complicated in this context.   Again, the conditions for the FD 
model are that the changes in the deviation from the mean occupational risk (across all 
industries) must be uncorrelated with changes in the error term from the regression 
estimating the changes in wage.49  There is not an intuitive story as to why this condition 
might hold.  However, there is not a clear argument against its validity either.   
Furthermore, the closeness of estimated IV-FE and IV-FE estimators when dif_rocc is 
included as an instrument, as well as the failing to reject Sargan statistics in these models, 
                                                 
49 See footnote 48 for the condition of valid instrument for the FE model. 
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provide some confidence that the models are well-defined.  Therefore, we draw our 
conclusions relying on the results from IV-FE and IV_FD models which include dif_rocc 
as an instrumental variable.  
Sensitivity Analysis. 
There is a concern that the difference of the OLS and panel estimators may be due 
to the systematic difference between job changers and non-job changers.  In the pooled 
OLS model, the variation in the risk variable from both job changers and non-job 
changers contribute to estimate the risk coefficient.  On the other hand, since the risk 
change is zero for all non-job changers, the variation to estimate the risk coefficient in the 
panel models comes from only the job changer sample.  It is possible that job changers 
and non-job changers may be systematically different in terms of the observable 
characteristics such as risk taking behavior or age, as well as the unobservable 
characteristics, such as risk preference or the level of job competence.   If job changers 
and non-job changers are systematically different, then there are two factors contributing 
the difference between the panel risk estimators and the OLS risk estimator.  One is time-
invariant worker heterogeneity (within sample heterogeneity), and the other is worker 
heterogeneity between job changers and non-job changers. 
Table 31 shows the summary statistics of key variables of job changers and non-
job changers.  Job changers are defined as workers who changed jobs at any point in the 
1996 Panel. The main noticeable, but relatively minor, differences between job changers 
and non-job changers are in their average age, union membership and the availability of 
full employer-provided health insurance.   The average age of non-job changer is 39 
years old while that of job changers is 36 years old.  This difference makes sense because 
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young people tend to change jobs more often.  There is a slightly higher proportion of 
people who are married, but a slightly lower proportion of people who have kids under 
age 18 among non-job changers as compared to job changers.  These differences are 
likely due to the difference in age between job changers and non-job changers.  The non-
job changer sample has a higher level of union membership rate and more access to the 
employer provided full health insurance as compared to job changers.  In addition, non-
job changers earn slightly higher hourly wage than job changers.   
To examine the effect of potential heterogeneity between job changers and non-
job changers on the estimating results, we re-estimate the pooled OLS model and panel 
models under two hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that the job changers and non-job 
changers face different hedonic wage schedules for occupational risk compensation, but 
both samples have the same sample distribution in terms of worker/job characteristics 
other than risk.  The second hypothesis is that the job changers and non-job changers may 
face different hedonic wage schedules for occupational risk compensation and both 
samples have different sample distributions in terms of other worker/job characteristics.     
To examine the first hypothesis, we estimate the following pooled OLS model. 
 iiiii XJCrry µγββ ++×+= 21 ,      (23) 
 where all variables are as described in equation 15 and JC is a dummy variable, where 1 
indicate a job changer and 0 indicate a non-job changer.  This model allows job changers 
and non-job changers to face different hedonic wage curve for occupational risk, but 
assumes all other variables have the same sample distribution.  The estimation results 
show that the risk coefficient for job changers is 0.0068 (SE=0.0031) and for non-job 
changers is 0.0238 (SE=0.0030) and they are significant at 1% and 5% level, 
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respectively.  The 95% confidence interval of these two risk coefficients do not overlap.  
This results strongly indicates that job changers and non-job changers face different 
hedonic wage schedule for risk.  In addition, we do not find a significant difference 
between pooled OLS risk estimator for job changers and panel risk estimators presented 
in table 27, which indicates that there is no time-invariant worker heterogeneity bias in 
the pooled OLS model when based on job changers only.   
Now, we assume that the job changers and non-job changers may face a different 
hedonic wage schedule for risk compensation and also assume that they may have 
differences in other worker/job characteristics that correlate with the risk variable.  To 
examine this hypothesis, we estimate the pooled OLS and panel models with only the 
job-changer sample.  Table 32 shows the regression results.  The risk coefficient in the 
pooled OLS model is 0.0207 and is significant at the 1% level.  The 95% confidence 
interval of the risk coefficient is between 0.0140 and 0.0275.  As shown in table 27, the 
risk coefficient in the pooled OLS model based on both job-changer and non-job changer 
sample is 0.0167 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.0118 and 0.0215.  When we 
estimate the pooled OLS model only with non-job changer sample, we obtain the risk 
coefficient of 0.0130 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.0062 and 0.0197.   Thus, 
including the non-job changers lowers the estimated risk coefficient in the pooled OLS 
somewhat, but the difference between the coefficient estimates from the three models is 
not statistically significant at the 5% level.  As expected, the risk coefficients from fixed 
effect and first difference models do not show a significant change by excluding non-job 
changers as shown in table 32.  This result reinforces the original conclusions that the 
time-invariant worker heterogeneity biases the pooled OLS risk estimator upward.  
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Since these two hypothesis leads to opposite conclusions, we need to carefully 
examine which hypothesis is more appropriate.  To test the appropriateness of the first 
hypothesis, we estimate the model which adds interaction terms between job changing 
status and all variables in the pooled OLS model (such as risk×JC, age×JC, college×JC 
etc.).  We test if the coefficients of all risk interaction terms are jointly different from 
zero.  We obtain the F-statistics of 4.34 and the p-value of 0.0040.  The test result 
suggests that it would be reasonable to assume that job changers and non-job changers 
are systematically different in terms of worker/job characteristics.  Therefore, we rely 
estimation results from the second hypothesis for our conclusions.   
With only the job changer sample, we estimate the VSL of $7.78 million, $2.59 
million, and $1.70 million from the pooled OLS, FE model and FD model, respectively.  
This result indicates that the use of the OLS model biases the risk coefficient upward 
significantly due to time-invariant worker heterogeneity.  Table 33 shows the 2SLS panel 
models with the second type of instruments with only the job changer sample.  We do not 
find endogneiy problem in our revised panel models.   
Next, we examine the potential bias associated with the market disequilibrium.  If 
the workers who tend to change jobs are ones who are out of equilibrium, and they 
change jobs so that they move towards an equilibrium position, then panel models do not 
provide consistent estimators.  If this is the case, the panel estimators represent the 
movement of workers from disequilibrium to the equilibrium, and not the static hedonic 
wage schedule.  Herzog and Schlottman (1990) use industry switching models to 
examine this disequilibrium hypothesis.  In this study, we compare hedonic wage 
schedule of before and after job change for the job changer sample.   
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Table 34 shows the summary of the sensitive analysis results.  The last row and 
the third from the last row shows the OLS results of the before job change sample and 
after job change sample, respectively.  The risk coefficient of before job change sample 
and after job change sample is 0.0164 and 0.0234, respectively.  The difference in the 
risk coefficients is not statistically significant at the 5% level.  Thus, similarity in the two 
estimates suggests that workers are not moving towards different HW schedules by 
changing jobs.  Of course this is not a concrete test for market disequilibrium since the 
OLS estimation results may be biased for other reasons as shown in this chapter.  
However, unless there is a strong reason why we should believe there is a different 
direction or degree of bias in the before job change sample and the after job change 
sample, this simple test provides useful information about the market disequilibrium 
hypothesis for our sample.  
Conclusions.    
This study aims to identify the endogeneity bias in previous cross-section HW 
studies by combining the panel data approach and the IV approach.  The endogenous 
nature of risk variable in HW models has been a major concern in using the wage/risk 
premium estimators in policy analysis (Viscusi & Aldy 2003).  This study uses two stage 
least square (2SLS) panel models to control for endogeneity bias resulting from omitted 
time-variant and time-invariant individual heterogeneity,  measurement error associated 
with the risk variables and simultaneity between the wage and risk variable.   
We collect a sample of workers from a large national panel study, the 1996 SIPP.  
Our occupational fatal risk rates vary by occupation and industry.  This fatal risk measure 
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provides important variation of the level of risk when workers change their occupation, 
and enable us to estimate the wage/risk premium with panel models.  
Our analyses find that there is a significant upward bias due to the omitted time-
invariant worker heterogeneity.  The estimated VSL after controlling for the omitted 
time-invariant worker heterogeneity is between $1.7 million-$2.5 million, which is nearly 
a half of the VSL estimate when we do not control for the omitted time-invariant worker 
heterogeneity.  Our analysis of two stage least square panel models show that there is no 
endogeneity bias in our panel models resulting from time-variant worker heterogeneity 
measurement error or simultaneity between risk variable and wage.     
Our finding is similar to the finding of Kniesner et al. (2005), which also use 
panel models to estimate wage/risk premium.  They found that the estimated VSL after 
controlling for the omitted time-invariant worker heterogeneity is $6.7 million, which is 
about a third of their VSL estimate without controlling for the omitted time-invariant 
worker heterogeneity.   
The difference in the absolute value of the VSL between the Kniesner et al. study 
and our study comes from the different model specifications and the different wage level 
of the sample.  We find that industry dummy variables and firm-side variables that are 
omitted from Kniesner et al. (2005) are significant wage determinants, and also correlate 
with the risk variable.  We show that omitting these variables bias the risk coefficient 
upward by about 50% in both cross-section and panel models.  Interestingly in footnote 9 
in page 14, Kniesner et al. (2005) report that the VSL estimate becomes $4.4 million 
when they include the one-digit level industry dummy, which is also about 50% smaller 
than their estimate of the VSL when excluding the one-digit level industry dummy.  
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However, in their text, they express concern about multicolinearity between the risk and 
industry dummy variables and do not consider the model with industry dummies further. 
 Our sample of workers has a lower than average wage, while Kniesner et al.’s 
(2005) sample has a higher than average wage.  This divergence of the average wage 
level may contribute to the disparity between our VSL estimate and their VSL estimate. 
To further explore this issue, we re-estimate the FE and IV-FE models with an adjusted 
SIPP sample.  We first exclude workers who are earning less than $9.7 per hour so that 
the sample average wage matches the U.S. average wage, $16 (see chapter 3).  This 
leaves 111,723 observations in the sample.  The estimated FE shows the coefficient of 
risk variable 0.0062, and a VSL of $2.0 million.  We further reduce our sample of 
workers to those earning more than $16 per hour so that our sample average wage 
matches the average wage level in the Kniesner et al. sample.   This leaves 44,605 
observations in the sample.  However, we do not obtain significant risk estimator with 
this sample in the FE model.  Although these results are only suggestive since we only 
match the mean, not the variance in wage across samples, they do suggest that perhaps 
the industry controls play a more important role in the difference our estimates as 
compared to the wage differences. 
It is important to remember that our sample is not a representative sample of 
workers in the U.S. (see chapter 3), and we must be cautious to apply our VSL estimation 
to policy analysis.  However, it is not likely that the uniqueness of our sample would 
undermine our conclusions about the existence of endogeneity bias in the cross-section 
HW models and the critical importance of including firm-side components that Kniesner 
et al. fail to explore.    
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As a sensitivity analysis, we consider whether our comparison of pooled OLS and 
panel models are appropriate to examine the bias due to time-invariant worker 
heterogeneity in pooled OLS model.  If there is heterogeneity between the job-changer 
and non-job changer sample, the difference between pooled OLS and panel model 
estimators comes from two sources; the worker heterogeneity and heterogeneity between 
job-changers and non-job changers.  When we estimate models only for job-changers, we 
find larger difference between pooled OLS and panel estimators.  This result reinforces 
our original observation of significant upward bias in pooled OLS estimators due to the 
time-invariant worker heterogeneity. 
We also examine our underlying assumption that workers are in equilibrium in 
any period of time.  In our sensitive analysis, we do not find a significant HW schedule 
change between before and after job change for the job changer sample. We conclude 
that workers do not move between different HW schedules, but move along the same HW 
schedule when they change jobs, and thus the our underlying assumption is valid. 
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Table 27  
Cross-section, Fixed Effect and First Difference Regression Results  
 OLS (clustered) (SE) 
Fixed 
Effect (SE) 
First 
Difference (SE) 
risk  0.0167*** 0.0024  0.0094*** 0.0015  0.0062*** 0.0022 
age  0.0303*** 0.0010  0.0556*** 0.0020  0.0156*** 0.0027 
age2 -0.0003*** 0.00001 -0.0007*** 0.00001 -0.0001*** 0.00003 
ugdeg  0.2022*** 0.0089  0.1097*** 0.0179  0.0183 0.0259 
college  0.1373*** 0.0058  0.0199*** 0.0137  0.0026 0.0195 
hsgrad  0.0785*** 0.0053  0.0150*** 0.0120  0.0009 0.0158 
hispanic -0.0095*** 0.0059     
blacknh -0.0569*** 0.0055     
female -0.1301*** 0.0043     
workov  0.0637*** 0.0037  0.0147*** 0.0015  0.0071*** 0.0012 
union  0.1983*** 0.0049  0.0515*** 0.0023  0.0163*** 0.0019 
kids18  0.0058*** 0.0017  0.0014 0.0013  0.00008 0.0017 
married  0.0739*** 0.0039  0.0171*** 0.0031  0.0056 0.0038 
hipart  0.1426*** 0.0036  0.0350*** 0.0016  0.0116*** 0.0014 
hifull  0.1513*** 0.0043  0.0383*** 0.0018  0.0118*** 0.0015 
empall  0.0472*** 0.0033  0.0131*** 0.0014  0.0060*** 0.0014 
empsize -0.0472*** 0.0035 -0.0149*** 0.0016 -0.0070*** 0.0015 
neast -0.0187*** 0.0063  0.0174 0.0195  0.0685 0.0272 
midwest -0.0421*** 0.0055 -0.0095 0.0155  0.0623 0.0223 
south -0.0962*** 0.0053 -0.0501*** 0.0144  0.0077 0.0210 
urban  0.0709*** 0.0043  0.0111*** 0.0037  0.0026 0.0048 
agind -0.1309*** 0.0166 -0.0418*** 0.0111 -0.0241*** 0.0181 
constind  0.0112         0.0114  0.0175* 0.0084 -0.0124 0.0141 
tcuind -0.0399*** 0.0107 -0.0122 0.0085 -0.0590*** 0.0145 
trdind -0.2205*** 0.0089 -0.0957*** 0.0072 -0.1135*** 0.0125 
servind -0.0933*** 0.0086 -0.0485*** 0.0069 -0.0714*** 0.0121 
manufind -0.0955*** 0.0091 -0.0105** 0.0074 -0.0432*** 0.0127 
craftocc  0.2605*** 0.0154  0.0717*** 0.0088  0.0611*** 0.0121 
profocc  0.3151*** 0.0160  0.0868*** 0.0091  0.0733*** 0.0124 
techocc  0.1849*** 0.0152  0.0558*** 0.0087  0.0501*** 0.0120 
servocc  0.0075 0.0156 -0.0227*** 0.0089 -0.0215* 0.0123 
laborocc  0.1130*** 0.0151  0.0343*** 0.0086  0.0192* 0.0116 
Constant  1.5049*** 0.0251  1.3747*** 0.0630  0.0103*** 0.0005 
N (# group)  166,362 (34,847)  166,362 (34,847)  113,343 (26,269) 
R2 (overall)  0.45   0.06   0.26  
VSL (million$)  4.60   2.59   1.71  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level.
 
 
 
101
Table 28  
First Stage Regression Results With Second Set of Instrumental Variables. 
 Fixed Effect model (SE) 
First 
Difference 
model 
(SE) 
age  0.0075*** 0.0024  0.0005 0.0023 
age2 -0.00007*** 0.00002  1.47×10-6 0.00002 
ugdeg  0.0455** 0.0206  0.0085 0.0220 
college  0.0214 0.0158 -0.0070 0.0165 
hsgrad  0.0122 0.0138 -0.0129 0.0134 
workov  0.0048*** 0.0017  0.0039*** 0.0010 
union  0.0062** 0.0026  0.0024 0.0016 
kids18 -0.0011 0.0015 -0.0006 0.0014 
married  0.0050 0.0035  0.0049 0.0032 
hipart -0.0004 0.0018  0.0008 0.0011 
hifull -0.0039* 0.0021  0.0003 0.0013 
empall -0.0025 0.0017 -0.0026** 0.0012 
empsize  0.0149*** 0.0018  0.0038*** 0.0013 
neast  0.0254 0.0225 -0.0530 0.0231 
midwest -0.0110 0.0179  0.0321* 0.0189 
south -0.0053 0.0165 -0.0010 0.0179 
urban  0.0037 0.0042 -0.0059** 0.0040 
agind  0.4900*** 0.0126  0.3973*** 0.0153 
constind  0.8854*** 0.0094  0.8795*** 0.0117 
tcuind  0.3793*** 0.0097  0.3107*** 0.0123 
trdind  0.0008 0.0083 -0.0008 0.0106 
servind -0.0512*** 0.0080 -0.0630*** 0.0103 
manufind -0.2171*** 0.0085 -0.2015*** 0.0107 
craftocc -0.6820*** 0.0101 -0.8254*** 0.0102 
profocc -1.3007*** 0.0105 -1.4503*** 0.0105 
techocc -1.3397*** 0.0102 -1.5134*** 0.0101 
servocc -1.0315*** 0.0103 -1.1550*** 0.0104 
laborocc -0.4030*** 0.0100 -0.5644*** 0.0099 
Dif_rocc  0.6529*** 0.0015  0.6790*** 0.0016 
Inc_other  2.42×10-7 1.06×10-7 -2.98×10-7 6.14×10-7 
Inv_all  0.00001 9.43×10-6  1.77×10-6 5.70×10-6 
N_SS  0.0034 0.0025 -0.0019 0.0017 
Nohi_reason  0.0281* 0.0171  0.0060 0.0091 
Constant  1.3984*** 0.0726  0.0004 0.0004 
R2 (overall)  0.78    0.72  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table 29  
Second Stage (IV-FE and IV-FD) Regression Results: Second Set of Instruments. 
 
 IV-Fixed Effect (SE) 
IV-First 
Difference (SE) 
risk-hat  0.0112*** 0.0021  0.0077*** 0.0028 
age  0.05567*** 0.0020  0.0156*** 0.0027 
age2 -0.0007*** 0.00001 -0.0001*** 0.00003 
ugdeg  0.1096*** 0.0179  0.0183* 0.0259 
college  0.0198 0.0137  0.0026*** 0.0195 
hsgrad  0.0149 0.0120  0.0009   0.0158 
workov  0.0147*** 0.0015  0.0071*** 0.0012 
union  0.0515*** 0.0023  0.0163*** 0.0019 
kids18  0.0014 0.0013  0.00008 ** 0.0017 
married  0.0171*** 0.0031  0.0056 0.0038 
hipart  0.0350*** 0.0016  0.0110*** 0.0013 
hifull  0.0383*** 0.0018  0.0118*** 0.0015 
empall  0.0131*** 0.0014  0.0060*** 0.0014 
empsize -0.0149*** 0.0016 -0.0070*** 0.0015 
neast  0.0173 0.0195  0.0686* 0.0272 
midwest -0.0096 0.0155  0.0624* 0.0223 
south -0.0502*** 0.0144  0.0078 0.0210 
urban  0.0111*** 0.0037  0.0026 0.0048 
agind -0.0418*** 0.0111 -0.0257 0.0182 
constind  0.0150* 0.0085 -0.0146 0.0143 
tcuind -0.0137 0.0085 -0.0601*** 0.0146 
trdind -0.0956*** 0.0072 -0.1134*** 0.0125 
servind -0.0483*** 0.0069 -0.0711*** 0.0121 
manufind -0.0099 0.0074 -0.0427*** 0.0127 
craftocc  0.0722*** 0.0088  0.0621*** 0.0121 
profocc  0.0878*** 0.0091  0.0746*** 0.0125 
techocc  0.0568*** 0.0088  0.0515*** 0.0121 
servocc -0.0219** 0.0089 -0.0203* 0.0123 
laborocc  0.0339*** 0.0086  0.0195* 0.0116 
Anderson LR statistics  P<0.01   P<0.01  
Sargan statistics  P=0.83   P=0.94  
Endogeneity test  P=0.19   P=0.786  
N (# group)  157,784 (26,269)  113,343 (24,142) 
R2 (overall)  0.08   0.01  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level.
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Table 30   
IV-FE and IV-FD Results With First Set of Instruments. 
 IV-Fixed Effect (SE) 
IV-First 
Difference (SE) 
Selected second-stage results 
risk-hat 0.0077 0.3052 -0.1210 0.6047 
Anderson LR statistics P<0.46   P<0.81  
Sargan statistics P=0.68   P=0.86  
Endogeneity test P=0.99   P=0.83  
N (# group) 157,784 (26,269)  113,343 (24,142) 
R2 (overall) 0.08   0.01  
Selected first-stage results 
inc_other 1.01×10-6 1.61×10-6 -2.91×10-7 9.76×10-7 
inv_all 0.00001 9.43×10-6  8.76×10-7 9.06×10-6 
N_SS 0.00166 0.00380 -0.0030 0.0028 
nohi_reason 0.03748 0.0258 -0.0048 0.0145 
R2 (overall) 0.53   0.30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104
Table 31  
Summary Statistics of Key Characteristics of Job Changers and  
Non-job Changer Sample. 
 Non-job changers Job changers 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
wage 13.8676 6.2192 12.5094 5.3895 
risk 0.5643 0.9690 0.5508 0.9410 
age 39.4184 11.58 36.3091 11.0654 
college 0.3283 0.4696 0.3363 0.4724 
hsgrad 0.4134 0.4924 0.4278 0.4947 
hispanic 0.1281 0.3342 0.1413 0.3483 
blacknh 0.1332 0.3398 0.1419 0.3489 
othrace 0.0385 0.1924 0.0436 0.2042 
female 0.4628 0.4986 0.4517 0.4976 
workov 0.1909 0.3930 0.1892 0.3916 
union 0.2252 0.4177 0.1580 0.3647 
kids18 0.7627 1.1019 0.8262 1.1086 
married 0.5820 0.4932 0.5361 0.4986 
hipart 0.4542 0.4979 0.4346 0.4957 
hifull 0.2216 0.4153 0.1806 0.3847 
empall 0.5676 0.4954 0.5581 0.4966 
empsize 0.2948 0.4559 0.2990 0.4587 
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Table 32  
Cross-section, Fixed Effect and First Difference Regression Results With Only Job 
Changer Sample. 
 OLS (clustered) (SE) 
Fixed 
Effect (SE) 
First 
Difference (SE) 
risk  0.0207*** 0.0034  0.0090*** 0.0017  0.0059** 0.0023 
age  0.0303*** 0.0015  0.0629*** 0.0033  0.0158*** 0.0044 
age2 -0.0003*** 0.00002 -0.0008*** 0.00002 -0.0002*** 0.00005 
ugdeg  0.1790*** 0.0135  0.0781*** 0.0242 -0.0107 0.0388 
college  0.1310*** 0.0083 -0.0153 0.0187 -0.0243 0.0312 
hsgrad  0.0801*** 0.0076 -0.0082 0.0164 -0.0156 0.0253 
hispanic -0.0928*** 0.0084     
blacknh -0.0453*** 0.0079     
othrace -0.0378*** 0.0146     
female -0.1316*** 0.0061     
workov  0.0638*** 0.0053  0.0208*** 0.0024 0.0097*** 0.0018 
union  0.1907*** 0.0075  0.0779*** 0.0036 0.0264*** 0.0031 
kids18  0.0026 0.0024  0.0010 0.0020 -0.0020 0.0025 
married  0.0791*** 0.0056  0.0288*** 0.0046 0.0140** 0.0060 
hipart  0.1390*** 0.0050  0.0477*** 0.0024 0.0159*** 0.0021 
hifull  0.1469*** 0.0061  0.0516*** 0.0029 0.0141*** 0.0024 
empall  0.0463*** 0.0046  0.0170*** 0.0021 0.0087*** 0.0021 
empsize -0.0422*** 0.0049 -0.0216*** 0.0023 -0.0124*** 0.0022 
neast -0.0243*** 0.0093  0.0142 0.0252 0.0587 0.0398 
midwest -0.0381*** 0.0081  0.0021 0.0204 0.0894*** 0.0325 
south -0.0949*** 0.0077 -0.0456** 0.0188 0.0192 0.0301 
urban  0.0743*** 0.0062  0.0130** 0.0052 0.0027 0.0067 
agind -0.1149*** 0.0249 -0.0329*** 0.0125 -0.0227 0.0195 
constind -0.0063 0.0168  0.0245*** 0.0095 -0.0099 0.0152 
tcuind -0.0567*** 0.0167 -0.0095 0.0096 -0.0588*** 0.0156 
trdind -0.1963*** 0.0139 -0.0874*** 0.0082 -0.1118*** 0.0135 
servind -0.0873*** 0.0135 -0.0409*** 0.0079 -0.0695*** 0.0131 
manufind -0.0810*** 0.0142 -0.0079 0.0084 -0.0439*** 0.0136 
craftocc  0.2574*** 0.0225  0.0669*** 0.0099 0.0596*** 0.0130 
profocc  0.3020*** 0.0233  0.0814*** 0.0103 0.0717*** 0.0133 
techocc  0.1869*** 0.0223  0.0513*** 0.0099 0.0490*** 0.0129 
servocc  0.0211 0.0228 -0.0261*** 0.0101 -0.0228* 0.0132 
laborocc  0.1113*** 0.0221  0.0301*** 0.0097 0.0180 0.0125 
Constant  1.4790*** 0.0365  1.2468*** 0.0971 0.0126*** 0.0008 
N (# group) 72,658 (11,294) 72658 (11294) 49102 (11294) 
R2 (overall)       
VSL (million$) 7.78  2.59  1.70  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 33 
IV-FE and IV-FD Results With Second Type of Instruments: Job-changer Sample 
Only. 
 IV-Fixed Effect (SE) 
IV-First 
Difference (SE) 
Selected second-stage results 
risk-hat 0.0108*** 0.024 0.0074** 0.0030 
Anderson LR statistics P<0.01   P<0.01  
Sargan statistics P=0.69   P=0.73  
Endogeneity test P=0.24   P=0.66  
N (# group) 72,658 (11,294)  4,9102 (10,020) 
R2 (overall) 0.11   0.01  
Selected first-stage results 
dif_rocc 0.6528*** 0.0023 0.6789*** 0.0024 
inc_other 4.39×10-7 2.29×10-6 -7.11×10-7 1.48×10-6 
inv_all 0.00004 9.43×10-6  2.16×10-6 0.00002 
N_SS 0.0065 0.0050 -0.0038 0.0038 
nohi_reason 0.0523 0.0349 0.0127 0.0200 
R2 (overall) 0.78   0.72  
 
Table 34 
Summary of Estimated Coefficients. 
 Coefficient 
(standard error) 
95% confidence interval 
Job changers-FD 0.0059 
(0.0023) 
0.00123 0.0105 
All-FD 0.0062 
(0.0022) 
0.0018 0.0105 
Job changers-FE 0.0090 
(0.0017) 
0.0055 0.0125 
All-FE 0.0094 
(0.0015) 
0.0064 0.0124 
Non-job changers 
OLS 
0.0130 
(0.0034) 
0.0062 0.0197 
All-OLS 0.0167 
(0.0024) 
0.0119 0.0215 
Job changers OLS -
before 
0.0164 
(0.0035) 
0.0096 0.0233 
Job changers OLS 
(before+after) 
0.0207 
(0.0034) 
0.0140 0.0275 
Job changer OLS-
after 
0.0234 
(0.0038) 
0.0159 0.0309 
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Chapter V 
Transferability of VSL: Hedonic Wage Analysis 
 
This study examines the transferability of the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) 
between different policy contexts using labor market data.  This study is motivated by the 
persistent concern regarding the use of VSL estimates based on fatal risks which are not 
directly related to the policy objective.  For example, U.S.EPA relies on the labor market 
studies to obtain the VSL to evaluate air pollution control program or fatal cancer 
reduction programs.   This exercise faces several criticisms; one of them comes from the 
concern that individual’s may have different preferences towards heterogeneous risks 
(USEPA, 1997, 2005; S. A. B. USEPA, 2000).  If individuals are sensitive to the 
qualitative characteristics of risk, such as dread, fear, and controllability, they may prefer 
certain risks over others even though both risks have a same probability of death.  If this 
is the case, individuals will place different values on risk reductions of different types.  
This implies that individuals may place different values on reducing environment-
oriented risks as compared to occupational risks, and the VSL obtained in the context of 
occupational risk is not a valid VSL to apply in the environmental policy evaluation. 
Early psychology studies did find that individuals perceive fatal risks differently 
depending on the perceived risk characteristics.  For example,  Slovic et al. (1980) find 
that lay people judge the degree of “risk” of death not only from the probability of death 
but also the characteristics of death.  Slovic et al. (1980) survey different groups and ask 
them to order the risk of 30 different activities, including nuclear power, motor vehicle, 
smoking, vaccinations etc.  They find that the order made by a group of experts matched 
the actual frequency or probability of events, while the order of lay people does not.   It 
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was possible that the perceived probability of lay people itself was biased by different 
reasons, such as an exposure to media coverage (Combs & Slovic, 1979).  However, 
Slovic et al. also find that the order that lay people assigned to the risk of death from 
various activities did not match with their perceived probability of each event either.   
Slovic et al. further examine what factors drive the disparity between lay people’s risk 
perception and their perceived probability of event.  Key characteristics that seem to 
affect individuals’ risk perception include the degree of control over the risk, the amount 
of dread involved, or potential to threat the future generations (Slovic et al., 1980).   
Several contingent valuation (CV) studies further examine the relationship 
between risk characteristics and individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce fatal 
risks.   There are three main approaches in these studies.  The first approach elicits 
individual’s WTP to reduce fatal risks that arise from different contexts, such as air 
pollution or traffic accidents (Cookson, 2000; McDaniels et al., 1992; Savage, 1993).   
The second approach elicits individual’s preference towards different policy programs 
which reduce different types of fatal risk but the cost effectiveness of the policy is 
identical (Cookson, 2000; Cropper & Subramanian, 1999).  The third approach elicits the 
individual perception on the equivalent number of lives saved in different policy contexts 
to a certain policy program (Chilton et al., 2002; Cookson, 2000; Jones-Lee & Loomes, 
1995).  These studies also ask individuals to rate the degree of qualitative characteristics 
of each risk according to their perception.  The elicited WTPs or preference towards 
certain policy are statistically or non-statistically related with the perceived risk 
characteristics, and estimate the marginal effect of each risk characteristic on the WTP.   
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Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995), Cropper and Sabramanian (1999), and Cookson 
(2000) found that individuals tend to exhibit a lower WTP (or place lower priority) to 
reduce highly controllable and voluntary risks (e.g., automobile accident risks) than to 
reduce other types of risks (e.g., air pollution).  Also, McDaniel et al.(1992) and Savage 
(1993) found that individuals have a higher WTP for reducing risks that involve a high 
degree of dread as compared to other types of risk.   
While there are a number of survey-based studies suggesting that individuals 
value a reduction of different types of risks significantly differently, we have little 
evidence from revealed preference studies in these regards.  There are two major 
advantages of using the revealed preference methods.  One advantage is that this method 
bases on the data from individuals’ actual behavior and eliminates the hypothetical bias 
which often pertains to survey studies (Cummings & Taylor, 1999).  The second 
advantage is that the labor market approach may mitigate the problem associated with the 
subject’s inability to understand small risk levels, which again is often an issue with 
survey methods (Corso, Hammitt, & Graham, 2001; Hammitt & Graham, 1999).  
Benjamin (2001) shows that on average, individuals can estimate their personal 
probability of death from various sources quite accurately.  Since occupational risk is a 
personal risk for workers, it is reasonable to assume that on average, these workers 
understand their probability of death at work reasonably well.   
This study attempts to provide insights into whether or not heterogeneous 
workplace risks play an important role in workers decision-making using labor market 
data.   In particular, we will focus on the risk/wage tradeoff between two very different 
risks: violent assault (homicide) risks and non-violent risks.  Although the focus is on the 
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individual’s behavior within the labor market, this study is potentially important to 
evaluate the transferability of VSL across different policy contexts.  If individuals exhibit 
different WTP to avoid different types of risks within the same policy context such as 
workplace safety, it is hard to justify the application of VSL transfer between different 
policy contexts.   
The next section describes previous work which this study improves upon, 
followed by a presentation of the empirical model.  Finally, results and conclusions will 
be presented.   
Literature Review 
To date, there is only one study that attempts to estimate the wage/risk premium 
for different types of risk using the hedonic wage model.  Scotton and Taylor (2006) 
construct an occupational fatality rate which varies by the cause of death from the public 
use sample of the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI).  Using this data, they 
estimate wage/risk premiums for different types of risk faced by a broad sample of 
workers.   
The results of their hedonic wage model are puzzling.  They find implausibly 
large risk premiums or large negative premiums for violent assault risks.  The authors 
suggest that the reasons they may have failed to estimate a theoretically consistent wage 
premium are: 1) the objective measures of risk they used may be different from the 
workers’ subjective measure of risk where the type of death is a rare event, and 2) the 
hedonic model they estimated may have failed to take into account the unobserved non-
risk characteristics of the job.   
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Also, Scotton and Taylor did not take into account the spatial heterogeneity of 
occupational risk.  For instance, workers in large cities tend to face higher crime and 
traffic accident rates, and thus face higher occupational fatal risks than those in rural 
areas.  The practice of assigning the same level of risk to workers in the same occupation 
regardless of location may have biased their result. 
In this study, we will improve the study design of Scotton and Taylor by using a 
different sample of workers as well as creating new, location-specific different risk data 
to estimate the wage/risk premia for two different types of risks: violent-assault risk and 
non-violent risk.   
To avoid measurement error caused by the disparity between an objective and 
subjective measure of risk, we will use a sample of workers who face either high violent 
assault or high non-violent (or both) risks routinely as part of their job.  Benjamin (2001) 
shows that individuals perform better in estimating their personal risk level when the 
actual risk level faced is high.  It is hoped that individuals who face high level of fatal 
risk routinely as part of their job are likely to understand the objective risk level of their 
job correctly.  Also, to minimize the bias caused by the unobserved job characteristics, 
we will use a sample of workers in a homogeneous occupation which requires very 
similar job duties.   
To fulfill these requirements, we will use a sample of occupational drivers, 
which includes taxi, truck, sales and bus drivers.  Occupational drivers face higher traffic-
accident risks on the job than other occupations, yet the type of risks faced varies across 
driver-types.  As discussed in chapter 3, the main causes of driver death are violent 
assaults and traffic-related accident.  Truck drivers have the highest traffic-related 
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fatalities among driving occupations.  Taxi drivers, on the other hand, have the highest 
homicide rate among those in driving occupations.  Indeed, the risk of death from violent 
assault for taxi drivers is the highest among all occupations, nearly four times more than 
the homicide rate of police officers (Knestaut, 1997).  In addition, the fatal risk rates from 
different causes varied significantly by the geographic area in which drivers reside.    
Slovic et al. (1980) show that lay people considers crime as a highly 
uncontrollable, involuntary and a highly dreaded risk.   In addition, lay people generally 
consider the fatal risk involving motor vehicles as relatively controllable, voluntary and 
with less dread.  Therefore, the comparison between violent-assault and non-violent risks 
for occupational drivers may be an excellent case in which we can examine the degree to 
which risks with different characteristics, especially in terms of dread and control 
involved, are valued differently by individuals.   
Empirical Model. 
We will use a cross-section hedonic wage model to estimate the risk/wage 
premium for a specialized sample of workers for each cause of fatal risk.  The estimating 
hedonic wage model is: 
ijoiojojojoji ZWXnvinjavinjanvriskavriskaawage εδγβ ++++++++= 43210ln  
           (24) 
where i denotes an individual worker in occupation o in area j.  The variables for 
occupational risk are as follows; vrisk is the fatal risk from a violent assault, nvrisk is 
fatal risk from a non-violent event, vinj is the risk of non-fatal injury (injury risk) from 
violent interactions and nvinj is the risk of non-fatal injury from non-violent causes.  
These risk rates vary by occupation (o) and geographic area (j).  X is a vector of relevant 
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individual characteristics, W is a vector of relevant job characteristics other than 
occupational risk, Z is regional characteristics which affect wage levels in each area, and 
ε is an error term.   
From the estimated HW model, we test if the wage/risk premiums for different 
types of fatal risk ( 1a  and 2a ) and for different types of injury risk ( 3a  and 4a ) are 
statistically different from each other.  The wage/risk premium for violent assault 
fatal/injury risk are expected to be significantly larger than that for non-violent 
fatal/injury assault risk due to the nature of violent risk with higher level of perceived 
uncontrollability and dread.  We assume the same wage-risk compensation schedule for 
each occupation. 
The choice of which geographic level to create the risk rates to be used may be 
important to estimate HW models accurately.  If the drivers work only within the MSA, 
the MSA level risk rates are the relevant risk measure.  If, however, the drivers work all 
over the state in which they reside, then a state-level risk rate is a more relevant risk 
measure.  It would be reasonable to assume that each driver works within and around the 
MSA in which they reside.  In this case, drivers would form their perception about their 
risks by weighting the MSA level risk and the state level risk according to the time they 
spend inside and outside the MSA.  
However, there is no record available from the CPS on how each driver in the 
sample allocates his/her time inside and outside of the MSA. Thus, the choice becomes 
either using the MSA-level or state-level risks.  We examine the sensitivity of results to 
the use of different geographic level risks in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
114
Results. 
This section presents the results of our analyses.  The base results, which are 
based on the MSA-level violent risk and the state-level non-violent risks created from the 
1992-2002 and 1998-2002 risk data, are presented first.  In general, the violent fatal risk 
is higher at the MSA-level than the sate-level, and the non-violent fatal risk is higher at 
the state level.  We include the MSA-level violent fatal risk and the state-level non-
violent fatal risk in the base model to avoid the possible underestimation of either risk 
level drivers face.   The summary of risks by type of risk and geographic level are 
presented in chapter 3.   
We first test the sensitivity of the base model to the inclusion of injury risk 
variables.   Additional sensitivity analyses are as follows. The second and third analyses 
examine the sensitivity of results to the use of risk rates created from the different 
geographic levels as well as the inclusion of different geographic level dummy variables.  
The fourth analyses examine the effect of adjusting the standard error in the model to 
allow for correlation among workers in the same geographic area.  We include 
geographic-level correlation that is different from the geographic level included as 
dummy variables.  For example, if a model includes MSA dummy variables, then 
correlation is allowed at the state level.  Allowing the correlation among observations, so 
called cluster, affects the standard errors of estimates (Sribney 2005). 50  Additional 
sensitivity analyses examine the effect of excluding the workers who face zero or high 
                                                 
50 The formula to estimate this variance is: 1
1
'1 )'()'(var −
=
− 

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jj   
where ∑=
clusterj
iij xeu and nc is the total number of cluster (William Sribney 2005 retrieved March 25, 2007 
from http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/cluster.html). 
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violent fatal risks and examining the effect of including MSA-specific descriptive 
variables.   
Table 35 shows the regression results with the base model and base sample of 
workers.  The fatal risk data is created based on the 1992-2002 CFOI in model 1 and 
based on 1998-2002 CFOI in model 2.  The base sample is occupational drivers who are 
not self employed, who work full time, who earn more than minimum wage, who work 
only one job and who are between age 18 and 66.  MSAs with less than 100 employees 
are omitted from the sample.51    Also, only workers in the continental U.S. are included.   
The base models (model 1 and model 2) include violent fatal risk, non-violent fatal risk, 
demographics, occupation and MSA dummy variables.  Since MSA-level violent risk is 
only available for drivers in MSA, we exclude drivers who live outside of MSA in the 
base model.   
All demographic variables show the expected sign.  Older workers earn more than 
younger workers, but at a decreasing rate.  College graduates and high school graduates 
earn more than non-high school graduates, white workers earn more than other workers, 
U.S. citizens earn more than non-US citizens, male workers earn more than female 
workers, unionized worker earn more than non-unionized workers, and married workers 
earn more than single workers.  Among occupations, truck drivers earn the highest level 
of wage, and taxi drivers earn the lowest level of wage.   
In both model 1 and model 2, the violent assault fatal risk has a significantly 
positive coefficient at the 1% level.52  The non-violent fatal risk has a negative, but not 
                                                 
51 Including MSAs with less than 100 employments does not change the results.   
52 We also include the squared violent and non-violent risk terms in the model.  However, the squared risk 
terms are not significant in any model estimate, which indicates that the linear risk model is the preferred 
model.    
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statistically significant coefficient in model 1 and negative and significant coefficient in 
model 2.  The coefficient of violent assault fatal risk is statistically larger than that of 
non-violent fatal risk at the 5% level in model 1 and at the 1% level in model 2 according 
to Wald tests.  A significantly larger coefficient for violent fatal risk than for non-violent 
fatal risk indicates that the workers require higher wage compensation to accept a 
marginal increase in violent assault fatal risk than to accept a marginal increase of non-
violent fatal risk.  The estimated VSL based on the violent fatal risk and mean wages in 
the sample is $1.8 million and $5.1 million for model 1 and mode 2, respectively.53   
We also estimate the VSL based on the total risk, which is the sum of violent and 
non-violent fatal risks.  The coefficient of total risk is 0.0034 in model 1 and 0.0052 in 
model 2.   They are significant at the 5% level and the 10% level, respectively. The 
estimated VSL based on total risk and average annual wage is $1.2 million and $1.8 
million for model 1 and model 2, respectively.  The VSL estimates based on total risk is 
compatible with previous VSL estimates and VSL estimated from panel models in 
chapter 4.  Our VSL estimates based on driver sample is lower bound of VSL estimate 
range (Kochi et al., 2006; Mrozek & Taylor, 2002; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).   
Table 35 shows that the use of different period of risk data makes significant 
impact on the risk premium estimation.  Model 2 has almost three times larger coefficient 
for violent risk as compared to model 1.  As discussed in chapter 3, the risk data created 
from 1992-2002 CFOI likely contains significant measurement error, which would bias 
the estimated risk coefficients downward.  In the following sections, we discuss the 
                                                 
53 VSL is calculated as follows: VSL=coefficient of risk variable ×weekly wage ×52 (weeks) ×10,000, 
where 10,000 is the unit of fatal risk. 
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sensitivity of model 2 to different model specifications and different geographic level 
fatal risks.  
Table 36 shows the sensitivity of the base result (model 2) to the different model 
specifications.   Model 3 adds the injury risk variables to model 2.  Adding injury risk 
variables slightly reduce the magnitude of coefficient for violent risk and remove the 
significance of negative coefficient of non-violent fatal risk.  Injury risk is significant and 
it is more theoretically sound to include it in the wage model, indicating that the model 3 
is preferred specification to model 2.   Thus, the remaining analyses include injury risk 
variables.  In model 3, the difference of coefficients between two fatal risk variables is 
significant at the 10% level.   The violent injury risk has a significantly positive 
coefficient at the 1% level, and the non-violent injury risk shows a positive but not 
significant coefficient.  The Wald test shows that the coefficient of violent injury risk is 
statistically larger than that of non-violent injury risk at the 1% level.  The estimated 
value of statistical injury for total injury risk is about $70,000.54   This is in the line of 
previous estimated value of statistical injury, which ranges from $30,000 to 360,000 (in 
2005 dollars) (Viscusi & Aldy 2003). The value of statistical injury for violent injury risk 
in this study is $1.0 million.   
Model 4 repeats model 3, but replaces the MSA dummy variables with state 
dummy variables.   Using state level dummy variable has little impact on the risk 
coefficient estimates, but does change comparison across risk types.  The Wald test now 
fails to reject the null of no significant difference between the two fatal risk coefficients 
                                                 
54 The coefficient of total injury risk for model 3 is 1.941 and significant at 1% level.  The value of 
statistical injury is calculated by multiplying 1.941 by annual wage. 
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at the 10% level.  However the difference is significant at 10.5% level.  The difference in 
coefficients of injury variables is still highly significant.   
Table 37 shows the sensitivity of estimation results to using different 
combinations of geographic level that defining the risk variables.  Model 5 and model 6 
include the MSA-level violent and non-violent risk variables, and model 7 and model 8 
include state-level violent and non-violent risk variables.  Model 5 and model 7 include 
MSA dummy variables and model 6 and model 8 include state dummy variables.  Note, 
in Model 5 and model 8, the risk variables vary by the geographic level that is the same 
level as the included geographic dummy variables.  For example, in model 5, risk only 
varies by MSA and occupation.  In this model, including MSA dummy variables reduce 
the variation of risk variables significantly, since the only variation to estimate the 
risk/wage premium comes from the variation over the occupation within the same MSA.  
Thus, it may be more reasonable to include geographic dummy variables which are not 
the same level in which the risk variables are created.  Model 6 and model 7 include the 
geographic dummy variables that are not same level in which risk variable is created.  
These models (models 6 and 7) show that two risk coefficients are statistically different 
from each other at the 5% level.  On the other hand, in model 5 and 8, the differences 
between the two risk coefficients are not significant.    
Although the same issue of multicolinearity applies to injury risk variables, which 
are only created at the state level (and varies by occupation), the results are robust to 
include state dummy variables.   For all models in table 37, the coefficients of violent 
injury risk are positive and significant at 1% level and the coefficients of non-violent 
injury are positive and not significant.   The Wald tests show that the differences in 
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coefficients of injury variables are significantly different from each other for all models 
at the 1% level.   
To avoid multicolinearity between risk variables and geographic dummy 
variables, we only focus on the model specifications that have a combination of fatal risk 
rates and geographic dummy variables that are created at different geographic level, such 
as model 6 and model 7.  Although in model 6, violent injury risks and geographic 
dummy variables are created at same geographic levels (state level), it seems there is no 
significant bias by doing so.  Therefore model 6 remains in our set of preferred models.    
Table 38 repeats the specifications of model 6 and model 7, but we allow for 
correlation among workers in a same geographic area.55  This allows us to examine the 
sensitivity of results to allowing the correlation within a geographic unit, but assuming 
there is no correlation across geographic units.  For model 9, the model includes state 
dummy variables and we allow for correlation within MSA.  For model 10, the model 
includes MSA dummy variables and thus we allow correlation within state.  The major 
change in table 38, as compared to table 37 is observed in model 10.  Without allowing 
correlation within geographic unit, the Wald test shows that the difference in the 
coefficients of risk variables is significant (model 7).  However, when we allow for 
correlation among geographic area, the difference is no longer significant.  The 
coefficients of injury variables are still significantly different from each other at the 1% 
level in both model 9 and model 10.   
When comparing model 9 and model 10, model 9 is preferred.  Model 9 uses 
MSA-level violent and non-violent risk.  The concern with model 10, which uses state-
                                                 
55 The complete set of models in table 38 with allowing the correlation among a same geographic unit are 
available in appendix G.   
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level violent and non-violent risk rates, is that the risk rates may not reflect driver’s actual 
fatal risk at work particularly for violent risk cases.  In model 10, state-level risk is 
uniformly assigned to the workers regardless of workers’ residency.  For example, taxi 
drivers working in MSAs and taxi drivers working in small towns in a same state are 
assigned a same level of violent fatal risk, which is not reasonable to assume.  On the 
other hand, model 9 does not include drivers who live outside of MSA, which make the 
sample of drivers more homogeneous in terms of the fatal risk level they face.   It is more 
reasonable to assume that the drivers who live in a same MSA face a same level of fatal 
risk (which still varies by occupation), than to assume that drivers who live in a same 
state face a same level of fatal risk.   
 Still, uniformly assigning the MSA-level risk rates for all drivers may not reflect 
their actual risk.  We also assign different geographic level risk rates for different drivers. 
Truck drivers are likely drive all over the state or inter-state, and sales driver and taxi 
drivers are more likely to work in the MSA.  Bus drivers could work all over the state if 
they are inter-state bus drivers.  However, bus drivers may also work within a MSA (e.g. 
public transit bus drivers).  Table 39 presents the results when we assign different 
geographic level risk rates to different drivers.  In model 11 and 12, we assign the state-
level risk rate for both violent and non-violent events for truck drivers and assign the 
MSA-level risk rates for both violent and non-violent events for bus, sales and taxi 
drivers.  The models also allow for correlation within geographic area as has been done in 
table 38.  Model 11 includes MSA dummy variables and model 12 includes state dummy 
variables.  In both models, violent risk is significantly positive at the 1% level and non-
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violent risk is not significantly different than zero.  The difference in coefficients of two 
risk variables is significant at the 5% level.  
In model 13 and 14, we assign state-level violent and non-violent risk rates for 
truck and bus drivers, and MSA-level violent and non-violent risk rates for sales and taxi 
drivers.  Assigning the state level risk rates for bus drivers reduce the magnitude of the 
coefficient of violent fatal risk, and increase the magnitude of coefficient of non-violent 
fatal risk.    This change makes the difference between two coefficients of risk variables 
insignificant in both model 13 and model 14.  Throughout the models in table 39, violent 
injury risk has significant positive coefficient and non-violent injury risk has a non-
significant coefficient.  The difference in coefficients of these injury variables is 
significant in all models.   
It is hard to discuss which model, model 11/12 or 13/14, is preferred.  If the 
number of local bus drivers outweighs the number of inter-state bus drivers, then model 
11/12 would be preferred, and vice versa.  There is no information in the CPS indicating 
whether a bus driver works at the local or inter-state level.  However, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that the number of local bus drivers outweigh the number of 
inter-state bus drivers if it is the case that public transit bus industry at a local level is 
bigger than the inter-state level bus industry.  However, this model may contain the 
problem due to the multicolinearity between fatal risk rates and geographic dummy 
variables. 
 Table 40 examines the sensitivity of results when we drop the observations with 
extreme levels of risks.  The risk rates used in these models are MSA-level for both 
violent and non-violent events and models include state dummy variables and allow 
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correlation among workers by MSA.  Model 15 excludes the workers who live in a state 
in which the state-level violent risk rate is zero.  This exclusion drops 1,572 observations.  
The difference between two fatal risk coefficients is still significant at the 5% level.  
However, the difference between two injury risk coefficients becomes insignificant.  This 
change is difficult to explain, and requires further characterization of dropped 
observations in terms of injury risks.   
In model 16, we drop the workers who face the MSA-level violent fatal rate 
higher than 12.7 (in 10,000), which is approximately the 95th percentile for violent fatal 
risk in our sample. This exclusion drops 142 observations, and affects the coefficients of 
fatal risk variables.  The coefficient of violent fatal risk is no longer significant and the 
difference of coefficients between two fatal risks is also not significant.  The exclusion of 
workers who face a high level of violent fatal risk does not affect the coefficients of 
injury risks.  The coefficient of violent injury risk is still significant at the 1% level and 
the difference between two injury coefficients is significant at the 5% level.   
Model 17 drops both workers who live in a state with zero violent fatal risk as 
well as workers who face a MSA-level violent fatal risk higher than 12.7 (in 10,000).  
The results for this model are similar to model 14.  The coefficient of violent fatal risk is 
significant (at the 5% level) and the difference in the coefficients between two fatal risk 
variables is also significant (at the10% level).  Neither of injury risk coefficients are 
significant, nor the difference in coefficients of these variables.  In summary, the 
estimation results are sensitive to the exclusion of extreme cases of violent fatal risk level 
from the sample.  However, in all models presented here, workers require higher 
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compensation to accept marginal increase of violent risk level than marginal increase of 
non-violent risk level, either from fatal injury events or non-fatal injury events. 
 Lastly, table 41 examines the robustness of results to including MSA variables on 
model 9.  The MSA variables included are the MSA-level annual unemployment rate, the 
MSA-level sales volume per capita in wholesales, retail, transportation, entertainment 
and food industries, and the MSA-level per capita vehicle miles traveled.  The MSA-level 
annual unemployment rates vary by year and the sales volumes is in 1997 level (see 
chapter 3).  Table 41 shows the coefficients for the fatal risk, injury risk, and MSA 
variables.  The coefficients of other demographic variables are not reported for 
succinctness.56  Wholesales and retail sales volume per capita have positive significant 
coefficients at the 1% and 10% level, respectively.  Transportation sales volume per 
capita has a negative coefficient that significant at the 10% level.  
The vehicle miles traveled per capita has a negative coefficient which is 
significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient of VMT per capita is small due to the large 
size of VMT per capita unit as compared to the unit for the log wage.  The mean VMT 
per capita is 9,310 miles per year with standard deviation of 2,348 miles per year.57   The 
increase of one standard deviation from the mean VMT per capita will reduce the wage 
by 1.6%.  Inclusion of the MSA variables slightly increases the coefficients for fatal 
risks, but does not affect the comparison between types of fatal risks or types of injury 
risks.  The violent fatal risk has significantly larger coefficients than non-violent fatal risk 
at the 5% level and the same is true for the injury risk cases. 
 
                                                 
56 Results for other variables are not affected by the inclusion of MSA variables. 
57 This mean value is not from the sample and is computed assuming the each MSA receiving equal weight. 
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Conclusions.     
This is one of few studies that use a revealed preference method to test the 
transferability of the VSL across different policy contexts.  Improved study design upon 
the previous revealed preference study enables us to articulate the individual’s WTP for 
different types of risk.   This study overcomes the issue of hypothetical bias that may 
pertain to previous studies based on surveys, and provide insights about how individual 
risk perceptions might play an important role in their actual decision making.    
We create unique geographic-occupation-specific fatal and injury risk rates for 
occupational drivers.  The sample of drivers is collected from the monthly CPS.  Our 
estimation results generally show that occupational drivers require more compensation to 
accept a marginal increase in violent fatal risk rate as compared to a marginal increase in 
a non-violent fatal risk rate.  Results also show that occupational drivers require more 
compensation to accept a marginal increase in violent injury risk as compared to a 
marginal increase in a non-violent injury risks.  The estimates of the wage/fatal risk 
relationship are somewhat sensitive to the different geographic level at which the fatal 
risks are created and for the geographic level of dummy variables included in the model.  
On the other hand, the estimates of the wage/injury risk relationships are quite robust to 
these changes.  
The sensitivity of the wage/fatal risk relationships are likely to come from the less 
appropriate model specifications.  For example, combining fatal risks and dummy 
variables which are created at a same geographic level in the same model is likely to be 
inappropriate due to the concern of multicolinearity among these variables.  In addition, 
the state-level fatal risk, especially for violent fatal risk, is not a preferred risk rate since it 
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ignores the heterogeneity of workers in terms of the fatal risk level at work within a same 
state.   
Among all model specifications, we prefer models with MSA-level fatal risks that 
include state dummy variables over other models for two reasons.  The first reason is that 
this model contains less multicolinearity issue.  The second reason is that the MSA-level 
fatal risks have a better representation of worker’s actual fatal risk level than state-level 
fatal risks.   When we focus on the estimation results from models with MSA-level 
violent and non-violent risks that include state dummy variables, our wage/fatal risk 
estimation results are robust to different model specifications.   Allowing correlation 
among workers within a same state, as well as adding MSA-specific demographic 
variables does not affect the results.  Our wage/injury risk results are also robust to 
different models specifications just mentioned above. 
Both wage/fatal risk and wage/injury risk results are somewhat sensitive to 
dropping workers with extreme violent fatal risk values from the sample.  When we drop 
individuals who work in states with zero violent fatal risk (at the state-level), we lose the 
significance of the violent injury risk coefficients, while we keep the significance of the 
violent fatal risk coefficient.  When we drop observations in high ends of MSA-level 
violent fatal risk (greater than the 95th percentile for our sample), we lose the significance 
of violent fatal risk coefficients while we keep the significance in violent injury risk.  
When we drop both observations in state with zero violent fatal risk and high ends of 
MSA-level violent fatal risk, we have significant violent fatal risk coefficient but non-
significant violent injury risk.  These changes of significance levels are puzzling.  
However, in any cases, either fatal risk or injury risk estimations indicate that drivers 
 
 
 
126
require higher compensation to accept marginal increase in violent risk than non-violent 
risk. 
The VSL for total risk in our sample in our base model (model 2) is $1.8 million 
and our preferred model (model 6) is $1.4 million.58  This is compatible with the VSL 
estimated from the panel models in chapter 4.  Although the type of workers included in 
this chapter and chapter 4 are quite different, we control worker heterogeneity in both 
studies, thus lending validity to the convergence of the VSL estimates between these two 
samples.  This study indicates that the VSL estimate from total risk is not applicable if we 
want to evaluate risk-specific policies such as traffic risk or violent risk.  When we 
separately evaluate individual’s willingness to pay to reduce each type of risk, we find 
quite different point estimates for WTP.   We find much higher VSL based on violent risk 
coefficient, and we do not find any wage compensation toward non-violent risk. 
The VSL estimated for violent risk in this study (around $3-5million) is in a range 
of the VSL estimated from previous cross section HW models, that is $4-10 million 
(Viscusi 1993).   At first thought, this comparison may appear to be counter to our 
hypothesis that wage/risk premia are differentiated by type of risk.  However, as 
discussed in chapter 4, existing estimates of the VSL in the literature typically do not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity.  In chapter 4, when we use undifferentiated risks 
and control for unobserved heterogeneity, our estimates of the VSL are approximately $2 
million, lower than the $4-10 million range found in the comparable existing literature 
using undifferentiated risks.59   
                                                 
58 The coefficient of total risk in model 6 is 0.0044. 
59 Total risk is the sum of violent and non-violent risks.  The wage/risk premium for total risk is likely 
smaller than that for violent risk because we could not find a significant compensation for non-violent risk, 
suggesting this type of risk may not be considered an issue for occupational drivers (perhaps they feel it is 
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We argue in chapter 4 that $4-10 million for undifferentiated risks is likely an 
upwardly biased estimate.  Our results in this chapter for undifferentiated risks also 
suggest $4-10 million is upwardly biased.  As such, our results suggest that a VSL of 
around $4 million may be appropriate to use in policy analysis designed to reduce the risk 
of fatal violent injuries among occupational drivers, and would not be appropriate to use 
for other policies involving different types of risks.  This point is further underscored by 
the fact that we could not find a significant wage premium for increased traffic accident 
risk among occupational drivers.  Traffic accident risk may be perceived as a highly 
controllable risk by this group of individuals, and as such, may not require wage 
compensation for working in areas with higher levels of fatality risks.    How the VSL 
level changes when we change the target risk type or target worker population should be 
pursued in the future study.          
The value of statistical injury for total injury risk in our sample in our base model 
(model 3) is $70,000 and our preferred model (model 6) is about $52,000.60  This is in 
line of previous estimated value of statistical injury.   However, once we separate violent 
and non-violent injury risk, we find much higher value of statistical injury for violent 
injury risk, which is around $1 million while we do not find significant wage 
compensation towards non-fatal non-violent injury risk.  This result confirms the 
conclusions from fatal risk analysis.   
Although the focus is on the individual’s behavior within the labor market, this 
study is potentially important to evaluate the transferability of VSL across different 
policy contexts.  Our results indicate that individuals exhibit different WTP to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                 
in their control).  As such, when adding violent and non-violent risks together to get a total risk, we are 
adding measurement error to the “risk” of the job, biasing this coefficient towards zero. 
60 The coefficient of total injury risk in model 6 is 1.4544. 
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different types of risks even in the same policy context.  This makes it hard to justify the 
application of VSL transfer between different policy contexts.  Although the occupational 
drivers are a special sample, we show that transferring VSL from one context to another 
is not an appropriate policy evaluation approach.  Our results from the revealed 
preference method confirm the previous results from stated preference method, and 
suggest risks with more dread/fear or less controllability require more compensation than 
risks with less dread/fear or more controllability.  These results suggest that it is 
necessary to estimate VSLs in the same policy context, or that any benefits transfer 
exercise require close attention to the types of risk being evaluated.      
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Table 35  
Regression Result: (Dependent Variable: ln(weekly wage), without MSA<100) 
 
 
Model 1 
Risk data 1992-2002 
Model 2 
Risk data 1998-2002 
 Coefficienta Standard error Coefficienta Standard error 
Violent risk (MSA level)  0.0050*** 0.0016  0.0140*** 0.0042 
Non-violent risk  
(state level) -0.0087*** 0.0063 -0.0138** 0.0058 
age  0.0373*** 0.0022  0.0369*** 0.0024 
agesq -0.0003*** 0.00002 -0.0003*** 0.00002 
ugdeg  0.00002*** 0.0195  0.1011*** 0.0218 
college  0.1012*** 0.0109  0.1032*** 0.0122 
hsgrad  0.1000*** 0.0096  0.0962*** 0.0108 
hispanic -0.0745*** 0.0137 -0.0701*** 0.0153 
blacknh -0.0348*** 0.0114 -0.0222*** 0.0126 
othrace -0.0978*** 0.0256 -0.0704** 0.0290 
uscit  0.1063*** 0.0157  0.1273*** 0.0173 
female -0.1800*** 0.0153 -0.1754*** 0.0168 
salary  0.0833*** 0.0080  0.0900*** 0.0089 
workot  0.2716*** 0.0073  0.2718*** 0.0082 
union  0.2341*** 0.0082  0.2188*** 0.0092 
married  0.0741*** 0.0079  0.0696*** 0.0088 
central -0.0276*** 0.0089 -0.0362*** 0.0101 
truck  0.0675*** 0.0207  0.0860*** 0.0220 
bus -0.0245*** 0.0205 -0.0128*** 0.0234 
taxi -0.1344*** 0.0290 -0.1480*** 0.0340 
Neweng -0.0389*** 0.2815 -0.0975*** 0.1930 
Midalt -0.3566*** 0.2899 -0.1698*** 0.1309 
Encent  0.0639*** 0.2766 -0.0384*** 0.2918 
Wncnet  0.1350*** 0.2852  0.0497*** 0.3006 
Satl  0.1601*** 0.3030  0.0598*** 0.2575 
Escent  0.1833*** 0.2833  0.1032*** 0.2838 
Wscent -0.5688*** 0.3260 -0.1920*** 0.1589 
Mount -0.3271*** 0.2928  0.1386*** 0.1493 
constant  5.5808*** 0.2803  5.2821*** 0.1076 
Test: violent= 
non-violent (p-value)  0.05   0.0004 
 
N  12,637   10,257  
Average weekly  
wage ($)  695.79 
  701.65  
VSL (violent risk)  $1.8 million  $5.1 million  
R2  0.32  0.32  
Note. MSA and year dummies are omitted to report. 
a regression shows significant heteroschedasity at 5% level and thus use robust estimators.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
130
Table 36   
Results With MSA Level Violent Risk and State Level Non-violent Risk Without 
MSA<100 (Standard error in parentheses) 
 
 Model3: 
w/ MSA dummy 
Model4: 
w/ state dummy 
violent fatal risk (MSA level)  0.0121***  0.0121*** 
non-violent fatal risk 
(state level) -0.0043*** -0.0028*** 
violent injury risk  29.2671***  30.8813*** 
non-violent injury risk  0.5831***  0.1285*** 
average weekly wage ($2004)  697.64  697.64 
R2  0.32  0.30 
N  8,685  8,685 
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)  0.08  0.102 
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)  0.008  0.0044 
VSL (violent fatal risk)  $4.3 million  $4.3 million 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 37  
Results With MSA Level or State level Fatal Risks Without MSA<100  
(Standard error in parentheses) 
 
 MSA-level fatal risks State-level fatal risks 
 Model 5: 
w/ MSA 
dummy 
Model 6: 
w/ state 
dummy 
Model 7: 
w/ MSA 
dummy 
Model 8: 
w/ State 
dummy 
violent fatal risk   0.0110***     0.0115***    0.0150***    0.0136*** 
non-violent fatal risk  0.0010***  0.0003*** -0.0001***  0.0084*** 
violent injury risk  29.5636***     31.0635***     38.1399***      29.8873***  
non-violent injury risk  0.7203***  0.2158***  0.2217***  0.8323*** 
average weekly wage 
($2004)  697.64  697.64  689.69  689.69 
R2  0.32  0.30  0.30  0.29 
N  8,685  8,685  12,509  12,509 
fatal: violent=non-violent  
(p-value)  0.134  0.0256  0.0328  0.528 
non-fatal: violent=non-
violent (p-value)  0.0085  0.0043  0.0001  0.0042 
VSL (violent fatal risk)  $3.9 million  $4.1 million  $5.3 million  $4.8 million 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 38   
Results with Allowing Correlation Within a Geographic Unit (standard  
error in parentheses) 
 
 MSA-level fatal risks State-level fatal risks 
 Model 9: 
w/ State dummy 
Model 10: 
w/ MSA dummy 
violent fatal risk   0.0115***  0.0150*** 
non-violent fatal risk  0.0003*** -0.0001*** 
violent injury risk  31.0635**  38.1399*** 
non-violent injury risk  0.2158***  0.2217*** 
average weekly wage ($2004)  695.28  687.31 
R2  0.30  0.30 
N  8,685  12,509 
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)  0.0131  0.1999 
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (p-
value)  0.0215  0.0009 
VSL (violent fatal risk)  $4.1 million  $5.3 million 
*p<00.1, **p<00.05, **p<00.01   
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Table 39  
Different Geographic Risk Level by Type of Driver With Allowing Correlation Within a 
Geographic Unit (standard error in parentheses) 
 
 truck: state-level,  
others: MSA-level fatal risks 
Truck/bus: state-level, 
others: MSA-level fatal risks 
 Model 11: 
w/ MSA 
dummy 
Model 12: 
w/ State 
dummy 
Model 13: 
w/ MSA 
dummy 
Model 14 
w/ State 
dummy 
violent fatal risk   0.0127***    0.0119***  0.0104***  0.0082***   
non-violent fatal risk -0.0047*** -0.0018***  0.0005***  0.0087*** 
violent injury risk  34.6514***  26.8280***  42.3898***  33.8273***  
non-violent injury risk -0.1886*** -0.0503*** -0.0701***  0.4533*** 
average weekly wage  
($2004)  691.40  691.40  688.82  688.82 
R2  0.30  0.29  0.30  0.29 
N  12,131  12,131  12,291  12,291 
fatal: violent=non-violent  
(p-value)  0.0119  0.0358  0.1796  0.9397 
non-fatal: violent= 
non-violent (p-value)  0.0003  0.0537  0.0001  0.0179 
VSL (violent fatal risk)  $4.5 million  $4.2 million  $3.7 million  $2.9 million 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 40 
Results With Limited Risk Range (With State Dummy and Allowing Correlation Within 
MSA) (standard error in parentheses) 
 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
 Drop vrisk_s=0 Drop vrisk_m>12.7 
Drop vrisk_s<0 & 
vrisk_m>12.7 
violent fatal risk (MSA level)  0.0139***   0.0105***  0.0163*** 
non-violent fatal risk (MSA level)  0.0021***  0.00003***  0.0018*** 
violent injury risk  24.4766***  30.6181***  23.2210*** 
non-violent injury risk  0.6544***  0.2835***  0.8628*** 
average weekly wage ($2004)  696.74  698.90  698.26 
R2  0.32  0.33  0.31 
N  7,113  8,514  6,942 
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)  0.0135  0.16  0.08 
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (p-
value) 
 0.1480  0.0244  0.18 
VSL (violent fatal risk)  $5.0 million  $3.8 million  $5.9 million 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
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Table 41  
Results With MSA Variables With Allowing Correlation Within MSA 
(standard error in parentheses) 
 
 Model 18: 
w/State dummy 
violent fatal risk (MSA-level)  0.0133*** 
non-violent fatal risk (MSA-level)  0.0021*** 
violent injury risk  30.9522*** 
non-violent injury risk -0.2817*** 
unemp -0.0043*** 
whole_sales  0.0035*** 
retail_sales  0.0063*** 
trans_sales -0.0195*** 
ent_sales -0.0225*** 
food_sales  0.0082*** 
msavmtp -7.06e-06*** 
average weekly wage ($2004)  692.43 
R2  0.31 
N  7,082 
fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)  0.0388 
non-fatal: violent=non-violent (p-value)  0.0329 
VSL (violent fatal risk)  $4.7 million 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation addressed two important issues in the VSL literature.  The first 
issue is the potential endogeneity bias in cross-section hedonic wage models. The second 
issue is the transferability of the VSL between different policy contexts.  
Chapter 4 addressed the issue of endogneity bias in cross-section HW models.  
We first estimated the cross-section model and panel models to identify the bias due to 
the time-invariant worker heterogeneity.  We also combined panel models and 
instrumental variable approach to control potential remaining endogeneity bias due to the 
measurement error associated with risk variable, time-variant worker heterogeneity and 
simultaneity between wage and risk. 
We use the national panel data of Survey of Income and Program Participation as 
our labor market data and occupation-industry risk matrices from Scotton (2000) as 
occupation-industry fatal risk data.  We find a VSL of $4.6 million (in 2005 dollars) with 
a standard error of $0.6 million from the cross-section hedonic wage model.  After 
controlling for workers unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity with the fixed-effect and 
first-difference models, we find the VSL of $2.5 million with the standard error of $0.4 
million and the VSL of $1.7 million with the standard error of $0.6 million, respectively.  
With the 95 percent confidence interval, there is no overlap of the VSL estimated from 
the cross-section model and panel models, while there is overlap the VSL estimated from 
the fixed-effect model and first-difference model.  We find no evidence of exacerbated 
attenuation bias from measurement error or remaining endogeneity bias in our panel 
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models.  We conclude that the cross-section OLS hedonic wage model is significantly 
biased upward due to the unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity, but not from 
the time-variant worker heterogeneity or simultaneity between wage and risk.    
Our hedonic wage models are sensitive to the inclusion of industry dummy 
variables and firm-side variables.  When we do not include industry dummy variables, 
our VSL estimate from the cross-section model increases to $10.3 million.  When we 
further drop firm-side variables, the VSL estimate from the cross-section model decreases 
to $7.2 million.  As documented in previous studies (McConnell, 2006; Mrozek & 
Taylor, 2002), we find that controlling industry differences and firm-side characteristics 
are important to obtain unbiased VSL estimates.   
The inter-industry wage differentials are well documented phenomenon in labor 
economics, and theoretically, industry dummy variables should be included in the 
hedonic wage model (McConnell, 2006).  The reason for not including industry dummy 
variables in hedonic wage models often is stated as a concern for potential multicolinerity 
between the risk variable and the industry dummy variables (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003). This 
concern is valid when fatal risk data only varies by industry.  Including the industry 
dummy variables often removes large amount of variation in risk variables and generate 
insignificant or sometimes negative risk coefficient (Dorman & Hagstrom, 1998).   
Our risk data in which risk rates vary by occupation and industry should mitigate 
the problem of multicolinerity between risk and industry variables.  Our regression 
results show that omitting industry variables significantly bias the risk estimators.  
Therefore when the industry dummies are omitted, the model may be significantly biased 
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and that must be corrected with instrumental variables models.61  Our regression models 
employ the one-digit level industry variables which are more aggregated than the industry 
variation in the risk variable.  Our second stage panel estimation results indicate that 
there is not an endogeneity problem in our panel models due to not controlling for more 
detailed level inter-industry wage difference. 
Mrozek and Taylor (2002) suggests that the VSL obtained from previous cross-
section hedonic wage models assuming all studies include industry dummy variables is 
about $2 million dollars in 1998 dollars or $2.4 million in 2005 dollars.  This is a quite 
similar value to the VSL we obtained from our panel models.  This may be because 
previous cross-section hedonic wage studies suffer from two types of bias; omitted 
variables bias and measurement error bias associated with risk variable, which work in 
opposite directions in this case.  Our study indicates that the previous studies suffer from 
upward bias due to the omitted variables.  However, at same time, previous cross-section 
hedonic wage studies are likely suffered from the attenuation bias from measurement 
error associated with risk variables.   
Since measurement error bias has been one of the major concerns in hedonic 
wage literature (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003), we further discuss this issue.  Most studies 
considered in Mrozek and Taylor (2002) use industry or occupation average risk data.  
When studies assign industry average risk levels to workers, they ignore the variation of 
risk within the industry.  In the same way, when studies assign the occupation average 
risk levels to workers, they ignore the variation of risk within the occupation.  For 
example, secretaries and construction workers in the construction industry must face 
different levels of risk.  However, in the hedonic wage model, researchers have had to   
                                                 
61 However, exclusion of industry dummy variables may lead to poor fit of the first stage regression.   
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assign the same risk level for these two types of workers due to data limitations.  This 
creates a significant measurement error problem in hedonic wage models and biases risk 
estimators downward.  In our hedonic model, we assign risk rates that vary by occupation 
and industry.  Thus in our example, secretaries and construction workers in the 
construction industry are assigned different risk levels.  Thus our study might mitigate 
measurement error bias caused from the disparity between actual risk and estimated risk 
level. 
Although our study mitigates the measurement error bias caused from the 
disparity between actual risk and estimated risk level, there is still a potential 
measurement error problem arising from the disparity between actual risk and perceived 
risk.  It is reasonable to assume that the workers do not know their exact actual risk level 
(such as 3.5 in 100,000 chance of death), but have some perceived risk level which may 
be different from the actual risk level.  A major concern is that this measurement error 
may exacerbate attenuation bias in panel models, which were estimated in chapter 4.   To 
attempt to address this issue, two stage panel estimations were employed.   
It was somewhat surprising to find that there was not measurement error bias in 
our panel models.  There are two potential reasons why measurement error was not an 
issue in our hedonic wage model.  The first reason is that the measurement error we were 
concerned with may not satisfy the classical errors in variables (CEV) assumption.  The 
CEV assumption indicates that measurement error biases the estimator only if there is a 
correlation between measurement error and the objective (actual) risk level.  If this is not 
the case, then the measurement error only increases the variance, and would not cause 
any bias in the estimator (Wooldridge, 1999).   
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The other reason is that the labor market may be in a long-run equilibrium and 
firms have correct information about the actual risk level.  As discussed in chapter 2, if 
the market is in a long-run equilibrium, the hedonic wage schedule is solely determined 
by the distribution of firm’ isoprofit functions.  If firms perceive the risk level in the same 
way as researchers do (i.e., perceive objective risks accurately), then a hedonic wage 
function is unbiased even if workers perceive risks differently from the actual risks. 
As compared with Kniesner et al.(2005), even after adjusting the difference of 
model specifications, the VSL estimates from our panel models are lower.  When we 
omit industry and firm side variables, we obtain the VSL of $3.0 (in 2005 dollars), while 
Kniesner et al. (2005) obtain the VSL of $6.7 million,62 both from the first difference 
model.  This is a quite large difference that we should not ignore.   The reason of the 
disparity between our VSL estimates and Kniesner et al.’s (2005) estimates may be the 
difference of our labor market data.  We use the SIPP as our labor market data while 
Kniesner et al. use the PSID as their labor market data.  According to the SIPP User 
Guide, neither the SIPP nor the PSID are designed to gather a representative sample 
within each state.63  This indicates that the distribution of workers characteristics may be 
significantly different between the SIPP and the PSID.  In addition, the PSID data set 
tends to generate high-end VSL estimates.  According to Viscusi and Aldy (2003), the 
VSL estimated using the PSID is between $8-20 million while the VSL estimated using 
the CPS is $0.7-12 million (in 2000 dollars).   
In the future analysis, we should include the CPS as the labor market data to 
examine the robustness of our results.   The CPS is designed to be a representative 
                                                 
62 Kniesner et al. (2005) do not explicitly mention to which year they adjust their dollar values.  Here we 
assume they use 2005 dollar value.   
63 Both SIPP and PSID are designed to over-sample low-income population. 
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sample of households within each state.64  Therefore the panel estimates from the CPS 
would have more relevance to be used in the policy analyses.  Although the CPS does not 
provide enough firm-side variables, we can estimate the possible bias due to the lack of 
firm-side variables from this study.  In addition, the CPS only has two current wage 
observations for each individual, which may limit the sample size.   Therefore, the results 
of this study and the results from future study using the CPS should be combined to 
provide an overall assessment of VSL estimates arising from current risk and labor 
market data. 
Chapter 5 addressed the issue of the transferability of the VSL between different 
policy contexts using cross-section hedonic wage models.  We examined whether or not 
workers and firms differentiate heterogeneous risks to determine the risk-wage 
compensation levels.  We focus on two very different fatal risks in terms of the degree of 
workers’ control over the risk and the degree of dread associated with risk.  We use risks 
related to violent assaults and risks related to non-violent events.  We use occupational 
drivers to mitigate potential unobserved heterogeneity of job characteristics and 
measurement error associated with risk variables.  The labor market data comes from the 
basic CPS, and the occupation-geographic specific risk rates for each cause of death are 
created from the non-public Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. 
When we use the MSA level risk rates for both violent and non-violent fatal risks, 
we find quite robust evidence of worker’s different WTP to reduce a marginal risk for 
different types of risks.  We find that occupational drivers require larger compensation to 
accept a marginal increase of violent risk as compared to non-violent risk.  This is true 
for both fatal and non-fatal risk cases.  When we use different geographic combinations 
                                                 
64 According to the SIPP User Guide. 
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of violent and non-violent risk rates, the results are less robust for the changes in the 
model specifications, but this is largely due to inappropriate model specifications.  The 
injury risk data is only available at the state level, and the estimations of injury-risk wage 
compensation are quite robust to changes in model specifications. 
This study verifies the findings from previous contingent valuation studies 
regarding the WTP to reduce heterogeneous risks.  The contribution of this study is that 
we show that individuals exhibit different WTP to reduce different types of risks by a 
revealed preference method.  The contingent valuation method is a very flexible and 
useful tool in many settings, however this method may suffer from hypothetical bias due 
to the nature of the surveys.  The revealed preference (hedonic wage) method, on the 
other hand, faces certain limitations due to the data availability.  Slovic et al (1980) 
indicates that violent risk is less controllable and more dreadful than traffic accident risk, 
which is the major component fatal risk for occupational drivers.  Our results strongly 
support that occupational drivers and firms differentiate heterogeneous risks depending of 
the qualitative risk characteristics, and generate different hedonic wage functions for each 
type of risk.  
Although both risks we examined in this study are occupational risks, we can 
derive the implication of transferability of the VSL between different policy contexts.  If 
individuals differentiate heterogeneous types of risks in a similar circumstance (such as 
risk at work), it is hard to assume that individuals do not differential heterogeneous risks 
that arise in very different circumstances, such as risk at work and risk from  
environmental damages.  Thus this study suggests that current direct use of VSL obtained 
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from hedonic wage studies in benefit estimation of various governmental programs 
should be reconsidered. 
Our study does not aim to quantify the difference of worker’s WTP for the 
occupational risk and other types of risks.  Instead, we aim to examine whether or not 
individuals differentiate risks with very different risk characteristics in their risk-wage 
compensation decision using the revealed preference method.  In the future analysis, we 
would incorporate more variety of risks such as exposure to harmful substances or 
environment and examine the sensitivity of workers risk preference towards other types 
of risks.   
To provide more direct implications to the environmental policy analysis, we 
would want to quantify the difference of worker’s WTP to reduce environmental-related 
risk and other risks.  Although there is no identical risk as environmental risk available in 
occupational setting, the comparison between worker’s WTP to reduce exposure to 
harmful substances or environment and other risks at work may provide more direct 
implications to assess the validity of current environmental policy analysis.    
In future analyses, it also would be important to examine robustness of our results 
with different groups of workers.  The fact that none of our estimation results show 
significant coefficients for non-violent fatal or injury risk may suggest that there is not 
enough variation in these variables to estimate wage/risk (wage/injury risk) coefficients 
among drivers.  Or, it could be the case that risks with great perceived personal control 
such as auto accident risks, the primary component of occupational driver’s non-violent 
risk, are not compensated in the workplace.   Adding different types of workers may 
enable us to estimate the non-violent risk premium better, since it would add workers 
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who face different traffic-related risk level than occupational drivers, which would 
increase the variation in non-violent risk/injury variable.  In addition, non-occupational 
driving workers may have different perceived personal control over the traffic-related 
risk, and they may require a different compensation over the traffic-related risk as 
compared to occupational drivers.  
To include different types of workers in the model, it is important to control for 
time-invariant worker heterogeneity as found in chapter 4.  In chapter 5, we used workers 
with similar job requirements to control unobserved job as well as worker characteristics.  
However, if we include more variety of workers, we would have same problems related 
to the unobserved worker heterogeneity as in chapter 4.   We can solve this omitted 
variable problem by employing the panel data analysis as in chapter 4.   
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 Appendix A CFOI Research File Elementsa 
 
 
 
 
a Source: BLS, CFOI manual.
Element Description 
REC Record ID 
REF Reference year 
YEA Year of injury 
MON Month of injury 
DAY Day of week 
TII Time of incident 
NAT Nature of injury 
PAR Part of body 
EVE Event or exposure 
SOU Source of injury 
SEC Secondary source of injury 
ACT Worker activity 
LOC Location 
REG Region 
OCC Occupation 
USO Usual lifetime occupation 
IND Industry 
USI Usual lifetime industry 
OWN Ownership 
EST Establishment size class 
EMP Employee status 
TIE Time with employer 
GEN Gender 
AGE Age group 
RAC Race 
HIS Hispanic origin 
FOR Foreign born 
SUR Days survived 
NARR Narrative 
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Appendix B Industry Group Classificationa  
 
Major industry 
group Dummy name SIC Division 
Two-digit SIC 
codes 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing 
and Mining 
AGIND Division A and B (10 and 20) 01-14 
Construction CONSTIND Division C (30) 15-17 
Manufacturing MANUFIND 
Division D (41: 
Durable and 42: 
Non-Durable) 
20-39 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
Electric, Gas, and 
Sanitary Services 
TCUIND 
Division E (51: 
Transportation and 
52: Communication 
& Utilities) 
40-49; except 43 
Wholesale trade and 
Retail trade TRDIND 
Divisions F and G 
(61: Wholesale and 
62: Retail) 
50-59 
Finance, Insurance, 
Real Estate, and 
Services 
SERVIND Divisions H and I (70 and 80) 60-88 
Public 
Administration PUBIND Division J (90) 43, and 91-99 
a Reproduced from Scotton (2000), pp.193. 
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Appendix C Occupation Group Classificationa  
 
Major occupation 
group Dummy name Sub-group CPS Codes 
Managerial 003-037 Managerial and professional 
specialty 
occupations 
PROFOCC 
Professional 043-199 
Technicians and 
related support 
occupations 
203-235 
Sales occupations 243-285 
Technical, sales, 
and administrative 
support occupations 
TECHOCC 
Administrative 
support occupations, 
including clerical 
303-389 
Private household 403-407 
Protective service 413-427 Service occupations SERVOCC All other service 
occupations 433-469 
Precision 
production, craft, 
and repair 
occupations 
CRAFTOCC  503-699 
Machine operators, 
assemblers, an 
inspectors 
703-799 
Transportation and 
material moving 
equipment 
occupations 
803-859 
Operators, 
fabricators, and 
laborers 
LABOROCC 
Handlers, 
equipment cleaners, 
helpers and laborers 
864-889 
Farming, forestry, 
and fishing 
occupations 
FARMOCC  473-499 
Armed forces and 
unidentified (not used)   
a Reproduced from Scotton (2000), pp.199. 
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Appendix D  Occupation Group Mappinga 
 
Occ code 22 Occupation Groups Census Occupation Classification codes 
70120 Executive & Administrative Positions 003-022 
70300 Management Related Occupations 023-037 
70400 Engineers 044-059 
71290 Professional Occupations (except Engineers) 043, 063-066, 069, 73-79, 083-106, 113-
199 
71590 Technicians (includes air craft pilots) 203-235 
71900 Marketing and Sales Occupations 243-285 
72300 Secretaries & Typists 313-315 
72400 Financial Records Keepers 337-344 
72600 Administrative Support Occupations (except Finance & Secretaries) 303-309, 316-336, 345-389 
73100 Cleaning & Building Service and Maintenance 448-455 
73200 Service Workers (except Cleaning & Building Service and 
Maintenance) 
404-447, 456-469, 425-432 
73350 Mechanics (all types) 505-552 
73400 Blue-Collar Worker Supervisors 503, 553-558, 613, 628, 803, 843, 864 
73490 Construction Tradesmen 563-599 
73510 Extractive Occupations 614-617 
73540 Precision Workers 634-699, 796-799 
73630 Machine Operators 703-779, 796-799 
73700 Fabricators & Hand workers 783-795 
73820 Truck Drivers 804 
73900 Motor Vehicle & Material Moving Equip Operators 806, 808, 813-814, 823-859 
74000 General Laborers 865-889 
74390 Farming, Forestry & Fishing Occupations 473-499 
aSource: Scotton (2000) pp.200 with some corrections.  
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Appendix E  Industry Group Mappinga 
 
23 Industry Groups 23 Inds Code Industry (2-digit SIC code) SIC SIPP code 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 9010 Agricultural Production Crops 01 
 9010 Agricultural Production Livestock and Animal Specialties 02 
 9010 Agricultural Services 07 
 9010 Forestry 08 
 9010 Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping 09 
010-032 
Mining, Extraction and Quarrying 9020 Metal Mining 10 
 9020 Coal Mining 12 
 9020 Oil and Gas Extraction 13 
 9020 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 14 
040-050 
Construction 9030 Building Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders 15 
 9030 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 16 
 9030 Construction Special Trade Contractors 17 
060 
Food and Tobacco Products 9420 Food and Kindred Products 20 
 9420 Tobacco Products 21 100-130 
Textile Mill and Apparel Products 9423 Textile Mill Products 22 
 9423 Apparel and Other Finished Products from Fabrics & Similar Materials 23 
132-152 
Lumber/Wood/Stone/Glass Products 9432 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 24 
 9432 Furniture and Fixtures 25 
 9432 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 32 
230-262 
Paper and Printing Products 9427 Paper and Allied Products 26 
 9427 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27 160-172 
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Chemicals/Petro/Plastics/Leather 9431 Chemicals and Allied Products 28 
Goods 9431 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 29 
 9431 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 
 9431 Leather and Leather Products 31 
180-222 
Metals, Machinery, and Misc. 
Manufacturing Industries 9435 Primary Metal Industries 33 
 9435 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery & Transportation Equipment 34 
 
 9435 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment 35 
 9435 Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment, Components, Except Computer Equipment 36 
 9435 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling 
Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks 
38 
 9435 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39 
270-350 
Motor Vehicle and Equipment 
Manufacturing 9437 Transportation Equipment 39 351-370 
Railroad and Water Transportation 9500 Railroad Transportation 40 
 9500 Water Transportation 44 400, 420 
Personal Transportation Services 
(ground) 9541 
Local/Suburban Transit & Interurban Highway 
Passenger 41 
 9541 Transportation Services 47 
401, 402, 
432 
Trucking, Warehousing and Air 
Transportation 9545 Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 42 
 9545 Transportation by Air 45 
410-411, 
421 
Communications, utilities and 
Sanitary Services 9549 Communications 48 
 9549 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 49 
 9549 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 46 
440-442, 
450-472 
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Wholesale Trade 9651 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 50 
 9651 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 51 500-574 
Retail Trade 9652 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply and Mobile Home Dealers 52 
 9652 General Merchandise Stores 53 
 9652 Food Stores 54 
 9652 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 55 
 9652 Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 
 9652 Eating and Drinking Places 58 
 9652 Miscellaneous Retail (Liquor and Drug Stores) 59 
580-694 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 9760 Depository Institutions 60 
 9760 Non-depository Credit Institutions 61 
 9760 Insurance Carriers 63 
 9760 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 64 
 9760 Real Estate 65 
 9760 Holding and Other Investment Offices 67 
700-714 
Personal Services 9872 Personal Services 72 
 9872 Private Households 88 
761, 771-
795 
Business, Auto and Repair Services 9876 Business Services 73 
 9876 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 75 
 9876 Miscellaneous Repair Services 76 
 9876 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services 87 
721-760, 
882-893 
Entertainment Services 9879 Motion Pictures 78 
 9879 Amusement and Recreation Services 79 800-810 
Health Services 9880 Health Services 80 812-840 
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Social, Legal, Educational and Other 
Services 
 
9885 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 70 
 9885 Legal Services 81 
 9885 Educational Services 82 
 9885 Social Services 83 
 9885 Museums, Art Galleries, and Botanical and Zoological Gardens 84 
 9885 Membership Organizations 86 
762-770, 
841-881 
Public Administration & USPS 9990 United States Postal Service 43 
  All Other Public Administration 91-99 
412, 900-
932 
aSource: Scotton (2000) p.194-198 with some modification.  
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Appendix F Definition of Occupational Drivers. 
 
Occupation 
title 
COC code  SOC 1980 
code 
Standard Occupation Classification 1980 
definition 
Occupation code [for 1998 (for 1999-2003)]and 
definition category for Occupational 
Employment Statistics  
8212 Truck drivers, tractor-trailer 
includes semi-tractor and trailer truckers 
 
8213 Truck drivers, heavy, 
single body trucks of at least three tons weight, 
including dump, flat bed, 
redi-mix, tank trucks, and trucks mounted with 
special service equipment as 
tow trucks, etc. 
 
97120 (53-3032): Truck drivers, heavy or 
tractor-trailer. Drive a tractor-trailer combination 
or a truck with a capacity of at least 3 tons, to 
transport and deliver goods, livestock or 
materials in liquid, loose or packaged form.  
May be required to unload truck. 
Truck 
driver 
804 
8214 Truck drivers, light (including delivery and route
drivers) operating automotive trucks less than 3 
tons weight, including 
pick-up, delivery, and van trucks. 
97105 (53-3033) Truck drivers, light include 
delivery and route workers.  Driver a truck, van, 
or automobile with a capacity under 3 tons.  May 
driver light truck to deliver or pick up 
merchandise.  May load and unload truck 
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Appendix F  (continued). 
Sales driver 806 8218 Driver-sales workers, includes occupations 
concerned with driving trucks or other vehicles 
over established routes to 
deliver and sell goods such as bakery and dairy 
products; collect and 
deliver items such as laundry and dry-cleaned 
garments; or collect coins, 
refill vending machines and service vending 
machines 
97117: Driver/ Sales Workers. Driver truck or 
other vehicle over established routes to: deliver 
and sell goods, such as food products; pick up 
and deliver items, such as laundry; or refill and 
collect coins from vending machines. Include 
newspaper delivery drivers. 
97108 (53-3021): Bus drivers.  Drive bus, 
transporting passengers over specified routes to 
local or distant points according to a time 
schedule.  Assist passengers with baggage.  
Collect tickets or cash fares. 
 
Bus driver 808 8215 Bus drivers, includes occupations involving 
transporting passengers by bus including school, 
inter and intra city, and 
private. 
97111: Bus drivers, school: transport students 
between pick-up points and school. Maintain 
order during trip and adhere to safety rules when 
loading and unloading pupils. 
 
Taxi driver 809 8216 Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs, includes 
occupations involving operating automobiles, 
limousines, and hearses to 
transport passengers and merchandise and 
driving new automobiles between 
production and customer delivery. 
97114 (53-3041): Taxi drivers and chauffeurs. 
Driver automobiles, limousines, custom-built 
sedans, or hearses to transport passengers or 
cargo. May drive automobiles for delivery. 
Exclude ambulance drivers and bus drivers. 
a Source: BLS, Occupational Employment Statistics, Dictionary of Occupations Customer Copy 1997-1998  retrieved April 25, 2007  
from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/oes/oesdic_98.pdf. 
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Appendix  G Complete set of results with allowing correlation within a geographic unit 
(Standard error in parentheses) 
 
 MSA-level fatal risks State-level fatal risks 
 Model9: 
w/ MSA 
dummy 
Model10: 
w/ State 
dummy 
Model11: 
w/ MSA 
dummy 
Model 12 
w/ State 
dummy 
violent fatal risk  0.0110*** 0.0115***  0.0150*** 0.0136*** 
non-violent fatal risk 
 0.0010*** 0.0003*** -0.0001*** 0.0084*** 
violent injury risk 29.5636*** 31.0635**  38.1399*** 29.8873*** 
non-violent injury risk 0.7203*** 0.2158***  0.2217*** 0.8323*** 
average wage ($2004) 695.28 695.28  687.31 687.31 
R2 0.32 0.30  0.30 0.29 
N 8,685 8,685  12,509 12,509 
fatal: violent=non-violent 0.1378 0.0131  0.1999 0.4854 
non-fatal: violent=non-violent 0.0041 0.0215  0.0009 0.0275 
VSL (violent fatal risk) $3.9 million $4.1 million  $5.3 million $4.8 million 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
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